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Abstract 
The historical memory of the Indian Wars of the Pacific Northwest was complicated 
by controversy almost immediately upon the commencement of hostilities. The struggle to 
construct and maintain the historical memory of the conflicts of 1855-56 in a way that would 
support the quest for Congressional funding continued throughout most of the nineteenth 
century. This struggle resulted in two vastly different accounts of the war, one account very 
supportive of the war, the other highly critical. The critical, minority, account was excluded 
from the developing historical memory of the conflict in the Pacific Northwest. This 
exclusion led to a fundamental lack of honesty in the mainstream historical memory, which 
shifted the responsibility for the Indian wars away from the settlers. 
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Introduction 
During the 1850s Indian Wars erupted in southern Oregon Territory when gold-
seekers from California moved northward as prospects declined in California. Almost 
simultaneously with the final outbreak of hostilities in southern Oregon, war also broke out 
around Puget Sound and in eastern Washington Territory. Those same years were marked by 
conflict between the territorial officials of Oregon and Washington and an apparent majority 
of the settlers of those two territories on the one hand, and a small number of federal officials 
and a very few settlers on the other. Two key figures in the early stages of the controversy 
were the commander of the US Army's Department of the Pacific, Brevet Major General 
John E. Wool, and the Oregon Territory Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Joel Palmer. 
General Wool was in command of the US Army's Department of the Pacific from February 
1854 until he was recalled at his own request for health reasons in February 1857.1 Joel 
Palmer was Superintendent of Indian Affairs from May 1853 until he was removed in 1856 
by a letter written by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in late June, but which Palmer did 
not receive until early August. During their time in office, both Wool and Palmer received 
reports from their subordinates showing quite clearly that neither was motivated solely by 
maliciousness to take the positions they did, yet that is precisely how General Wool in 
particular has been portrayed by his detractors. 
Washington Territory, created from the northern part of Oregon Territory in 1853, 
was only two years old when war started between the settlers and a number of aboriginal 
1
 Harwood Perry Hinton, 'The Military Career of John Ellis Wool" (Ph D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 
1960), 238, 372. 
2
 Stanley Sheldon Spaid, "Joel Palmer and Indian Affairs in Oregon" (PhD. diss., University of Oregon, 
1950), 88, 215-216. 
2 
groups in three widely separated areas of the Pacific Northwest during autumn of 1855. By 
mid-October of that year there were open hostilities around Puget Sound, in the Yakima 
Valley in the upper Columbia River region, and in the Rogue River Valley of Southern 
Oregon. That the Columbia River was less important as a political boundary then than it is 
today can be readily seen from the way the Territorial Governor of Oregon, George L. Curry, 
raised a regiment of mounted volunteers specifically to operate in Washington Territory. 
General Wool, responsible for all federal troops west of the Rockies, was particularly 
troubled by developments in Oregon and Washington. Ostensibly, Joel Palmer was 
responsible for Indian Affairs only in Oregon Territory, but Indian groups normally resident 
in Oregon who spent part of their time in Washington Territory pursuing subsistence 
activities remained under Palmer's authority while they were in Washington Territory. 
Palmer also served as a Treaty Commissioner during the treaty negotiations conducted by the 
Governor and Indian Affairs Superintendent of Washington Territory, Isaac I. Stevens. 
Furthermore, although Palmer, Wool and a few others disagreed, most settlers and territorial 
officials in Oregon and Washington portrayed the nearly simultaneous outbreak of hostilities 
over such a widespread region as evidence of a conspiracy on the part of most Indians of the 
Pacific Northwest to eradicate the American settlers of the region. Therefore, the histories of 
the conflicts in the two territories are intertwined to such an extent that no useful distinction 
can be drawn using contemporary political boundaries. 
However, an important difference between Oregon and Washington in the way that 
the historical memory developed can be found in the person of Isaac I. Stevens, the first 
Governor of Washington Territory, simultaneously ex officio the first Superintendent of 
Indian affairs for the territory. One historian writing during the 1970s noted that "Stevens is 
one of the most written-about personalities of Pacific Northwest history. He dominates the 
3 
historiographical landscape of the area the way Mount Rainier dominates Puget Sound."3 
This position is somewhat overstated in that Stevens does not dominate the historiography of 
the Rogue River Indian War.4 That historians of that conflict do not have to labor under the 
enormous shadow cast by Stevens undoubtedly helps explain why recent histories of the 
conflicts in southern Oregon dealt in a straightforward manner with the position of Wool and 
Palmer and found it to be well-supported. 
At the core of both Wool and Palmer's critique was their shared belief that the settlers 
of southern Oregon were determined to exterminate the Indians and reap profits from the 
federal treasury for doing so. Wool and Palmer agreed that history would favor the Indians 
in this conflict. Writing to General Wool three weeks after the outbreak of "a war of 
extermination by our citizens against all Indians in southern Oregon," Palmer explained that 
[Relieving, as I do, that the cause of the present difficulty in southern Oregon is 
wholly to be attributed to the acts of our own people, I cannot but feel that it is our 
duty to adapt such measures as will tend to secure the lives of these [friendly] Indians, 
and will maintain guaranties secured them by treaty stipulations. The future will 
prove that this war has been forced upon these Indians against their will, and that, too, 
by a set of reckless vagabonds, for pecuniary and political objects, and sanctioned by 
a numerous population who regard the treasury of the United States a legitimate 
subject of plunder. The Indians in that district have been driven to desperation by 
acts of cruelty against their people; treaties have been violated and acts of barbarity 
committed by those claiming to be citizens that would disgrace the most barbarous 
nations of the earth.6 
3
 Louis Leonard Tucker, "The Governor and the General: The Isaac Stevens - John Ellis Wool Controversy," 
in Kansas and the West: Bicentennial Essays in Honor ofNyle H. Miller, ed. Forrest R. Blackburn and others 
(Topeka: Kansas State Historical Society, 1976), 51. 
4
 Of the three published academic treatments of the Rogue River Indian War, only Stephen Beckham fails to 
mention Stevens. Both E.A. Schwartz and Nathan Douthit briefly discuss Stevens' role in the formation of 
reservations, and both mention him briefly once more to make other points. Stephen D o w Beckham, Requiem 
for a People: The Rogue Indians and the Frontiersmen (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1996 
[Reprint, Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1971]); E.A. Schwartz, The Rogue River Indian War and its 
Aftermath, 1850-1980 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 83-84, 153; Nathan Douthit, Uncertain 
Encounters: Indians and Whites at Peace and War in Southern Oregon 1820s to 1860s (Corvallis: Oregon State 
University Press, 2002), 94, 143. 
5
 See particularly Schwartz, 44-147. 
6
 Joel Palmer to Major General John E. Wool, November 1, 1855, in "Message from the President of the 
United States, Communicating Information relative to Indian hostilities in the Territories of Oregon and 
Washington." US Congress, 34th Congress, 1st Session, House Ex. Doc. No. 93 (1856), 112-113. 
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General Wool best articulated his critique of the war and his faith in history in a letter 
to the editors of the National Intelligencer written May 30, 1856, after the controversy had 
become very heated. Wool argued that 
[t]hese inhuman and atrocious outrages, besides many of less notoriety, several of 
which were spread before the public as great volunteer victories, and which forever 
will disgrace the annals of our country, were the cause of laying waste the settlements 
and the murdering of many innocent and worthy citizens in Rogue River Valley. I do 
not doubt, if the massacres previously mentioned had not occurred and the volunteers 
had never entered the field, the war would have been closed long since in southern 
Oregon. But this would not have suited the political aspirants nor money speculators. 
With them it was a war, and a long war, under the pretence of enriching the country, 
no matter how many citizens might be sacrificed. The more the massacre by whites 
and Indians the greater surety that the war debt would be paid by Congress. With 
them every murder or atrocity, whether committed by white or red men, appears to be 
a source of rejoicing instead of regret, because of the tendency to prolong the war and 
raise the price of the Curry and Stevens' scrip. For example, as reported, one of the 
most active and prominent exterminators said, in reference to the massacre of the 
whites at the Cascades, "the people have suffered, but it will raise the price of scrip a 
million of dollars." .... Such are the men who advocate the war and proclaim it a 
"God-send to the people." 
But Palmer and Wool were wrong about the way the wars would be remembered, at 
least initially. It took historians many years to reveal how the pursuit of profit motivated the 
wars and that the war was forced upon at least some Indians; indeed, the annals of the 
country have never been disgraced by the actions of the volunteer Indian fighters enlisted by 
the territorial governors. This is because promulgators of a competing version of events 
succeeded in supplanting Palmer and Wool's interpretation. While the fighting was still 
going on, Oregon Delegate Joseph Lane articulated the competing account in Congress in an 
effort to convince Congress to pay the war debts. Lane described the settlers as "an honest, 
7 
John E. Wool, "The Indian War in Oregon, &c." National Intelligencer, July 1,1856, in Elwood Evans, 
(compiler), "Campaign of Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, U. S. Army against the People and Authorities of Oregon 
and Washington, 1855-6." [Microfilm of collected newspaper clippings and pages of government publications, 
with handwritten annotations and commentary by Evans. Original in Beinecke Library, Yale University]. 
(New Haven, CN: Research Publications, 1975). [Western Americana: Frontier History of the Trans-Mississippi 
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industrious people" and dismissed the claim "that they could be capable of making a war 
against the Indians for the sake of plunder" as "a slander upon chivalrous, high-spirited and 
gallant men who have periled their lives and bared their bosoms to the weapons of a skulking 
and treacherous foe in protecting the defenseless women and children who have been forced 
to fly from their beautiful dwellings, which have, in many instances, been fired by the torch 
Q 
of the savage before they were out of sight of their once peaceful homes." 
The struggle to construct and maintain the historical memory of the conflicts of 1855-
56 in support of the quest for Congressional funding continued throughout most of the 
nineteenth century. In the preface to History of the Pacific Northwest (1889), Elwood Evans 
unblushingly supported the monetary claims of Indian War Veterans and made plain that his 
state-building history conflicted dramatically with Wool and Palmer's version of events. 
Evans wrote that history would 
establish that the people who settled in Oregon, and who Americanized it, were 
patriotic, patient and eminently considerate and kind to the aborigines; and that the 
conflicts between the natives and the settlers were not occasioned by any provocation 
given by the latter, beyond the isolated fact that their presence was an offense in the 
eye of the Indian, who, quick to observe, took advantage of the neglect of the 
government to protect the settler, and attempted to exterminate the American race in 
that region. 
History was required to supply the picture of the surroundings of the Oregon 
pioneer. And now, after a full generation, in which these country-savers, these state-
builders, have been under a cloud, denounced as barbarians and robbers of the 
national treasury, their single offense being that, in the hour of desolation and doubt, 
they prevented the American settlements of Oregon from being wiped out forever, the 
great fact still remains that the government, which ignored their presence in the 
territory, which profited by their services in the field, still repudiates the full payment 
of the debt so justly their due. These men, these veterans, now deem it to be a simple 
act of justice, to themselves and to their children, to publish a history which may 
serve also to illustrate the value and importance of the region they fought to save to 
the country, humanity and the American occupants.9 
Joseph Lane, Speech on the floor of the House of Representatives, May 7, 1856. Congressional Globe, 34' 
Congress, First Session, 1144. 
9
 Elwood Evans, History of the Pacific Northwest, Volume One (Portland: North Pacific History Company, 
1889), v. 
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During the quest to secure federal funding from Congress for war-related claims, 
which continued well into the 1890s, the image of General Wool as a settler hater with a 
particular dislike of volunteer Indian fighters solidified into a formidable consensus. 
Decades passed before Palmer and Wool's position on the validity of the justification of the 
wars began to receive serious consideration from historians. And it was not until the 1990s 
that a detailed academic study demonstrated that Wool and Palmer had accurately 
characterized the conflicts of 1855-56 as being motivated by economic gain.10 Still, no 
similar work has been published for Washington. 
General Wool's attitude toward civilians, at least those who settled in Indian Country, 
may have been negative, but his outlook was legitimately rooted in the reports that he 
received from his subordinate officers and a few civilians. Further, it appears that territorial 
officials deliberately kept Wool in the dark. In his letter to Governor Stevens of February 12, 
1856, Wool stated that, 
your communication is the first that I have received in relation to yourself, or on any 
subject whatever, touching the Indian war, from any civil functionary, either in 
Washington or Oregon territories; and I have received but one from the [volunteer] 
military, and that was from Col. Nesmith [of the Oregon Mounted Volunteers], who 
requested me to furnish him with two howitzers, which I refused.11 
The situation was comparable in Oregon, and Wool suggested the lack of information from 
territorial officials was deliberate. In his first letter to the National Intelligencer he explained 
that 
[m]y information is derived from citizens and regular officers under my command, 
and not from any of the civil or military functionaries of the Territory of Oregon. I 
Schwartz, passim; See also: Earl Albert Schwartz, "Blood Money: The Rogue River Indian War and its 
Aftermath, 1850-1986" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri - Columbia, 1991. Ann Arbor: UMI 
Dissertation Services, 1997). 
11
 Major General John E. Wool to Isaac I. Stevens, February 12, 1856, in US Congress, 34th Congress, 1st 
Session, House Exec. Doc. No. 93 (1856), 47. 
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have never been informed by anyone, not even by the Governor, of the military wants 
of the Territory. He has never called on me to defend it or to protect the inhabitants 
from savage barbarity, although he has, as it would appear, purposely avoided all 
communications with me on the subject.12 
Framed against this backdrop, this study examines the creation and maintenance of 
this fundamentally flawed and dishonest memory of the mid-nineteenth century Indian Wars 
of the Pacific Northwest. Chapter One centers on the conflict between General Wool and 
Isaac Ingalls Stevens, who simultaneously held three federal patronage positions. He was the 
first Governor of Washington Territory, the first Superintendent of Indian Affairs for 
Washington Territory, and led the Northern Route survey of the proposed trans-continental 
railroad. The obvious conflicts of interest in which his various duties placed him failed to 
attract any concerns at the time. 
The second chapter argues that a distorted image of Wool was deliberately crafted 
and used in Oregon to obscure the origins of and motivations for the war in Southern Oregon. 
The aspersions cast upon Wool's personality served to keep the discussion centered on 
personality, not substance. The quest for funding from Congress for war claims continued 
into the 1890s, during which time the negative image of General Wool solidified. Also, the 
memory of the events of the 1850s was firmly rooted in first and second-hand accounts of 
those who profited from the wars, with assistance from those who idealized the settlement of 
the Pacific Northwest and justified the conquest with rhetoric of racial superiority. 
Additionally, it will be demonstrated that there were those who deliberately manipulated the 
historical record for personal financial gain. 
12
 Major General John E. Wool, "To the Editors of the National Intelligencer," reprinted in Congressional 
Globe, 34th Congress, First Session (May 7,1856), 1135. 
8 
The final chapter looks at the extent of societal responsibility for the start of the war 
in southern Oregon. The attitudes of Euro-Americans towards the Indians of the region are 
examined in some detail, as are some of the various techniques used by writers to shift 
responsibility for the Indian wars away from the settlers. These techniques result in two 
vastly different accounts of the war, one account very supportive of the war, the other highly 
critical. The critical account was excluded from the developing historical memory of the 
conflict in Southern Oregon, sometimes by threat of violence. This exclusion led to a 
fundamental lack of honesty in the mainstream historical memory, which had the effect of 
shifting responsibility for the Indian wars away from the settlers. The voice of a dissenting 
settler, the only resident of the Rogue River Valley with the courage to speak up in spite of 
much opposition from his neighbors to toe the community line, greatly complicated this shift 
of responsibility. In short, then, the third chapter continues the effort to demonstrate the 
fundamental dishonesty and highly flawed nature of the social and historical memory of the 
Indian wars of the Pacific Northwest. 
This study is not intended to be an aboriginal history. There are no Aboriginal voices 
here, but their absence should not be interpreted as implying anything about the validity of 
Aboriginal narratives of the conquest of the Pacific Northwest. The reason aboriginal voices 
have not been included in this study is that this is a history of memory construction, a cultural 
history of the way the settlers of the Pacific Northwest remembered the Indian wars of the 
1850s. Neither is this study intended to be a straightforward historiography. It is not an 
attempt to fit the historical writing of the Pacific Northwest into the broader scope of the 
historiography of the Western US. The historiography of the Pacific Northwest is discussed 
as an aspect of memory construction. 
9 
One of the central arguments of this study is that there were a significant number of 
settlers who advocated the extermination of the Indians of the region. Other things that this 
study will not attempt to do are rank in importance the various motivations that may have 
factored into the desire to see the Indians exterminated or try to quantify just how many 
settlers supported the extermination of the Indians of the region. In the light of the 
controversy over the war and the long-term effort to collect as much money as possible from 
Congress, it would seem that published sources, the main focus of this study, are inadequate 
for determining whether the extermination of the Indians of the region was the primary goal 
of advocates of this policy, or whether extermination was more accurately seen as a means to 
other ends, such as financial gain, control of land, or security from aboriginal retaliation for 
perceived injustices. It would seem more likely that a re-examination of the vast store of 
unpublished sources on the history of the settlement of the Pacific Northwest would be a far 
more fruitful place to look for evidence that might help us understand why some settlers 
advocated the extermination of the Indians of the Pacific Northwest and some did not. 
Chapter One 
"Governor Stevens' War" 
10 
The public controversy with General Wool, based upon his letters to various 
newspapers as well as his official reports, played a key role in shaping the way that the wars 
were remembered in the Pacific Northwest. This chapter examines the controversy between 
General Wool and Governor Isaac I. Stevens of Washington Territory. This very public 
dispute between two prominent federal officials was accompanied by vigorous ad hominem 
attacks upon General Wool by editorial writers on both sides of the Columbia River, who 
emphatically argued that Wool had gone senile in the field. Eventually, politicians from both 
territories petitioned Congress and the executive branch for Wool's prompt removal. This 
dispute also attracted the attention of later writers. A proper understanding of this dispute 
requires an understanding not only of what General Wool claimed and did that caused Isaac 
Stevens' attack, but also an understanding of the positions adopted by Stevens' supporters 
and the small but vocal group of Stevens' critics. The evidence shows that the prevailing 
image of General Wool was a misrepresentation, which also distorted the historical memories 
of the Indian Wars, and of Isaac Stevens. 
Brevet Major General John Ellis Wool commanded the US Army's Department of the 
Pacific from February 1854 to February 1857. Born in 1784, Wool was nearly seventy years 
old when assigned to the Department of the Pacific. Wool's military career began with the 
War of 1812 and ended after his command of federal troops in New York during the anti-
draft riots of 1863, after which he was ordered into retirement at age seventy-nine. Serving 
as Zachary Taylor's second in command during the war in Mexico, Wool was praised by 
11 
many, including Taylor, for his role in the Battle of Buena Vista.1 Thanks to the public 
acclaim and favorable publicity after the Mexican War, Wool was mentioned as a potential 
Democratic presidential candidate before the elections of 1852 and 1856.2 However, not all 
the public attention Wool received was positive. 
During the Indian Wars of the Pacific Northwest in 1855 and 1856, Wool earned the 
ire of newspaper editors, legislators, and territorial officials in both Oregon and Washington. 
After journeying north from his California headquarters in December of 1855, Wool became 
the target of several highly critical newspaper editorials in Oregon and Washington 
newspapers for refusing to pay inflated local prices for supplies. The situation worsened 
when, during an unusually cold period, the lower Columbia River froze before the supplies 
ordered from California arrived. The ice kept the federal troops at Fort Vancouver while the 
volunteers were in the field. As Wool stated in a letter written to army headquarters on 
December 25, 1855, 
Since my communication to the headquarters of the army, dated the 13th instant, 
winter has fairly set in, the ground is covered with snow, and the Columbia river is 
frozen over as low down as the mouth of the Willamette, six miles below this place. 
This cuts off all communication with the Dalles, until the river is cleared of ice.... 
I mentioned in my communication of the 13th [of December, 1855] that I was 
actively engaged in preparing an expedition for the Indian country. I soon found it 
would be impracticable to execute my intentions as soon as I desired. I could obtain 
in this country neither the means of transportation nor forage without paying 
enormously for them, and which the state of war in this region does not call for. This 
state of things has been caused by the extraordinary course pursued by Governor 
Curry, who is making war against the Indians on his own account, and without the 
slightest reference to myself, not having received any communication whatever from 
him on the subject. 
1
 Hinton, 206-217. 
2
 "Political Portraits with Pen and Pencil. Major General John E. Wool, United States Army," The United 
States Democratic Review 29, no. 161 (November 1851), passim; Nancy J. Emmick, "The Washington Territory 
Indian Wars: Stevens versus Wool" (MA thesis, San Jose State University, 1978), 115-116. 
3
 Major General John E. Wool to Lieutenant Colonel L. Thomas, Assistant Adjutant General, U.S. Army, 
December 25,1855, in "Message from the President of the United States, Communicating Information relative 
to Indian hostilities in the Territories of Oregon and Washington." US Congress, 34th Congress, 1st Session, 
House Ex. Doc. No. 93 (1856), 25. 
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The dispatch of volunteers into Washington Territory by the Governor of Oregon Territory 
was particularly irksome. Writing to headquarters in New York, Wool referred to "the 
Crusade of Governor Curry, of Oregon, against all the Indians inhabiting Washington 
Territory," arguing that "[b]y sending his volunteers against the Walla Wallas, who had not 
made open war against the whites, he [Curry] has added several tribes to the ranks of the 
enemies." 
Although Wool would be blamed, the delay was actually the result of Governor 
Curry's dispatch of four companies of mounted volunteers into Washington Territory, and 
the subsequent effect on local prices. As Wool described the situation, 
The quantity of the supplies required for the volunteers, and the enormous prices paid 
in scrip, by those authorized by the governor to make purchases for them, has 
rendered it necessary for me to resort to Benicia [California] for horses and mules, 
and for forage to San Francisco. In this section of the country no danger existed 
which required either the services of the volunteers or the extravagant prices which 
have been paid in scrip for the horses and forage, as well as everything else required 
for the volunteers.... 
It is reported that Governor Curry purchased a thousand horses, varying from $150 to 
$700 each; that he ordered to be purchased 250,000 bushels of oats at one dollar per 
bushel; and the transportation to the Dalles would be another dollar per bushel. 
Everything purchased, as I am informed, is in the same ratio, and, as the volunteers 
themselves say, there is no system in furnishing rations, and every man helps 
himself.5 
Support for General Wool's concerns about profiteering can be found in at least one frank 
memoir of volunteer activities during the Yakima and Clickitat Indian Wars. 
According to Urban East Hicks, an officer of Washington volunteers, the profiteering 
started immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities in Washington Territory. Hicks wrote 
that 
4
 Wool to Thomas, January 19, 1856, in US Congress, 34th Congress, 1st Session, House Ex. Doc. No. 93 
(1856), 32-33. 
5
 Wool to Thomas, December 25, 1855, in US Congress, 34th Congress, 1st Session, House Ex. Doc. No. 93 
(1856), 25-28. 
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I purchased a little Kentucky rifle, the best I could get, paying $40 for it, which did 
not originally cost much above $6.00, and afterwards bought a second-hand Colt's 
revolver for $24.00, which could now [in 1886] be had at any shop for $3. Powder 
immediately advanced to $2 and $3 a pound, and lead from 75 c. to $1 a pound; 
provisions and supplies of all kinds almost thribbled in price.6 
Further, Hicks description of discipline among Washington volunteers strongly supports 
Wool's opinion of volunteers. Hicks wrote that volunteers "had to be kept constantly in 
motion, however, to keep down insubordination and rows amongst themselves, and if we 
camped at night anywhere within twelve or fifteen miles of a barrel of whiskey or box of 
tobacco, more than half of it would be in camp the next morning."7 It seems that this lack of 
discipline worked its way down the command structure. Hicks explained that upon 
"[l]earning that some of my company had been wounded, and that the Captain had jumped 
into a hollow stump and was still there, I procured assistance, and by running directly in front 
of the enemy's fire, we succeeded in getting the wounded into camp.... At camp great 
confusion prevailed; no one seemed to be in command, but everyone ready to fight on his 
own hook." 
But Wool's argument was not widely accepted among the public of the Pacific 
Northwest, and attacks upon him in newspapers of the region began shortly after he decided 
it was not feasible to mount a winter campaign into Yakima Country. Editor Thomas J. 
Dryer of the Oregonian boasted that he was the first to attack Wool in the press. On 
February 2, 1856, Dryer took exception to a San Francisco Daily Evening News report of 
January 19, which referred to "some of the editors" in Oregon "blaming Gen. Wool and the 
regulars for not sharing in the exposure of a winter campaign with part of Governor Curry's 
Urban E. Hicks, Yakima and Clickitat Indian Wars, 1855 and 1856. Personal Recollections ofCapt. U.E. 
Hicks (Portland: [George] Himes the Printer, n.d. [1886]), 6. 
7
 Ibid, 7. 
8
 Ibid, 10-11. 
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volunteers." Dryer responded that, "[t]he one truth in the above extract is that one paper, 
viz.: the Oregonion [sic], did 'blame' Gen. Wool for not sharing the exposure of a winter 
campaign. No other 'papers' in Oregon have dared to express an opinion as to Gen. Wool or 
anybody else." It seems that Wool's relationship with the people of the Pacific Northwest 
was decided as soon as the Columbia River froze. An editorial published in the Oregonian 
before Wool began to be scapegoated in that publication demonstrated how dissent would be 
characterized. Editor Dryer declared that 
[t]he Indians have declared a war of extermination. They have notified us that there 
shall be no peace, as long as they have a warrior left, or that there is a white man 
occupying the country. - Therefore we have no other recourse left, but to go into the 
contest, and fight until we are conquered, or the Indians are exterminated. - Under 
these circumstances, we hold all men, whether saint or sinner, Jew or gentile, a traitor 
to his country and an enemy to his race, to talk peace, or who will for any purpose 
whatever, oppose the progress of the present war.1 
Lest such rhetoric be taken as empty, it should be made clear that Dryer was a force 
to be reckoned with in Oregon Territory. In his History of Oregon Newspapers, University 
of Oregon journalism professor George Turnbull described the Whig Oregonian and its main 
competitor the Democratic Statesman of Oregon City as "highly political." Specifically, 
"these political papers, appearing often with a minimum of other matter and scarcely any 
local news in the early years, were the most successful and influential papers."1' Dryer's 
association with the Oregonian ended many years before it published his obituary in 1879, so 
perhaps the statement in the Oregonian's editorial column describing Dryer's influence can 
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be taken at something close to face value. The author of Dryer's obituary claimed that 
"[d]uring the years of his active participation in affairs, no man in Oregon commanded a 
larger share of public attention." 
In addition to the topic of the Indian Wars, the pages of the Oregonian in early 1856 
contained Dryer's rhetoric on Oregon Statehood. Reflecting on Dryer's position on this 
issue, Turnbull wrote that 
[e]ven the issue of statehood appears to have been settled largely on the ground of 
partisan political expediency. The Oregonian first opposed the measure, fearing that 
the Democrats would control the government of the new commonwealth; then later, 
as the anti-slavery strength grew, the paper became more fearful of the Buchanan 
administration than of any possible Democratic majorities in Oregon itself.13 
Perhaps Turnbull was referring to editorials published during the campaign for the other, 
earlier or later statehood referendums, but Dryer's 1856 editorials on the third referendum 
contain no references to slavery. Instead, the issue of war debts is front and center. Dryer 
suggested, "Let the people vote now for State government, and the war scrip issued to pay 
the expenses of the Indian war will be worth just about as much as 'continental money' was 
at the close of the revolutionary war."14 
Indeed, before the statehood referendum or the Wool/Stevens controversy, Dryer was 
offering suggestions to readers about what he believed needed to be done to see that the war 
debts were paid as quickly as possible. This concern is evident in an editorial written less 
than a month after the outbreak of war in the region, 
If this war is conducted properly, there can be no reasonable doubt but that the 
government will promptly step forward, assume its responsibility, and pay its 
expenses. If, on the contrary, schisms and contentions, or party and personal strife, 
should creep in to the extent to convince the general government that it is a mere 
speculation of dollars and cents, on the part of those who stand aloof from an active 
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and personal participation in it, then it may be a question of doubt whether the general 
government will sanction it.15 
The payment of war debts was often mentioned on the Oregonian 's editorial page before 
Dryer's attacks on Wool began, beginning less than a month after the outbreak of war in 
southern Oregon. 
Not surprisingly, soon after Dryer began attacking Wool, others did too. In response 
to Wool's public statements the Oregon Legislature sent a unanimous memorial to President 
Pierce in January 1856 asking for Wool's removal from his command. This explicit plea for 
Presidential intervention stated 
that early in October last the people of Oregon and Washington territories were 
startled by a general outbreak among nearly all the Indian tribes in the western and 
middle sections of these territories. These hostilities, unprovoked on the part of the 
whites, were characterized by the usual mode of Indian warfare - an indiscriminate 
slaughter of all our citizens who fell into their hands without regard to age, sex or 
condition, and by the pillaging and burning of dwellings and the destruction of 
property. 
Instead of offering aid and encouragement to our people he [Wool] has shown a 
disgraceful activity in his endeavors to persuade our merchants and those of 
California not to furnish ammunition and supplies for our volunteers in this trying 
time of their need. Instead of attending to the duties of his high office he has become 
an intermeddler between the people of Oregon and the government of the United 
States, and publicly declared that his influence will be exerted to prevent the payment 
by the United States, of the just claims, incurred in the prosecution of the War. 
Therefore inasmuch as your memorialists as well as the people of Oregon have 
lost all confidence in the willingness of General Wool to assist and defend them in 
their present Indian difficulties they most respectfully ask that he may be recalled 
from the command of the military department of the Pacific.16 
The wording of this memorial suggests that the legislators of Oregon were at least as 
concerned with Wool's negative impact on business and his ability to interfere with the 
payment of claims as they were with the danger to citizens. 
T.J. Dryer, "The Indian War," The Oregonian (November 3, 1855), 2. 
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The Washington Territory legislature eventually followed suit with their own 
memorial asking for Wool's removal. But this took until April of 1857, over two months after 
Wool's reassignment, because the legislators sitting during the hostilities were unable to 
come to the desired unanimity. It took an election and the cessation of hostilities before the 
Washington legislature reached a unanimous condemnation of Wool.17 This delay suggests 
that the possibility of being short-changed in any pending reimbursement from Congress 
quieted legislative disagreement in Washington Territory. The version of events expressed in 
Dryer's editorials and these two legislative resolutions became central to the historical 
memory of the Indian Wars of Oregon Territory. 
Isaac Stevens and General Wool disliked each other before the Indian Wars started. 
Wool and Stevens were both in San Francisco in the fall of 1854 when Stevens took 
exception to comments made by Wool about the war in Mexico. Both men were veterans of 
that war. Stevens believed that their 1854 confrontation motivated Wool's later position on 
the Indian Wars in the Pacific Northwest. Wool allegedly spoiled an evening of gentlemanly 
talk amongst "a number of officers and other gentleman" at a San Francisco hotel where the 
Stevens family was staying on their way from Washington, DC. According to Stevens' son 
Hazard, 
[fjhe talk turned to the battle of Buena Vista, and General Wool loudly claimed for 
himself all the credit for that battle, disparaging in an offensive manner General 
Taylor and the part he took in it. At length Governor Stevens, whose strong sense of 
justice was outraged by the boastful and unfair tirade, spoke up and said: "General 
Wool, we all know the brilliant part you bore in the battle, but we all know and 
history will record that General Taylor fought and won the Battle of Buena Vista." 
Wool, although visibly offended, made no reply to this rebuke, but it rankled and 
US Congress, "Resolutions of the Legislature of the Territory of Washington relative to the Reports Made 
by General Wool concerning the Late Indian War in that Territory." 35th Congress, 1st Session, House Misc. 
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caused a bitter animosity, which subsequently found vent in hostile speech and 
action.18 
From Hazard's description of the incident, it can be seen that the Stevens believed that 
Wool's actions and words dealing with Indian hostilities in Washington Territory were 
motivated by personal pique directed at Isaac. 
However, Hazard Stevens did not include some important background information. 
This is not surprising since Hazard Stevens was not his father's impartial biographer. Hazard 
stated he wrote the biography of his father, 
not only injustice to General Stevens's memory, but also as an act of duty to the 
young men of the country, that the example of his noble and patriotic career might not 
be lost to posterity. An only son, closely associated from boyhood with him, his chief 
of staff in the Civil War, and always the recipient of his counsel and confidence, the 
opportunities thus given to me to know his sentiments and characteristics, and to 
witness so many of his actions, plainly augment the duty of making his record more 
widely known. In these pages, setting aside, as far as possible, the bias of filial 
respect and affection, I seek to simply narrate the actual facts of his life.19 
Further, in spite of Hazard Stevens claims of impartiality, it is difficult to see this weighty 
two-volume set, which Hazard began to write in 1877 and finally published in 1900, as 
anything other than a collection of the reminiscences of an adoring son who idealized his 
father. The image presented in these volumes obviously conforms to how Isaac Stevens 
would have wished to be remembered. A more hagiographical presentation is difficult to 
imagine. 
The background information that Hazard left out, and may not have been aware of, 
was that Mexican War must have been very frustrating for Isaac Stevens. Plagued by an old 
hernia that returned after an eighteen-year respite, he watched many of his fellow officers be 
in the right place at the right time to perform deeds that resulted in acclaim. Stevens 
Hazard Stevens, The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1900), Vol. 1, 437. 
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persistently missed that fortune and was seriously wounded in the foot on the last day of the 
fighting. The wound became badly infected, amputation was barely avoided, and the foot 
became one of a number of physical problems that plagued Stevens for the rest of his life.20 
General Wool's luck was better than Stevens'. A November 1851 article about 
General Wool in The United States Democratic Review includes a letter of glowing praises. 
Written by Joseph Lane, who served as a Brigadier General of Volunteers under Wool in 
Mexico and had recently been Territorial Governor of Oregon, 1849-50, the letter assured 
Wool that 
[y]our exertions as second in command, at the great and glorious battle of Buena 
Vista, moving to and fro in every part of the field, watching the movements of the 
enemy, exposed to danger almost every moment of the day, ordering and disposing of 
our forces in the best manner, to meet and repulse the enemy - by your exertions, 
coolness, and courage in gaining this victory, you have won laurels and a fame that 
91 
will endure as long as the traces of American history shall exist. 
The same Democratic Review article also contained excerpts from General Taylor's reports 
of the battle of Buena Vista. Taylor's first report acknowledged "my great obligations to 
Brigadier General Wool" noting that he was "particularly indebted for his services on this 
occasion." His second report stated that, "To Brigadier General Wool my obligations are 
99 
especially due." Of course, Taylor did not give Wool "all the credit" for the battle, but the 
thanks expressed ring sincere. 
Wool later passed up an excellent chance to vent any bad feelings he may have 
harbored toward Taylor. In 1860 Wool wrote two memoranda to an author who had sent him 
galley proofs from a chapter of Battles of the United States. Wool's account of the Battle of 
Buena Vista written thirteen years after the battle certainly presented himself in a positive 
20
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light, but it said nothing negative about Taylor.23 However, another secondary account does 
criticize Taylor's conduct at Buena Vista. In his History of the United States Army, which 
had two editions and a reprint between 1924 and 1964, Colonel William Addleman Ganoe 
critiqued Taylor's return to the battlefield at Buena Vista by stating that 'Taylor then 
appeared on the scene. Though his brave attitude gave confidence, he uttered few directions, 
which were poor. The initiatives of his trained subordinates came into play in spite of the 
absence of orders."24 Given this evidence, it appears that Isaac Stevens, perhaps somewhat 
intoxicated, may have overreacted to Wool's comments. Indeed, as events developed, 
Stevens' associates made a number of comments about Stevens' supposed drinking problem. 
At the same time, Stevens' reaction may have been rooted in insecurity. John Wool 
was a very small man, but it seems that he was probably taller than Isaac Stevens. According 
to Stevens' other, more impartial biographer, Kent D. Richards, Isaac Stevens had a "large 
head and short, stumpy legs [that] indicated a malfunction of the pituitary gland which 
allowed the cartilage to calcify and create a mild form of dwarfism." An earlier writer 
noted that Stevens never permitted a full length picture to be taken of himself with men of 
Oft 
normal height. Such evidence suggests that perhaps Stevens may simply have been jealous 
of the attention received by another extremely short man, one without his own various 
physical problems. 
Other descriptions of the 1854 encounter between Isaac Stevens and John Wool 
further muddy the waters and call into question the accuracy of their authors. Drawing upon 
an 1868 letter to an Olympia newspaper, Hubert Bancroft's History of Washington, Idaho 
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and Montana dates the encounter between Wool and Isaac Stevens as 1854, the same year 
given by Hazard Stevens.27 However, J.G. Swan, the author of the letter in The Olympia 
Transcript, who claims to have heard about the incident personally from Isaac Stevens, stated 
that the encounter occurred just before Wool came to the Columbia River. The well known 
fact that Stevens was then off in what is now Montana negotiating a treaty with the Blackfeet 
brings Swan's reliability into serious question. If this acrimonious encounter between Wool 
and Stevens happened, it can only have been in the autumn of 1854, because only then were 
they both in San Francisco with Stevens' family also present. Bancroft, or an associate, 
obviously realized this and corrected Swan's error, hence the discrepancy of dates. 
However, there is another, potentially more serious discrepancy to be found between 
Swan's account and that of Hazard Stevens. Hazard Stevens, who was in San Francisco with 
the rest of the family, wrote that the incident occurred at the Oriental Hotel.29 Swan, 
however, stated that the encounter occurred at the Rassette House (spelled "Rasette" in the 
Bancroft volume). To further the confusion, the prominent Washington historian Edmond 
S. Meany attached his own date to this incident. Meany was Chairman of the Department of 
History at the University of Washington from 1897 until his death in 1935 and also editor of 
the Washington Historical Quarterly from 1906 to 1935, the same year the journal was 
renamed the Pacific Northwest Quarterly?1 In a 1909 textbook, Meany said the San 
Francisco encounter occurred in April 1854. Isaac Stevens was in San Francisco in April 
Hubert Howe Bancroft [Frances Fuller Victor], The Works, Vol. XXXI, History of Washington, Idaho, and 
Montana 1845-1889 (San Francisco: The History Company, 1890), n. 14, 117. 
28
 J.G. Swan, "Gen. Wool and Gov. Stevens," The Olympia Transcript (May 9,1868) 2. 
29
 Hazard Stevens, Vol. 1, 437. 
30
 Swan, 2; Bancroft, Vol. XXXI, n.14, 117. 
31
 George A. Frykman, "Development of the Washington Historical Quarterly, 1906-1935." Pacific 
Northwest Historical Quarterly 70 (3) (1979), 121. 
32
 Edmond S. Meany, History of the State of Washington (New York: Macmillan, 1909), 187. 
22 
1854, and General Wool likely was too, but Stevens' family was not, since they stayed in the 
East during Stevens' first trip to Washington Territory.33 
These numerous errors cause concern, especially in Meany's case because he strongly 
sided with Stevens. In describing the "peppery correspondence [that] passed between the 
governor and the general," Meany stated that "[t]he direct, forceful letters of Governor 
Stevens, the weak, evasive, and transparent letters of General Wool make a most pitiful 
spectacle of a man holding high military command." Of Stevens' character, Meany said 
that "he was governed by a singleness of unselfish purpose and that he possessed an unsullied 
character, the brightest adornment of which was a lofty and steadfast patriotism."35 
Unfortunately, in Young Man in a Hurry, Kent Richards did not resolve the confusion. He 
offered few details of the Stevens' stay in San Francisco in the fall of 1854 and made no 
mention of any such encounter between Isaac Stevens and General Wool.36 
The published correspondence between Wool and Stevens about the hostilities in 
Washington suggests that communication between them started off civilly but soon became 
hostile and public. On December 28, 1855 Stevens wrote a long letter to Wool from the 
Walla Walla Valley laying out information on the region and presenting a detailed plan for 
action against the Indians of that region. However, before Wool received the letter, Stevens 
wrote another to the General on January 29, 1856 from Olympia declaring his intention to 
make an official complaint against Wool for disbanding volunteer units raised to come to 
Stevens' aid in Blackfeet country, aid which Stevens readily admitted he did not need 
33
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because of ample support from one hundred fifty well-armed Nez Perce allies. Wool 
responded from California on February 12, 1856. Wool rather critically noted that 
[i]n presenting, however, your plan of campaign, which is a very extended one, you 
should have recollected that I have neither the resources of a territory, nor the treasury 
of the United States, at my command. Still you may be assured that the war against 
the Indians will be prosecuted with all the vigor, promptness and efficiency I am 
master of, at the same time without wasting unnecessarily, the means and resources 
at my disposal, by untimely and unproductive expeditions. 
After describing reports of atrocities committed by volunteers in Oregon and Washington, 
Wool denied receiving any communications about Indian hostilities from the civil authorities 
of either territory previous to Stevens' letters. Wool stated the only communication he had 
received before Stevens' letter from a territorial official was a request by Colonel Nesmith of 
the Oregon Mounted Volunteers for two howitzers, which Wool refused. Wool closed by 
emphatically denying he had disbanded any volunteer units or that he even knew that any 
were raised for the purpose of providing an escort to Stevens.40 Stevens responded with a 
long, rambling letter that alternated between hoping Wool now knew he had been misled and 
accusing the General of incompetence.41 Wool had the letter returned without a response.42 
This controversy quickly became public. Newspaper editors received copies of 
official correspondence and printed it, usually with comments attacking Wool. Upon reading 
Wool's letter to Stevens of February 12 in an unnamed newspaper, Governor Curry of 
Oregon decided to join those demanding Wool's removal by writing a letter to Secretary of 
War Davis, which was then printed in local papers. Curry felt that Wool had maligned both 
himself and the people of Oregon. Curry wrote that "my official conduct and the patriotic 
38
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and self-sacrificing efforts of my fellow-citizens, are alluded to with such perversion of facts 
as to impose upon me a necessity that because of the distinguished public service of Gen. 
Wool, in the past, I would most gladly have been spared." 
Curry, apparently more politically astute than the authors of the Oregon legislature's 
resolution requesting Wool's removal, which discussed Wool's negative impact on business 
and future payment of claims, agreed with that resolution without mentioning financial 
issues. Curry's letter concentrated on public safety and requested that Wool "be withdrawn 
from a position which his prejudices and indifferences to the dangers which threaten to 
desolate our settlements have rendered him incompetent to hold.44 
In response, Wool published a series of letters in newspapers in San Francisco and 
Baltimore defending himself and blaming the Indian Wars of the Northwest on the whites. 
Wool maintained that the settlers of the Pacific Northwest were determined to exterminate 
the Indians, that the wars were simply a way to get money from the federal treasury, and that 
both of these practices were being encouraged by territorial officials. As Wool expressed in 
a letter to the National Intelligencer, 
I have not doubt but for the indiscriminate warfare carried on against them, and the 
massacre of several parties of friendly Indians by the troops of Governor Curry, the 
war would have long since been brought to a close in Oregon.... I think, if the 
volunteers, who expect to be paid largely for their services, were withdrawn, and 
private war prevented, I could soon end the war in the Rogue river valley, and indeed 
throughout Oregon and Washington; but the determination of the Oregonians to 
exterminate the Indians, which I am wholly opposed to, if not discountenanced by the 
United States Government, may prolong the war almost indefinitely.... Yet, by a 
proper and judicious course, the war may be brought to a close, when, by establishing 
posts at proper points, a recurrence of the past might be prevented; but to do this, I 
repeat, the extermination of the Indians should be abandoned. No doubt they could 
George L. Curry, "Letter of Gov. Curry to the Secretary of War," Pioneer and Democrat (June 20, 1856) 
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be exterminated, but it would cost fifty to one hundred millions of dollars, besides 
thousands of innocent and valuable lives. 
Wool's letter heated up the controversy by seriously endangering the payment of the war 
debts, an effort that brought a response as immediate as technology of the time allowed. 
Upon receipt of the newspaper containing Wool's letter, editor Dryer of the 
Oregonian retorted that "[i]t is hard to conceive how any man of common intelligence could 
devise a more gross and positive slander upon a people, or invent a more glaring set of 
misrepresentations, and gross falsehoods than will be found stated in this letter." Dryer was 
certain that Wool would pay a heavy price in the way he was remembered historically. Dryer 
described the letter as carrying "upon its face unmistakable evidence of the design of the 
writer, and will in the end consign the author to the position of a designing and revengeful 
demagogue." Dryer went on to call Wool's letter "a lie from beginning to end" and "a libel 
upon the history of the present Indian war, and a gross slander upon the people of Oregon 
and Washington Territories."4 
But not all Oregonian readers agreed with Dryer. A week later Dryer published a 
letter by a Dr. Newell, who was obviously acquainted with Dryer, and who took exception to 
Dryer's contention that Wool's entire letter was a lie. Newell pointed out several things in 
Wool's letter that were common knowledge and widely believed. Newell's first point dealt 
with an episode recounted by Wool of the killing of a Walla Walla chief who approached a 
volunteer group under a flag of truce while professing peace. According to Wool, the chief 
was scalped, and the volunteers "cut off his ears and hands, and sent them to their friends in 
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Oregon."47 Newell wrote that "Gen. Wool states that Pee-pee-mox-mox came to the 
volunteer camp and was killed &c. Do you remember Mr. Dryer, that you and I went into 
Mr. Smith's apothecary shop and saw a bottle sitting on a table by the stove with ears in it, 
and don't you remember they told us they were the ears of Pee-pee-mox-mox? Of course you 
do." But Newell's larger point dealt with the complicity of the press in the war. "Mr. 
Dryer," he wrote, 
I know it is dangerous to offer to enjoy those privileges we so much boast of, in 
Oregon; and the freedom of the press I know is only a name in Oregon. I do not think 
there is one press in all Oregon, who will or does publish the news as it is received 
from the battle field, or from the people at large. Could all have been heard without 
reserve, I verily believe we would not have had this war on hand at this time.49 
Newell also had a point about how the public battle with Wool started. Newell argued that 
"if we had let Gen. Wool alone, and not made any charge against him, (which we did first,) 
he never would have said a word about us, but we have charged, and charged, Governors and 
Editors, but all to no purpose. It would appear that we want to crush Wool (who is Uncle 
Sam) that we may rise."50 
Editor Dryer published Newell's letter with a response in order to clarify that in his 
editorial a week earlier he was referring to the "gist" of the letter, or its "material and 
important points.,"51 The way that Dryer sidestepped Newell's point about the death of the 
Walla Walla chief implies that he considered the brutal torture and dismemberment of an 
important Indian leader who professed peaceful intentions neither material nor important. 
Dryer also ignored Newell's comments about the complicity of the press in the war and how 
the controversy with General Wool started. Dryer closed his response to Newell with a 
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paragraph of Chinook preceded by the statement that "[i]f Dr. Newell can't make out our 
language, we will address him in a language which he does understand."52 Dryer must have 
done this to draw questions about Newell's loyalties. Newell was a former mountain man 
who earned the title "doctor" through his knowledge of healing herbs and his ability to 
perform emergency surgeries. Newell married a Nez Perce woman before settling in Oregon 
CO 
and was appointed an Indian Agent by President Polk in 1849. 
The killing of the Walla Walla Chief Peu-peu-mox-mox seems to have been one of 
the very few atrocities committed by settlers to cause any outrage at the time.54 Of course, 
the five volunteer officers involved all wrote reports denying any wrong doing, and 
consistently sticking to their killed-while-trying-to-escape story. One striking thing about 
these reports is that two of them, the Assistant Regimental Surgeon and the Company 
Commander of the volunteers involved, are so vague as to not even specify what type of 
injuries or wounds were inflicted upon the Walla Walla chieftain. The other three reports 
vary somewhat, but all agree that Peu-peu-mox-mox was beaten with a rifle butt and then 
shot after one of his companions drew a concealed knife rather than be tied up. The 
statement of Lieutenant Colonel James Kelly, the commander of the First Regiment Oregon 
Mounted Volunteers is similar to the other two accounts, except it lacks some of the names of 
the volunteers involved, which vary between the other two accounts. Kelly reported that 
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Indians fired upon his men who were "engaged in driving up some beef cattle," cattle which 
belonged to the Indians. Kelly continued, 
The fire was returned, and a general fight ensued. The enemy were rapidly driven 
before us for about ten miles, along the Walla Walla river, until we reached the 
farmhouse of La Rogue, when they were reinforced and made a stand. Piu-piu-mox-
mox and his companions were in the meantime closely guarded and brought up to our 
camp at La Rogue's. All this time they were exceedingly restless and uneasy. At the 
latter place, as I was passing from the right to the left wing of the regiment, I went by 
where the prisoners were. The sergeant of the guard said to me that they were greatly 
excited while the battle was raging and he feared they would escape while the men 
were out in the field. I told him to tie them all, and if they resisted or attempted to 
escape, to kill them. I then rode on, and when about two hundred yards distant heard 
the report of firearms at the place where the prisoners were. I did not stop, but passed 
on to where the left wing was engaged with the enemy, and was shortly afterwards 
informed that when my order to tie the prisoners was about being carried into effect 
they resisted, one of them having drawn a concealed knife from his coat sleeve, with 
which he wounded Sergeant Major Miller in the arm. Piu-piu-mox-mox attempted to 
wrest a gun from the hands of one of our men, when he was knocked down with a 
rifle and put to death, as were all the other prisoners who attempted to escape, except 
one, a Nez Perce youth, who made no resistance, and who was tied.56 
At very best, this incident represented a haphazard and unprofessional manner of dealing 
with an important prisoner of war. At worst it was outright murder and the mutilation of this 
Chief's body certainly suggests that. Another factor that may have contributed to the death 
and mutilation of the Walla Walla Chief was mentioned over two years earlier in a report to 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs by Isaac Stevens. Stevens described gossip circulating in 
the settlements about "Pu-Pu-Mux-Mux, who is not only a chief of influence but of 
substance, owning a thousand horses and cattle, and, as is said, several thousand dollars in 
gold." One wonders if perhaps the mutilation of Peu-peu-mox-mox began as torture for 
information on the location of the rumored gold. 
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By the first few decades of the twentieth century some of those responsible for 
maintaining Oregon's historical memory appear to have conceded there was no justification 
for the killing of Peu-peu-mox-mox. This may have been a bitter pill for some to swallow. 
The same issue of the Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society that carried Thomas W. 
Prosch's Annual Address to the 1914 General Meeting of the Oregon Historical Society 
(OHS) also carried notice of Prosch's death. This means that Prosch never received much if 
any feedback from outside the OHS. Prosch's address is significant because it appears to be 
the first time that points were raised in the Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society 
questioning some of the standard myths of the wars. One point concerned the death of Peu-
peu-mox-mox. Prosch admitted that 
[i]t is not always agreeable to say good things of the Indians, and not always grateful 
to say bad things of the whites, in contrasting them, but it is none the less true, be it 
said to our shame, that the most atrocious, fiendish and barbarous acts of the struggle 
herein briefly treated were those of our own people - the cruel, cold-blooded killing 
of the wife and six children of the Chief Spencer, the killing and mutilation of Chief 
Peu-peu-mox-mox, and other deeds of similar character that we all know of but 
shrink from mentioning.59 
Although Prosch conceded a few of General Wool's more striking but actually secondary 
points, such as the deaths of Peu-peu-mox-mox and Spencer's family, he maintained the 
party line on General Wool himself. Prosch referred to "the petulant fault-finding of General 
John E. Wool," and argued that Wool 
early assumed that the white people were more to blame than the Indians, and he did 
not hesitate to say so again and again on every available occasion. Of course his 
charges were disputed by the newspapers and citizens of both Oregon and 
Washington, as also by Governors Curry and Stevens. Wool maintained that the war 
was encouraged and continued for the purpose of employing unnecessary volunteer 
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soldiery, supplying them with horses, foods, equipment and other necessaries at high 
rates of compensation, all to be charged against and collected from the general 
government. He charged them specifically and generally with cruelties and acts of 
outrageous violence and murder, and made official report of their mishaps, 
misfortunes and alleged misconduct on numerous occasions.60 
What Prosch leaves out of this analysis is that Wool's specific charges of "outrageous 
violence and murder" were directed at the killings of Spencer's family, the death and 
mutilation of Peu-peu-mox-mox, "and other deeds of similar character." 
Wool's problems with the settlers of the Pacific Northwest should not have surprised 
anyone. By March 1854, less than three months after taking charge of the Department of the 
Pacific, Wool wrote requests for more troops to protect the Indians from the settlers. As 
Wool wrote to the Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, 
The number [of troops] is wholly inadequate to give protection to either whites or 
Indians. The difficulties with the latter are frequently produced by the cupidity of the 
whites. Indeed, if I am correctly informed, most of the difficulties with the Indians 
have been caused by outrages committed by men who have no regard for law or 
justice. I will do all I can, with such limited means, to prevent the continuance of 
these outrages.61 
Davis refused Wool's request for more troops. Wool's belief that Indians had to be protected 
from settlers was reminiscent of an earlier episode in Wool's career. 
In the summer of 1836 Secretary of War Lewis Cass sent Wool to keep the peace in 
and around the Cherokee Nation as preparations were made for removal of the divided 
Cherokees under the terms of the Treaty of New Echota that many considered fraudulent. 
During this assignment, Wool became embroiled in such heated controversy, not only with 
settlers but also with state and federal officials, that he twice requested transfer and a Court 
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of Inquiry into his overall performance in Cherokee Country. After Wool's second request 
was granted, a Court of Inquiry convened, but only with a narrow mandate to hear a 
complaint from the state of Alabama that Wool's actions in Cherokee Country contravened 
states' rights and ignored individual liberties. When the session opened the State of 
Alabama's case fell apart due to lack of witnesses and evidence. Wool defended himself by 
contending that the charges were laid because he had listened to the Cherokees, not because 
he had violated the Constitution. He argued that "[m]y crime has been not in using the 
language here supposed, but in listening to his [the Cherokee's] complaints and redressing his 
wrongs."62 
Another episode in Wool's career also foreshadowed his problems in the Pacific 
Northwest. After Wool was exonerated by the court of inquiry, he returned for a few months 
to his previous post as Inspector General of the Army. In January of 1838 Wool went north 
to prevent filibustering expeditions from crossing the border from New York and Vermont 
into Canada.64 Wool used volunteers mustered into service through trusted contacts because 
he did not trust the local militia, many of whom supported, or in some cases were involved 
in, the incursions into Canada. Wool not only had to contend with militiamen who allowed 
filibusterers to regain their confiscated arms, he had to deal with outraged public meetings 
and irate newspaper editorials all denouncing him. 6 Historians have paid little attention to 
this episode in Wool's life. Outside of Hinton, who described Wool as "disgusted with 
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volunteers"67 after an episode of militia men returning confiscated munitions to filibusterers, 
none seem to have mentioned it. 
Historians have, however, examined Wool's activities in Cherokee Country and their 
take on Wool's role in events leading up to the removal of the Cherokees from their 
traditional territory has evolved over the years. In 1960 Hinton characterized the assignment 
as "difficult if not impossible. Ordered to preserve peace among the Cherokees, he [Wool] 
found that every action provoked criticism." During the late 1970s Wool was represented 
as very close to pro-Cherokee, and the tense relations with President Jackson and state 
authorities that led Wool to request reassignment and an official investigation were 
emphasized.69 In the late 1980s Wool was "a humane man and an excellent administrator .... 
but nonetheless firm in discharging his duty to execute the treaty and remove [the Cherokees] 
to the West."70 More recently, however, Laurence Hauptman argued that Wool's 
correspondence from the 1830s, largely in the possession of Wool's relatives until the 1960s, 
shows a significant bias toward the pro-removal faction of the Cherokees. Hauptman 
concluded that "[h]ardly benevolent in his approach, Wool presented himself as an 
71 
unbending, vindictive military officer willing to carry forth with swift retribution." 
Hauptman argued that it was only through the efforts of Wool's friends and colleagues on the 
court of inquiry that his later image was "mistakenly transformed into the very image of a 
humanitarian general."72 Hauptman cited an October 1856 letter from Wool to a Senator 
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from California to support his contention that Wool was not a humanitarian. Wool's position 
that California was not Indian Country and therefore state law took precedence led Hauptman 
to the conclusion that "the septuagenarian general was no longer willing to become 
no 
embroiled in opposing state officials' actions in regard to American Indians." However, 
Hauptman made no mention of the controversy over Wool's performance in the Pacific 
Northwest that was still going on when Wool wrote the letter to the California Senator. 
The historiographical debate over Wool's activities in Cherokee country is striking 
because no similar debate has occurred in respect to Wool's problems in the Pacific 
Northwest. Historians of the West have tended to blame Wool's problems there on his 
personality. For example, in The Legacy of Conquest, Patricia Nelson Limerick called Wool 
"something of a prig" and said looking at pictures of Wool gave her the idea that "the 
symmetrical and carefully waxed curls at his temples suggest that he and the Oregon pioneers 
might have been at odds without the troubles of Indian policy."74 Limerick's source for her 
observations on Wool, Robert Utley's Frontiersmen in Blue, also emphasized Wool's 
personality but offered a view of the bigger picture too. Utley described Wool as a "stiff-
necked professional of forty-two years' service," before noting that 
the diminutive general possessed a contentious temperament that overshadowed a 
piety somewhat unusual in the Regular Army. He reposed great confidence in his 
own judgment and tended to regard anyone who differed with him as a scoundrel 
controlled by impure motives. In this category he placed the citizens of the 
Northwest and their political officials, who insisted on appropriating all the Indian's 
land and killing him if he objected. In the larger sense, of course, Wool was right, but 
in the context of his times his inability to understand the other point of view as well 
cost him needed civilian support and deepened the bitterness already engendered by 
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field commanders who now and then sided with the Indians. Intemperate public 
utterances insured wide circulation of the general's views. 
It seems Utley was either unaware or simply did not care that the controversy started with 
Dryer's attacks on Wool in the Oregonian, not with Wool's public utterances. The 
publication of Wool's letters to other federal officials by newspaper editors with an axe to 
grind hardly seems like "intemperate public utterances." But the most important point of 
Utley's position on Wool is that the later appearance of correctness inherent in Wool's stance 
on the wars of the Northwest was irrelevant because it ran counter to public opinion. From 
the viewpoint of those who constructed and maintained the historical memory of the 
settlement of the Pacific Northwest, the desire to maintain Wool's irrelevance is hardly 
surprising. From a prominent historian however, the position that being right is less 
important than being in line with public opinion seems an unusual interpretive stance; one 
that was perhaps only possible before opposition to the US involvement in Vietnam became 
widespread. 
Utley seems to have maintained his stance that the correctness of Wool's position was 
irrelevant. In The Indian Frontier, Utley made no attempt to discuss the foundations of the 
problem, and simply referred to "[s]harp-tongued, combative little John E. Wool." Other 
historians have made similar judgments. In a 1978 MA thesis Nancy Emmick blamed the 
dispute on a personality clash and characterized Wool as "an irascible old man" whose 
"difficulties stemmed from his misjudgment of the fears felt by the settlers during the first 
winter" of the war.77 About Stevens, Emmick wrote that he had "an unbounded confidence 
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in himself [and] was a conceited and obstinate man .... who followed his own sense of right, 
no 
wrong and justice." Emmick placed the ultimate responsibility for the dispute on Congress 
70 
for not separating the two adversaries like bickering children. Three years later Robin 
Fisher, in his comparative study, "Indian Warfare and Two Frontiers," also referred to a 
SO 
"personality and policy clash" between Wool and Stevens. Fisher said nothing about 
General Wool's personality, probably because he was dealing with differences in Indian 
policy between British Columbia and Washington Territory and how these differences 
potentially contributed to the relative lack of warfare in British Columbia. About Stevens' 
personality, Fisher simply said that Stevens "was politically ambitious and impatient to get 
things done."81 
There would seem to be little room for doubt that Wool was arrogant, opinionated and 
stubborn, and that there was indeed a personality clash with Stevens, but to reduce Wool's 
objections to the violence perpetrated by miners and settlers to inconvenient aspects of his 
personality, while largely neglecting Stevens' part in the situation, is a gross over 
simplification. In fairness, not all historians have seen personality as the main factor at work 
here. In his "A Reexamination of General John. E. Wool's Role in the Stevens-Wool 
Controversy," John Simpson did not focus on personality but instead argued that the 
"Stevens-Wool controversy was triggered by General Wool's strong questioning of Governor 
Stevens' policies toward the Native Americans." Like Utley in Frontiersmen in Blue, some 
historians have seen both personality and politics in the Wool-Stevens dispute. In his study 
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of Isaac Stevens, Young Man in a Hurry, Kent Richards also pointed to Wool's personality, 
but in addition to seeing Wool's good side, Richards demonstrated an ability to look beyond 
personality to the underlying political differences. Richards described Wool as 
a vigorous, capable officer - apparently the logical choice for the large, politically 
sensitive Department of the Pacific. He proved to be capable of running the huge 
department with as much efficiency as circumstances allowed, but he was less suited 
to handle political problems. Thoroughly professional, completely honest, and 
imbued with a sense of public service, Wool believed that the army was in the best 
position to deal with the various problems caused by American expansion. The 
general would brook no interference from outside sources - which included state, 
territorial, and local officials within his broadly defined sphere of influence. In 
addition he held a high opinion of his moral infallibility, which at times led him to 
ignore or question the motives of others. His critics (there were many) called him 
pompous and arrogant. But criticism did not deter Wool. He was not concerned with 
public relations; he would do his duty as he saw it, whatever the objections or 
ultimate consequences. 3 
Isaac Stevens also brooked no interference from outsiders in his own broadly defined sphere 
of influence, which was Washington Territory. According to Richards' apt description, 
Although Stevens would have disputed any charge that he was not a thoroughgoing 
democrat (as well as a Democratic party faithful) his temperament, training, and 
professional career best prepared him to operate as a monarch. He had always viewed 
his responsibilities broadly, and his overlapping duties and titles after 1853 led him to 
assume that he had absolute power. He defended his actions as a military necessity; 
he even portrayed himself as the territory's only hope for salvation. 
Stevens most controversial escapade demonstrates rather clearly his monarchial tendencies. 
Besides engaging in a battle of words with Wool, Isaac Stevens provoked uproar from 
citizens and the bar of Washington territory in the late spring of 1856 by declaring martial 
law and twice imprisoning Chief Justice Lander of the Territorial Court, along with two 
different clerks. Prior to both arrests, Lander was about to issue a writ of habeas corpus to 
thwart Stevens' efforts to try seven settlers for treason before a panel of volunteer officers 
selected by Stevens. The proclamation of martial law provoked a bitter protest from legal 
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professionals in the Territory. As vindication of his action, Stevens stated that the accused 
were "mostly the retired servants of the foreign corporations in our midst, and they have a 
deadly antipathy to the dominant, that is, the American power here."86 Stevens claimed that 
all of them had connections by marriage to hostile tribes and had been "the main original 
cause of the war." However, in a letter written to the Secretary of State to update the report 
of the territorial bar association sent to President Pierce a few days earlier, two members of 
the bar of Washington Territory disputed Stevens' claims, pointing out that only three of the 
men had ever worked for the Hudson's Bay or Puget's Sound Companies and that some of the 
men were not married and the wives of the others were "half-breeds from the Red river 
country, and have no connexion with the Indians of this country." As for Stevens' 
accusation that the seven accused caused the war, these writers described it as "a fiction that 
has found birth in Governor Stevens' own brain, and never, to our knowledge, was dreamed 
of by anyone else. These causes it is not now necessary to discuss; there are many who 
attribute them chiefly to Governor Stevens himself."89 
In the opinion of these lawyers, the real crime of the accused was their returning to 
their farms in defiance of Stevens' evacuation order, and the real point of the declaration of 
martial law was to force these men to comply with Stevens' orders. In support of this 
position they noted the fact that the accused, "although awaiting their trials by a military 
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commission on a charge of treason, are at this moment on parole, and quietly walking about 
the towns without guard, with their usual arms." Their letter further stated that the 
declaration of martial law "was without law, precedent, or palliation, and intended to subject 
them [the accused] to the despotic will and pleasure of an officer whose rage was excited, not 
by their crimes, but by their disobedience to his [Stevens'] orders."91 The lawyers believed 
Stevens was out of control and pursuing a petty grudge. They maintained that "[t]he sole 
object of the proclamation was to get a half a dozen obscure individuals into his absolute 
control, and to demonstrate that he, Isaac I. Stevens, could, on the field offered by a small 
Territory, enact, at second hand, the part of Napoleon." The letter concluded that, 
the immediate removal of Governor Stevens from office is absolutely requisite for the 
peace and safety of this community. Of a naturally arrogant and domineering 
character, of overweening ambition, and even unscrupulous as to the means requisite 
to effect his objects, he has been further inflamed by the immoderate use of ardent 
spirits, and in his fits of intoxication knows no bounds to his language or to his 
actions. 
This judgment of Stevens' "utter lack of restraint" is quite compatible with the assessment of 
Stevens' mental state that General Wool offered in a letter to headquarters just a couple of 
months later. Wool argued that "Governor Stevens is crazy and does not know what he is 
doing."94 
This assessment of Stevens' mental state was not widely accepted, but through the 
Secretary of State, President Pierce censured Stevens for this incident. Secretary of State 
Marcy wrote that, 
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While the President does not bring into question the motives by which you were 
actuated, he is induced, by an imperative sense of duty, to express his distinct 
disapproval of your conduct, so far as respects the proclamation of martial law. 
Were the President able to adopt the conclusion that martial law could, in any case, 
be established without express legislative authority, he could not find such a case in 
the state of things in Washington Territory as you have presented them Martial 
law.... never can be excusable where the object of resorting to martial law was to act 
against the existing government of the country, or to supercede its functionaries in the 
discharge of their proper duties. The latter seems to have been the principal ground 
you had for proclaiming martial law. Your conduct in that respect does not meet with 
the favorable regard of the President.95 
This reprimand seems rather mild and inconsequential considering that Stevens was a federal 
official and had clearly violated the US Constitution. Stevens seems to have had very strong 
support from President Pierce. 
However, the approval of the citizens of Washington Territory is a different matter. 
Even discounting the harsh criticism of Stevens quoted above as nothing more than the 
protestations of a few lawyers offended by infringement upon their authority, there is room 
for doubt about the depth of Stevens' support. Kent Richards argued that Stevens' election as 
Congressional delegate in 1857 shows the majority of voters approved Stevens' handling of 
Territorial affairs as governor.96 But as was pointed out in the press during the election 
campaign, failure to send Stevens to Congress would have delayed Congressional 
appropriations to pay the war debts. And there was at least one newspaper, the Puget 
Sound Courier, published from May 1855 into 1857, which opposed Stevens, referred to the 
war as "Governor Stevens' War" and argued he was responsible for it. The Courier 
editorialist wrote that, 
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As we have said before, had the treaties here never been made, no difficulties would 
now exist. If Governor Stevens and his underlings had never set foot in Washington 
Territory, the people would have been better off, for the Indians before this, have 
always been willing that the Americans should settle and live on their land and 
amongst them. They had then no fears of being driven from their home, under a 
pretext of purchase at a nominal price - a mere nothing. We have only one wish, and 
that is, that Governor Stevens himself, was here to receive a proper lesson from his 
unrighteous acts. 
Whether we shall be justified in all we advocate on this subject, by a majority of 
the people, we know not, but what we think right we say. Those who have been the 
first to cause these troubles, should receive condemnation, as well as the savages for 
the atrocities they have committed.98 
As suggested by the editorialist's uncertainty as to whether the majority of the people would 
accept his position, this was a minority paper. A writer in an early edition of The Quarterly 
of the Oregon Historical Society, described the Courier as "Whig in politics, and as the 
population was overwhelmingly Democratic it soon died for lack of sustenance."99 Not 
surprisingly then, the Pioneer and Democrat from Olympia, a decidedly pro-Stevens paper, 
sneered at this article in the Courier, and characterized it as "a libellous, scurrilous and ill-
timed attack upon Gov. Stevens." However, the Puget Sound Courier endured through 
the entire period of hostilities in western Washington and for about a year afterward. Some 
people were obviously reading it. Those who wished to express dissent to the majority view 
of the war managed to create a local outlet to do so. As we shall see in chapter three, dissent 
was not treated so magnanimously in southern Oregon. 
There were others who held Stevens responsible for starting the war in Washington 
Territory. They were a minority, but some recognized the treaties signed at the Walla Walla 
Council as the immediate cause of the war. One army officer present compared Stevens' 
behavior at Walla Walla to "the Highway man, who with his hand on your throat, and a pistol 
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at your head, requests your small change."101 In a report to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Joel Palmer, a treaty commissioner at Walla Walla, described the causes of the 
Yakima War as stemming from 
the present state of disaffection among the Indians in Washington Territory, among 
which may be named the following: The Yakama Indians were represented in the 
Walla Walla council by four of their principal chiefs, accompanied by a number of 
their leading men, all evidently opposed at first to entering into any negotiations for 
the sale of their country. After more than two weeks had been spent in trying to 
convince them of the importance and necessity of such a course in open council, they 
gave a decided and peremptory answer in the negative. But during the next week, by 
interviews with the chiefs separately, Governor Stevens induced them to agree to the 
terms of the treaty 
It is pretty evident that the signing of the treaty was adverse to the will of the 
nation, as expressed prior to the delegation's coming to the council, and that on the 
return of the chiefs they were beset by their people and denounced as traitors to their 
tribe. Two of the chiefs, Owhi and Skloo, evidently signed the treaty with great 
reluctance, and, after returning home and meeting with their friends, were easily 
induced to join in opposition to adhering to its provisions. 
Captain Thomas Jefferson Cram, the chief topographical engineer for the Department of the 
Pacific agreed with Palmer's assessment that the treaty council at Walla Walla had led 
directly to hostilities in the area. He criticized "[t]he hot haste and grasping disposition 
evinced by the senior commissioner [Stevens] in his speeches in council," concluding that 
"the superintendent for Washington left in his rear a vast extent of Indian country in which 
the proceedings of the council had stirred up little else than strong dissatisfaction in the 
10^ 
Indian heart." Stevens' reputation among his former comrades in arms sank to a very low 
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point. One officer described him to General Wool, as "the worst looking and the most 
drunken character that I have seen for many months."104 
After the signing of the Treaty at the Walla Walla council Isaac Stevens was in such a 
rush to open the area for settlement that he did not wait for the US Senate to ratify the 
treaties. Seventeen days after the treaties were signed the same edition of the Olympia 
newspaper that announced the negotiations also carried, on another page, an announcement 
that much of the upper Columbia River region was now opened for settlement with a detailed 
description of the areas offered.10 The same notice ran once a month, all through the war, 
continuing through August 1856.1 6 
To add further injury, there was a gold rush in the area shortly after the Walla Walla 
Council. According to Captain Cram, 
The routes thither led directly through the Walla Walla and Yakama countries, and as 
the whites passed, some of them committed excesses and outrages of the grossest 
kinds upon the hitherto unoffending Indians of the very tribes the proceedings of the 
council had so much and so recently disturbed. The bare recital of some of the crimes 
committed by these Anglo-Saxon devils, in human shape, is sufficient to cause the 
blood of every virtuous man, whether of red or white skin, to boil with deep 
indignation. They were not satisfied with stealing the horses and cattle of the Indians, 
but they claimed the privilege of taking and ravishing Indian women and maidens ad 
libitum. What wonder, then, that the Indians who had been so grossly outraged 
should have retaliated, as they did, by killing some half dozen of these miscreants?107 
It was not just army officers subordinate to General Wool who wrote about the inappropriate 
activities of gold seekers and the inevitable Indian responses. According to the editorial 
writer at the Puget Sound Courier, 
It will be noticed that they [the Indians] desire to kill none but Americans; for in all 
those companies [of would be miners traveling east of the Cascades] where 
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Americans have been killed, the Frenchmen have not been harmed, and in one or two 
instances they have saved it is supposed, the whole companies by being Frenchmen. 
"King George" men, we believe, are also left unharmed. For this distinction, there is 
a plenty of reasons. None but the Americans have used them wrongfully, and they, 
not all, but many, and those mostly whom the Indians denominate tyees, have done it 
with a vengeance; robbed them of their lands, treated them worse than slaves - as 
10R 
brutes - and in fact, been the cause of these difficulties. 
From these two reports it can be seen that just prior to the outbreak of the Yakima war there 
were both some army officers and some settlers who believed that the participants in the 
mining rush who had been slain were simply reaping the consequences of their own 
inappropriate actions and treatment of the Indians of the upper Columbia basin.. 
The fact that the Indians were commonly known to spare "King George men" and 
"Frenchmen," i.e. employees or former employees of the Hudson's Bay or Puget Sound 
Agricultural Companies, might account for some of Stevens' apparent antagonism to those 
groups. However, signs of this antagonism can be seen well before either the hostilities or 
the gold rush began in a report on Hudson's Bay Company property claims that Stevens 
made to the State Department. In June 1854 Stevens wrote that, 
It has been the policy of the [Hudson's Bay] company to discourage agricultural 
emigrants, and to keep the greater portion of the territory a mere wilderness, or a vast 
preserve for game. Vattel has observed that the cultivation of the soil is an obligation 
imposed by nature upon mankind, and he and other writers upon natural law place but 
little value upon the territorial rights of people sparsely inhabiting vast regions, and 
drawing their subsistence chiefly from the forest. In this view it would be difficult to 
distinguish the territorial rights of this company from those of the people fast 
disappearing before the steps of civilization on this continent.109 
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From Stevens' sentiments expressed in this report, one gets the impression that former 
associates of the Hudson's Bay Company might not have needed to do much to be considered 
enemies by Stevens. 
The Walla Walla treaties were not the only ones negotiated by Stevens that were 
problematic. As Thomas Prosch noted in his address to the 1914 annual meeting of the 
Oregon Historical Society, "The first and last of the Stevens treaties were apparently the 
immediate cause of the war that followed, for the Indians affected by them were the ones that 
entered upon it, while the Indians affected by the other treaties generally abstained, though 
the terms of all treaties were substantially alike."1 The Walla Walla treaties were the last. 
The first treaty that Stevens negotiated was the Medicine Creek Treaty, signed by Indians 
from southern Puget Sound in late December of 1854. Later historians have argued it was a 
prelude to the war in the Western part of Washington Territory. However, the criticism 
started early. In 1857 George Gibbs, a surveyor involved in the negotiations who then 
surveyed the reservations that resulted from the negotiations, wrote a letter critical of 
Stevens' treaties. According to Gibbs, "the governor's treaties had a great deal to do in 
fomenting this war there is no doubt. Those on the Sound were too much hurried, and the 
reservations allowed them were insufficient; but his grand blunder was in bringing together 
the Nez Perces, Walla Wallas, Yakamas, and others into one council, and cramming a treaty 
110
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down their throats in a hurry."112 Also in 1857, Gibbs wrote to the Washington Republican 
claiming that Isaac Stevens "appeared intoxicated ... at the treaties here on the sound."113 
Intoxicated or not, it appears that Stevens did not want the Indians at Medicine Creek 
to understand the treaty they were to sign. In his extensive collection of oral history 
interviews done in the early twentieth century, early Washington settler Ezra Meeker had an 
interview with a settler who attended the Medicine Creek negotiations. According to Owen 
Bush, an early settler who could speak several native languages and who attended the 
Medicine Creek negotiations, 
Stevens did not seem to want anyone to interpret in their own tongue, and had that 
done in Chinook. Of course, it was utterly impossible to explain the treaties to them 
in Chinook. Stevens wanted me to go into the war, but I wouldn't do it. I knew it 
was his bad management that brought on the war, and I wouldn't raise a gun against 
those people who had always been so kind to us when we were so weak and needy. 
The Indians could have killed us all at any time during the eight years we were here 
before Governor Stevens came, but instead of molesting us in any way they helped us 
all they could.114 
The interpreter at the Medicine Creek Council refused to talk to Meeker, but this individual, 
who had been previously interviewed in 1893 by another author, strongly denied deliberately 
deceiving the Indians during those negotiations. Still, he readily acknowledged that it was 
obvious to him that the Indians did not understand the treaties.11 It would seem that this lack 
of understanding was probably not unintended on Stevens' part. Two months after the 
negotiation of the Medicine Creek Treaty, Margaret Stevens described her husband's 
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negotiating tactics in a letter to her sister. Margaret Stevens noted that her husband "has 
them right under his thumb - they are afraid as death of him and do just as he tells them."116 
The Indians kept doing as Isaac Stevens told them for a few more months, before some 
Indians began to do otherwise in a dramatic fashion. 
The tendency of historians to parallel the ad hominem arguments against Wool such 
as those of the highly polemical Thomas Dryer, and other editorialists of his ilk, and focus on 
Wool's personality has kept most of them from dealing adequately with the politics 
underlying the Wool-Stevens dispute, and more importantly with the substance of General 
Wool's allegations. Further, as we have seen, Stevens' personality would appear to be a 
potentially fruitful source for the mining of raw material to conduct attacks similar to those 
waged upon Wool. But, as we have also seen, Stevens has been exempt from such attacks by 
later writers. Even Ezra Meeker, although highly critical of Stevens whenever the 
opportunity arose, treated Stevens with a modicum of respect, a practice that appears to have 
been lacking in the early twentieth century writers who dealt with General Wool. 
The prevailing image of General Wool thus formed distorts the memory of Wool and 
more generally the Indian Wars of the Pacific Northwest, originally by denying the validity 
of Wool's criticism and later by a generalized but not quite universal reluctance among 
historians to deal head on with Wool's critique of the motivations behind the wars. Some 
historians have confronted the settler myths, but not in a manner that has reached the public. 
For example, as Robert Ficken noted in 1985 at an obscure conference organized by the 
Washington National Guard, 'The military experience in the Pacific Northwest offers 
evidence contrary to that in the myriad letters and diaries of settlers and enables a more 
116
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objective assessment of the responsibility for the numerous nineteenth century Indian 
,117 
conflicts in the region." One of the other presentations at this conference was published in 
a regional historical journal, but Ficken's was not.118 Even now little historical writing on the 
Pacific Northwest questions settler mythology. I suggest that it is time to completely 
rehabilitate General Wool from the negative aspersions cast upon him by those who, through 
motivations of profit or behind the shield of patriotism, concealed the true nature of some of 
the more abhorrent episodes that occurred in the Pacific Northwest during the 1850s. 
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"A serial fictionist"" 
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Brevet Major General John Ellis Wool was as controversial in the Indian Wars of 
Oregon as he was in Washington, and the evidence shows that there too, people who stood to 
gain from a certain portrayal of events deliberately crafted a distorted image of General Wool 
in order to obscure the history of the hostilities in Southern Oregon. These people cast 
aspersions upon Wool's personality to hide the fact that events of the 1850s and the few 
decades following the wars demonstrate that Wool's allegations were well founded. The 
quest to secure Congressional funding for war related claims continued into the 1890s, even 
as the image of General Wool as a settler hater with a particular disdain for volunteer Indian 
fighters solidified into a formidable monolith. The memory of the events of the 1850s 
became firmly rooted in first- and second-hand accounts of those who profited from the wars, 
with assistance from those who valorized the settlers of the Pacific Northwest and justified 
the conquest with rhetoric of racial superiority. Some even set out to manipulate the 
historical record for personal financial gain. 
The costs of putting volunteer fighters into the field were met by the issue of scrip by 
the Territorial Government. However, under the federal legislation forming the Oregon 
Territorial Government, all acts of the Territorial Government had to be approved by 
Congress, and therefore the Territorial Legislature had no independent financial authority.' 
Consequently, the provision of goods or services solely upon the issuance of semi-legal 
Territorial scrip was a risky proposition. It took several years for the federal government to 
1
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honor the scrip issued for Oregon's first Indian war, the Cayuse War of 1847-48, but in the 
end the federal government paid for the war, which was fought by volunteers because there 
were no regular troops in the Northwest at the time. Therefore, the people of the Pacific 
Northwest had some reason to expect that the federal government would pick up the bill for 
the costs of fighting Indians in the 1850s, however, a significant barrier to the payment of the 
debt arose. According to Hubert Bancroft's second volume of Oregon history, 
the allegations made by the highest military authority on the Pacific coast that the 
people of Oregon were an army of organized Indian-murderers and government 
robbers, in support of which assertion was the enormous account against the nation, 
of nearly six million dollars, the payment of which was opposed by almost the entire 
press of the union.3 
In his financial history of Oregon during the territorial period, Frederick Young 
described the settlement of the war claims as "a part of national finances," and thus outside 
the parameters of his study. Nonetheless, he argued that "the realization that the Oregon 
community was under this stress during this period is necessary for a true appreciation of the 
territorial finances proper."4 Young, editor of the Oregon Historical Society's Quarterly for 
its first twenty-nine years, and a professor at the University of Oregon, attributed Oregon's 
difficulties in securing reparations primarily to Wool. Young argued that Wool's attitude 
"had no doubt most to do towards developing opposition in Congress to prompt and liberal 
reimbursement for losses and costs connected with the suppression of Indian hostilities in the 
Pacific Northwest."5 In 1860, after over four years of wrangling, Congress approved 
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payments of $2,714, 808.58 out of the original claims of $6, 011,497.36. From the popular 
viewpoint, then, General Wool's statements delayed all reparations for nearly five years and 
effectively reduced the payment by over three million dollars. Money trickled in for years 
afterward. According to Young, 
By November 27, 1871, overlooked claims on account of services, supplies, etc., 
during these Indian hostilities of 1855-6, to the amount of $52,019.78, had been filed 
at Washington. Items, generally small, but once as large as $33,976.71 for one 
Congress, were included in the appropriation bills almost regularly down to the 
nineties [1890s], for the payment of such unsettled claims.7 
The fact that the Oregon state legislature appropriated $100,000 and $45,000 as late as 1903 
and 1905 respectively to bring volunteer's pay up to the rate specified in the original 
resolutions of the territorial legislature in 1856, shows that these claims remained a political 
Q 
issue for some years after payments from Congress finally stopped in the 1890s. 
Things were similar in Washington, except the expenses there were substantially less. 
Claims in Washington for expenses directly related to putting the volunteers into the field 
were $1,481,975.45, or less than one-third that of Oregon. But Washington's claims were 
paid just as slowly as Oregon's. According to Thomas Prosch, 
Nothing was paid until 1861, and then slowly and cautiously for a long term of years. 
The Treasury Department gave twenty year bonds, bearing six per cent interest to pay 
these accounts, delayed for years, reduced in amount about one-half, and the bonds 
themselves being worth less than their face. Some of these Indian war accounts were 
unpaid in the 1870's. It is safe to say, taking all things into account, the people did 
not get one-fourth of the money they should have got, and that the service rendered 
the United States was more illy paid than any other of the nineteenth century in the 
history of the nation. In order to justify this course on the part of the government the 
territorial authorities and people were loudly and frequently slandered as plunderers, 
instigating and keeping up the war for the purpose of robbing the Indians and Federal 
Government.10 
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With such a reservoir of potential clients, careers were made by those who worked to get 
money out of Congress for debts claimed with respect to the Indian Wars of the 1850s. 
Political and legal efforts to collect payment of war related claims continued into the 1890s. 
It seems quite reasonable to expect the quest for funds to exert an influence upon the 
historical interpretation of the wars. Of course, there are a multitude of possible motivations 
other than profit to valorize the pioneers; however, when efforts to influence the historical 
memory come from someone who was in the business of collecting war debts, as were many 
lawyers in the Pacific Northwest, it seems quite reasonable to infer that profit is amongst the 
author's motivations. 
Frances Fuller Victor has cast a long shadow on the historiography of the Pacific 
Northwest, especially of Oregon. Before she died, some in the press referred to her as the 
"Mother of Oregon History."11 Her obituary published in the Quarterly of the Oregon 
Historical Society described Victor as "the Clio of the Northwest."12 The tone became less 
adulatory over the next eight decades, but these assessments remained relatively intact for 
quite some time. In a 1981 article on the historiography of Oregon and Washington, Kent D. 
Richards wrote that "[d]espite errors of fact and omission, the Victor volumes on Oregon and 
Washington must be considered by all historians of the region, and in some aspects 
(particularly details on personalities) they have not yet been superceded." Victor's 
treatment of General Wool followed the established tendency of emphasizing personality in 
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pointing to Wool's "prejudiced and arbitrary sentiment towards civilians." Further, Wool 
"behaved with a degree of hauteur towards civil authorities which had gained him the dislike 
of every governor."15 Victor went on to dismiss all reports made by Wool and his 
subordinates as tainted by bias. Victor argued that 
[w]hoever has read his correspondence with Adjutant-General Thomas must have 
perceived his strong bias against the people as distinguished from the army, from 
governor's [sic] down to the humblest citizen, and his especial dislike of volunteer 
organizations. The reports of the officers in command of posts in Oregon, California, 
and Washington, were colored by this feeling exhibited by the general of division, 
and their correspondence was too often distorted by their sense of what was expected 
of them by their chief.' 
With this simple statement, Victor historically disempowered General Wool, his subordinate 
officers and all of their civilian informants. 
Victor did not arrive in Oregon until 1865. She wrote her first book-length historical 
work, River of the West, in 1870. Ostensibly an account of the life of Joe Meek, a former fur 
trader who became an early settler and was prominent in Oregon politics during the 1840s 
and 50s, River of the West dealt with more than Meek's colorful life. It contained an account 
of General Wool's difficulties in Oregon that differed significantly from Victor's later 
comments on Wool. At the beginning of her historical career, Victor wrote that 
[w]hen General Wool, at the head of the Department in San Francisco, was consulted, 
he also was without authority to employ or receive the volunteers; and when the 
volunteers, who armed and equipped themselves, came to go into the field with the 
regulars, they could not agree as to the mode of fighting Indians, so what with one 
thing and another, the war became an exciting topic for more reasons than because the 
whites were afraid of the Indians. As for General Wool, he was in great disfavor both 
in Oregon and Washington because he did not believe that there had existed the 
necessity for a war; and that therefore he bestowed what assistance was at his 
Frances Fuller Victor, The Early Indian Wars of Oregon (Salem: Frank C. Baker, State Printer, 1894), 328. 
Ibid, 385. 
Ibid, 328. 
53 
command very grudgingly. General Wool, it was said, was jealous of the volunteers; 
and the volunteers certainly cared little for the opinion of General Wool.17 
Victor's judgment of General Wool obviously hardened somehow at some point after 1870. 
In 1878 Hubert Bancroft hired Victor as one of his so-called assistants, more 
accurately as a staff writer who wrote a number of the books published under Bancroft's 
name.18 Bancroft's practice of not crediting his writers later diminished his reputation 
significantly. As one historian, obviously a Bancroft admirer despite Bancroft's tarnished 
reputation, admitted in 1945, "Bancroft's failure to credit his helpers, explicitly or 
semiexplicitly, on the title pages or in the prefaces, was the greatest mistake of his life."19 
Victor was Bancroft's only female assistant. Victor was an early feminist who 
explored the socially constructed nature of gender and advocated gender equality during the 
1860s and 1870s in her fiction, poetry, and newspaper columns before she turned to the 
professional writing of history.21 In 1874 Victor wrote that "[m]ind is the same, whether it 
resides in a man's form or a woman's. All the laws of the mind, the soul, the affections, are 
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the same in men and women, so far as observation and science can determine." Two 
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relatively recent feminist writers saw Victor as an important pioneering feminist and offered 
much praise for her fiction.23 
But from reading Victor's historical work, it seems as though her ability to empathize 
with the oppressed may have been dependent in large part upon the degree to which the 
oppressed were like her. For example, her interpretation of Indians' motivations for resisting 
the incursion of settlers into their traditional territories is quite typical of Victor's 
representation of Indians in her historical writing. Victor theorized that because Indians had 
nothing of their own, they were the more covetous of the possessions of others. 
Lacking a knowledge of any law, human or divine, except a law implanted by nature 
in the beginning of people - "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," they were 
quick to find offenses and ready to avenge them. Without feeling under moral 
obligations to keep faith with others, they were ready to resent any appearance of 
duplicity in the superior race, of whom they were unavoidably jealous.24 
Victor's eloquent reassurances of the guiltlessness of the settlers most likely contributed to 
her popularity. 
In the early 1890s the Oregon legislature paid Victor $1,306.13 to write The Early 
Indian Wars of Oregon. Victor elaborated her attitude towards Indians in the preface when 
she wrote that 
[fjhe Indian is a wild man; it would only be a fact of evolution to call him a wild 
animal on his way to be a man, provided the proper environments were furnished 
him. While the instincts and perceptions are acute, the ethical part of him is 
undeveloped, and his exhibitions of a moral nature are whimsical and without motive. 
Brought into contact with white men, whether of the lowest or of the highest, he is 
always at a disadvantage which is irritating, and subject to temptations which are 
dangerous. On the other hand, the white man is subject to the more subtle temptation 
to abuse his superiority for selfish purposes; he being in selfishness often but little, if 
at all, removed from the wild man. 6 
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Although Victor's succinct four-paragraph preface mentioned neither Wool nor his 
allegations, right after she elaborated her attitude towards Indians, Victor described 
the accountability of the government in our Indian wars, and its indebtedness to the 
pioneers of every part of the country: first, in inviting settlement, and then in not 
properly protecting settlers. The policy of the government for a hundred years has 
been to throw out a vanguard of immigration, and then when these had fallen victims 
to savage cupidity or hatred, to follow with a tardy army and "punish" what should 
have been prevented. The Spaniards did better than this, for they sent a garrison out 
with every colony and "reduced" the native population with comparatively little 
bloodshed.27 
Her choice of examples suggests that Victor meant comparatively little bloodshed to the 
settlers. Not surprisingly then, especially considering that the state legislature paid her to 
write the book, she depicted the wars as 
unavoidable. They laid waste the homes of white and red men alike; but the white 
race was compelled to make good its own and its enemy's losses, and while it plowed 
and planted and built, the Indians were fed, nursed, and taught, so far as they would 
be. When a large portion had died off, who were unfit to love, the remainder began a 
new growth and increase in numbers. The children born on the reservation know no 
other home, and even their elders are at length content, living a half civilized life, 
which, compared with their former nomadic existence, is one of indolent ease. 
Thus, it would seem that from Victor's viewpoint the wars were beneficial to the Indians 
who survived them. 
Victor's historical writing was firmly situated in Manifest Destiny. The Indian 
resistance had been pointless. Victor characterized the resistance as "all of no use. Let them 
kill and steal and burn never so bravely, the fate of the savages was fixed beforehand; and not 
by volunteers, white or black, but by almighty providence, ages before their appearing, just 
as we of the present dominant race must fade before a stronger, whenever such a one is 
sent."29 And there was little room for doubt about who had been destined to mete out the fate 
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that awaited the Indians. Victor argued that "[t]he savages should have been more quickly 
and cheaply killed; the regulars could not fight Indians."30 Victor showed no signs of 
empathy with members of the hostile Indian bands, even noncombatants. Commenting upon 
a report in the Oregon Statesman that volunteer actions in the Rogue River Valley "blotted 
out Jake's band", Victor's sentiments concerning the controversy with General Wool and the 
treatment of Indian noncombatants were clear. Victor also appeared to be presenting a 
sample of contemporary public opinion on the activities of the volunteers when she wrote, 
That they [volunteers] had done so [nearly exterminated a particular band of hostiles] 
was a cause of congratulation to the white settlers, who could nevermore hope for 
security of life or property while they were alive and free. But General Wool in his 
official report stigmatized their proceedings as murder, and drew a pathetic picture of 
the women and children of the slaughtered Indians making their way to Fort Lane 
"for protection," with their limbs frozen. That some had frozen limbs was probably 
true, for the winter was an unusually cold one, a circumstance as injurious to the 
volunteers, many of whom were ill-clad, as to the Indians. But war is a trade, whose 
masters cannot show mercy, even to themselves, peace being obtained only through 
relentless strife. 
These passages and many others of a similar nature reveal Frances Victor's work as 
explicitly racist and implicitly social Darwinist, neither of which is particularly surprising for 
the time that she was writing. Nor is it surprising that Victor justified the conquest of Oregon 
with rhetoric of racial superiority. But some authors are unable or unwilling to see such 
things in Victor's work. In Jim Martin's hagiographical biography of Victor, A Bit of a Blue, 
he claimed that "Frances valued the truth above all else, and was never shy about putting 
forward her view of it.... Her insights, enriched by contact with a wide variety of people, 
remain clear, direct and relevant." In the introduction to a more recent biography of Victor, 
Thomas Vaughan, a former editor of the Oregon Historical Quarterly, downplayed the 
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highly opinionated nature of Victor's historical writing when he assessed the current 
relevance of Victor's work. Vaughan wrote that, 
Most important for our era is the huge mass of information she acquired on her 
endless trawls. There is still much to consider in all she saved for us in the essentially 
unprocessed, uninterpreted information concerning those uncharted landscapes Victor 
visited from the Isthmus of Panama north to Alaska.... [W]e can be grateful that she 
spent far more time recording and preserving rather than interpreting her bountiful 
catch.33 
Unfortunately, it is not just writers of popular history who avoid dealing with Victor's 
fervent racism, and it is more problematic when a contemporary academic does it. In Women 
and the Historical Enterprise in America: Gender, Race, and the Politics of Memory, 1880-
1945 (2003), Julie Des Jardins devoted a total of just over two pages to Victor's career. Still, 
one might wonder how closely Des Jardins read Victor's work. It is strange that in a book 
with "race" in the title, Des Jardins ignored Victor's many strikingly racist comments in The 
Early Indian Wars of Oregon. Perhaps an acknowledgment of Victor's racism would have 
undermined Des Jardins' argument. Des Jardins claimed that because they tended not to be 
associated with university history departments, early women historians "obtained the 
freedom to investigate areas of the past long ignored by the academic establishment, 
including the untapped field of Native American history."34 But, the manner in which Des 
Jardins fit Victor into her argument is seriously flawed, because it misinterprets the goals of 
the Oregon legislature. Des Jardins stated that 
[ujniversity presses accepted monographs on slavery and urban poverty with 
increasing frequency, but the historical abuses of Indians continued to receive only 
marginal attention at regional presses. Fortunately government agencies compensated 
for the lack of academic support by providing women with access to archival 
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evidence and funds to publish their findings on Native American topics. Frances 
Victor proved as early as the 1890s that one need not have academic credentials to 
seek government sponsorship for these projects. Frustrated by the rejection of 
university presses and her menial compensation at the Bancroft Library, she finally 
turned to the Oregon state legislature, which hired her to write The Early Indian Wars 
of Oregon (1894).35 
This passage raises the question of why the Oregon legislature was interested in "Native 
American history." 
Not surprisingly, they were not; they were interested in the history of the settlement 
of Oregon, and "House Concurrent Resolution No. 22," which was included in the opening 
pages of The Early Indian Wars of Oregon, makes that abundantly clear. The Legislature 
resolved that, 
Whereas the early history of the territory of Oregon is in a chaotic state as regards the 
early pioneers, - those noble men and women who braved the perils and sufferings 
incident to a long and tedious journey over the then trackless and uninhabited desert; 
and whereas there still remains a full and varied record of the heroic deeds of those 
brave men and noble women, in the office of the secretary of state, the compilation, 
tabulation, and publication of which would redound to the honor of this patriotic 
people, worthy of adorning the brightest page of American history, and thereby 
transmit to posterity the fortitude and sacrifices of the men who saved this state to the 
United States, - a state that is today the brightest gem in the galaxy of our glorious 
constellation; and whereas many of those early pioneers have passed that bourne from 
whence no traveler returns, and Time has laid his heavy hand on the hoary heads of 
those that remain, let us join with them in erecting to their memory a monument that 
will stand in the solitude of time, beneath whose shadow nations may crumble, and 
around whose summit generations yet unborn may linger, by the publication of those 
records, now resting in oblivion, in the archives of the state.36 
Des Jardins never mentioned this explicit statement of legislative intent as to what type of 
history should be produced from what type of sources. Indeed, Des Jardins endeavored to fit 
Victor into her hypothesis on women historians. As Des Jardins described it, "Delilah 
Beasley had relied heavily on oral testimony for her history of African American 
Californians, as did Frances Victor when writing her histories of Native Americans in the 
"House Concurrent Resolution No. 22," in Victor, Early Indian Wars of Oregon, iii. 
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Pacific states." However, this statement is highly problematic. Although Victor did use 
some oral testimony in her work, she did not write "histories of Native Americans." There 
are no Native American voices in Victor's work. Indeed, among Victor's more important 
sources were letters written in the field by volunteer officers. Instead of Native American 
voices in The Early Indian Wars of Oregon then, we find many examples of the voices of 
volunteer Indian fighters. When she described an encounter between a company of 
volunteers and a band of Tule Lake Modoc in 1853, Victor wrote that, "On the Indian 
children was found the blood-stained clothing taken from murdered immigrant children. 
These families, hiding from the justly apprehended wrath of white men, were made to pay the 
penalty of blood without process of law, or the law's delays." Another example is found in 
Victor's description of a bloody pre-emptive strike made during the autumn of 1855 by a 
group of volunteers on the coast in Coos County, who wished to make sure that local Indians 
did not communicate with emissaries from hostile upper Rogue River bands rumored to be in 
the area. Victor wrote that "[a]n attack was made on them at Drolley's, on the lower branch 
of the Coquille, four being killed, and four captured and hanged. This chastisement seems to 
have convinced these Indians of the folly of attempting to follow the example of the Rogue-
rivers, for they remained quiet during the winter, being closely watched and guarded."39 
Clearly then, Frances Victor and the state legislature were trying to ensure that the 
volunteers' stories were preserved for posterity, but they showed no such interest in the 
stories of the Indians and the few dissenters brave enough to speak out. But apparently that 
is not clear to everyone. Des Jardins described Victor as "initially a serial fictionist who 
came to applaud the new scientific age of truth-seeking and tried to transform herself from a 
37
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story teller into a serious research historian." This statement by Des Jardins is difficult to 
accept in its entirety. Victor was indeed at one point a serial fictionist, but she always 
remained a story teller, because what she turned out to be was much more propagandist than 
historian. It was her position as a literary figure that was stressed in the memorial article 
published in the Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society. At the beginning of the article, 
Victor was described as "the most versatile figure in Pacific Coast literature, a literary 
pioneer on the coast, and a woman to whom Oregonians owe much."41 At the end of the 
article, she combined "the qualities of poet, essayist and historian, [and] she occupied a 
position without peer in the annals of Western literature." 
Victor may have believed that she was "a serious research historian." She certainly 
projected an image that she was seeking the truth. She showed this clearly in a response to a 
critic during a letter exchange published in a newspaper in 1870. Victor argued that because 
she had "access to old files of papers - all the books previously written about the [Oregon] 
country and its history - private papers and public documents, it would be strange if, with a 
disposition to write the truth without fear and without favor, I had not arrived at something 
approximating to it."43 Over two decades later, in the preface to The Early Indian wars of 
Oregon, Victor wrote that "fiction and sentimentalism on the one hand, and vengeful hatred 
on the other, have perverted the truth of history."44 Through the years, Victor engaged in 
public crusades against "fiction and sentimentalism," which seems to have been her term for 
myths she did not accept. The most enduring of these crusades targeted the popular myth 
that had grown up around the martyred missionary Dr. Marcus Whitman, the first fatality of 
40
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Oregon's first Indian war. Victor fought particularly hard against the unsupported assertion 
that Whitman had "saved" Oregon for the US by organizing and leading the important 1843 
immigration over the Oregon Trail. This struggle apparently began in 1880 and continued 
through the rest of her life into the early twentieth century. 
Proponents of the Whitman myth also took the struggle seriously. A prominent local 
historian noted in a review of The Early Indian wars of Oregon in the Oregonian that 
Victor's estimate of Dr. Whitman will not be generally accepted. The impression of 
him given in her writings is of an inflexible, but designing and narrow-minded man, 
whose aims were largely personal. She says of him and his associates that, instead of 
spiritualizing the Indians, they became themselves unspiritualized. She makes the 
astonishing assertion that, upon his setting out for his winter trip to Washington city, 
in 1842, he threatened his Indians that he was going to bring many white men back to 
chastise them. What proof she has for a declaration so little accordant with 
Whitman's character, and so unnecessary and foolish, she does not give, relying 
apparently upon the rumors around the Hudson's Bay trading post.... 
It is to be remembered, however, that Victor has never been a friend of Dr. 
Whitman, and not until positive documents were found, ever admitted that he went to 
Washington. Yet it is too much to imply, or almost boldly assert, that the massacre 
and the Cayuse war were to be laid to a threat of Whitman's that he would bring 
many people to chastise his Indians. The idea is preposterous, and should not be 
found in a book published by the state.46 
About Victor's technique of writing history he argued that 
Victor has written the history of Oregon with the Roman steel, trying to reach 
objective verity. This has been a great service, even where her conclusions have been 
prejudiced and unjust; for, since her method of destructive criticism has been applied, 
a certain sentimentalism that rejoices in the indefinite and improbable has received a 
great correction, and the materials of constructive history are defined as never before, 
thanks as much to those who have combatted her as to herself.47 
Thus it would seem that Victor's belief that she was actively seeking the truth was shared to 
an extent by at least some of those who disagreed with her. 
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Victor had another illuminating encounter with a promoter of mythology. Perhaps 
more used to battling men in the media, Victor's final struggle, which would lead to her only 
publication in a national historical journal, was with another woman. This other woman, 
more than a generation younger than Victor and the wife of a prominent lawyer, was Eva 
Emery Dye who, according to one source, stood 
out as an unusually ambitious and accomplished woman of her time. After attending 
college and earning a Master's degree [in Greek] in Ohio in 1889, she moved to 
Oregon where she became prominent as a literary figure, a researcher in Oregon 
history, and an active member of the Oregon State Women Suffrage Association. 
Dye's novels about early Oregon drew a national audience and were instrumental in 
launching myths about the state's history.48 
Dye wrote her first novel, McLoughlin and Old Oregon, between 1891 and 1893. In 
1894 Dye declined an offer from Harper's to serialize it and then allegedly put the 
manuscript in a drawer for six years before a friend convinced her to submit it to a Chicago 
publisher. In the meantime, Dye wrote a nominally historical work on the Hudson's Bay 
Company for the Historical Series of the Bulletin of the University of Oregon, which was 
under the editorship of Professor F.G. Young, who soon became the first editor of the 
Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society. Even under the editorship of one of the few 
professional historians in Oregon at the time, Dye's imagination was clearly at work in a 
piece that has no notes or citations of any type. Dye described McLoughlin as missing "his 
late imperial fastness in the north. He would be monarch in his fort."50 Dye went on to 
describe Fort Vancouver as a "semibarbaric court, with nabob partners and transient guests, 
with retinues of French-Canadian cooks and voyageurs, and leagues and leagues of Indian 
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subjects."51 Dye depicted the character of the McLoughlin regime as not only regal, but 
worthy of admiration when she wrote that 
the Frenchman amalgamates with inferior tribes is the history of North America; he 
loses his identity, loses his civilization, finally loses empire. The Anglo-Saxon, with 
a moral onsweep, molds anew. With him, tribes must rise or perish. He never loses 
himself. Incapables disappear or blend in the leaven of his empire. The way was 
clear for such an empire here, purely English. But America was too quick.5 
Even in what was touted as an historical article, Dye played somewhat loose with the details 
and seemed to be consciously constructing a myth of Manifest Destiny. 
When McLoughlin and Oregon: A Chronicle was finally published in 1900 its sparse 
framework of actual historical characters was held together with a few fictitious minor 
characters and a large quantity of invented dialogue. Readers met Dr. McLoughlin's 
daughter Eloise, overheard her private conversations with her father, which revealed Eloise 
as a very royal young woman indeed, and then witnessed a very regal Christmas dinner. 
Readers were permitted to travel to California with Sir George Simpson, Dr. McLoughlin and 
Eloise, and even to listen in on their private conversations with high-ranking Mexican 
officials.53 This was just the sort of myth creation which would have excited Victor, 
especially because Dye's book received extremely favorable reviews in the nearly brand new 
Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society. The review is unsigned. Given the shoestring 
budget in those early days of the Quarterly, and the fact that Young was paying at least 
Victor for reviews, it seems likely that the review was written by Young. The review praises 
[t]he secret of her remarkable success in making the characters and conditions of that 
time live again [, which] lay in her getting the confidence of the principle surviving 
actors of that period and securing from them the fullest impress of the traditions of 
stirring times, with all the halo that a half-a-century would naturally invest them with. 
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Through these sources she attained an understanding of the actors and spirit of the 
times so intimate that her pretension to supply the words used on all important 
occasions does not become a mockery, but through this dramatizing the author attains 
the unique element in her success. 
Phrases like "thrilling issues and two real heroes" or "such rare skill and energy" are liberally 
sprinkled through the three-and-a-half page adulatory review. However, near the end of the 
review a small cloud appeared in the otherwise bright sky when the reviewer wrote that 
"[t]owards the closing chapters the author swerves farthest from history towards romance." 
But the cloud vanished with the last sentence, which declared that "[t]his book is by far the 
best that the general reader can select for an introduction to the life of early Oregon."55 
In October 1900, when Frances Victor reviewed Dye's book in the American 
Historical Review, she was far less enthusiastic than the author of the review in the Quarterly 
of the Oregon Historical Society four months earlier. Victor stopped just short of accusing 
Dye of being irresponsible with the truth when she wrote that, 
The impression left upon the general reader is very similar to that received from a 
drama. But the student of history, however the action in the play may entertain him, 
regrets the mingling of fiction with historical truth in a work which is likely to be 
mistaken for a wholly serious one. Mrs. Dye refrains from referring to her 
authorities, although she uses with great freedom all those who are well known, and 
many of which no account is given. This method leaves her free to put her characters 
on the stage in any picturesque dress or attitude which she may choose. Where this 
irresponsibility deals only with the purely romantic it is in a degree pardonable, since 
it enhances the attractiveness of the book. But when, either by assertion or by 
implication, it leads the reader to believe that which is essentially erroneous it 
becomes mischievous. 
Victor made a few specific criticisms in this short review of just under two pages. In her 
book, Dye accused the HBC of trying to thwart American immigration to Oregon by 
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confusing the Methodist missionaries about the trail through the Blue Mountains to the 
Columbia River. Victor noted that "[e]ven the necessity of introducing the element of 
villainy into melodrama does not excuse the perversion of history. Rivalry there was 
between British subjects and Americans in Old Oregon, but criminality, even inhospitality, 
never." Victor also disliked Dye's efforts to make Eloise McLoughlin appear as a kind of 
princess on the Columbia and referred to "representing Eloise McLoughlin as an 
equestrienne" as one of the "unjustifiable instances of this struggling after dramatic effect in 
Mrs. Dye's book."58 Victor explained that at Fort "Vancouver the rules of the Company 
forbade the participation of women in any social functions, and Mrs. McLoughlin and her 
daughter were forced to live in almost conventual seclusion. With her nimble pen our author 
ought to improve upon this performance."59 Clearly, then, Victor wanted to believe that she 
was seeking the truth. But it seems that what she was actually doing was defending her 
personal authority while she told the story of the conquest of the Pacific Northwest from the 
victors' perspective. The truth that she thought she had found was really only social 
consensus, consensus which she played an important role in strengthening. 
This social consensus became powerful. Some people were hesitant to speak openly 
about the Indian Wars years afterwards. In 1878 Hubert Howe Bancroft made a trip to 
Oregon to conduct interviews with pioneers and also to offer Frances Victor the job as one of 
his assistants. One of the interviews Bancroft conducted was with Reverend Josiah L. 
Parrish, a former Methodist missionary, who later became the first Indian Agent on the 
Oregon coast. Also present at the interview was John Minto, a friend of Parrish who had 
come to Oregon in 1844. Minto would later be named by the Board of Directors as Acting 
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President of the Oregon Pioneer Association upon the death of the elected incumbent.60 
When Bancroft asked, "Why did they [the settlers] want an Indian war?" Minto responded, 
"As a means of making money," and Parrish added, "Money was at the foot and head of it."61 
After a brief discussion of profiteering, which Minto concluded by stating "I could name 
some men in Portland who had [engaged in profiteering] in the Indian war," Reverend 
Parrish continued, "I presume it will not be neccesary to give my name in connection with 
this history for I presume they will want to kill me, some of them, and treat me as they did 
Peopeomuxmux." Parrish had willingly engaged in first negotiations with Aboriginal 
groups along the Southern Coast who stood accused of committing atrocities upon travelers. 
He also conducted the first Indian Department count of the Indian peoples of the Southern 
Oregon coast. During both types of expeditions he was the only non-Indian in the group, 
accompanied only by former slaves who had been removed from the Southern Coast to the 
Willamette Valley many years earlier.63 But in 1878 Parrish was afraid of being killed by 
fellow settlers for speaking out about profiteering. 
If we compare another passage from River of the West with something she wrote later, 
we can see that Victor was apparently affected by the social consensus. In 1870 Victor 
described the start of the war in eastern Washington as resulting after a 
party of lawless wretches from the [Puget] Sound Country, passing over the Cascade 
Mountains into the Yakima Valley, on their way to the Upper Columbia mines, found 
some Yakima women digging roots in a lonely place, and abused them. The women 
fled to their village and told the chiefs of the outrage; and a party followed the guilty 
whites and killed several of them in a fight.64 
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Victor also had Indian sub-Agent Andrew J. Bolon bearing some of the responsibility for his 
own death after Bolon failed to judge "the case impartially, [and] made use of threats in the 
name of the United States Government, saying that an army should be sent to punish them for 
killing his people."65 But the most striking thing about Victor's early assessment of the 
Yakima War is the way she described Governor Curry's dispatch of volunteers from Oregon 
into Washington Territory as being "tempted by an opportunity for gain, and encouraged by 
the somewhat reasonable fears of the white population of Washington and Oregon."66 
That the Yakima War was triggered by the reaction to several sexual assaults by 
prospectors and the threats made afterward by Andrew J. Bolon, seems to be very generally 
accepted today. But Victor's account of the events preceding and following the death of sub-
Agent Bolon, changed dramatically in the account she prepared for Bancroft's History of 
Washington, Idaho, and Montana, 1845-1889. All mentions of sexual assaults and 
inappropriate threats were gone, and Victor simply related that 
[f]rom Puget Sound several small parties set forth for Colville by the Nisqually pass 
and the trail leading through the Yakima country by the way of the catholic mission 
of Ahtanahm, and by the middle of September it was rumored that some of them had 
been killed by the Yakimas.... Unattended he [A.J. Bolon, sub-agent responsible for 
dealing with the Yakimas] set out on this business, to show by his coming alone his 
confidence in the good faith of the tribe, and to disarm any fears they might have of 
the intentions of the white people. His absence being protracted beyond the time 
required, Nathan Olney, agent at The Dalles, sent out an Indian spy, who returned 
with the information that Bolon had been murdered while returning to The Dalles, by 
the order of [Yakima head-chief] Kamiakin, and by the hand of his [Kamiakin's] 
nephew ... who shot him [Bolon] in the back while pretending to escort him on his 
homeward journey, cut his throat, killed his horse, and burned both bodies, together 
with whatever property was attached to either. 
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In 1890 Victor made no mention of Governor Curry being "tempted by an opportunity for 
gain" when sending the Oregon Mounted Volunteers (OMV) across the Columbia into 
Washington Territory. 
Indeed, as far as the Bancroft volumes authored by Victor go, any meaningful 
discussion of Curry's dispatch of the OMV into Washington seems to have been lost. There 
is no such discussion in Bancroft's Volume Thirty, the second volume of Oregon history. 
That volume does state that "war followed, the history of which belongs both to Oregon and 
Washington. But since the Indians involved in it were chiefly those attached to the soil and 
superintendency of the latter, I shall present the narrative in my volume on Washington." 
However, in Bancroft's Volume Thirty One, the History of Washington, Idaho and Montana, 
1845-1889, the Oregon Volunteers are given only one mention, which in its entirety says that 
"[s]everal companies were raised in Oregon, as I have elsewhere related, J.W. Nesmith being 
placed in command, with orders to proceed to the seat of war and cooperate with Raines."69 
It appears that the discussion to which Bancroft referred did not find its way into publication. 
In an attempt to find the elsewhere that this information was related, the appropriate volumes 
of Bancroft's histories were searched thoroughly and carefully, but to'no avail. As we shall 
see in the third chapter, where there is a similar episode of information being lost around the 
California boundary, the Bancroft volumes authored by Victor had a tendency to avoid 
information that may have embarrassed her friends. 
By the time Victor began working for Hubert Bancroft she had accumulated a 
substantial collection of historical documents, many of which had been shared with her by a 
small group of close friends, all elite males, lawyers, all of whom shared with Victor an 
Bancroft [Victor], History of Oregon, Vol. II, 368. 
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interest in the history of the Pacific Northwest. These lawyers were well placed to exert an 
influence on the historical memory of the Indian Wars. One of them, Elwood Evans, offered 
a very different interpretation of Isaac Stevens in his History of the Pacific Northwest (1889), 
than had the letters and petitions that Evans had signed during the 1850s. 
Evans had been the deputy court clerk arrested with Chief Justice Lander of the 
Territorial Court the second time that Isaac Stevens used volunteer troops to shut down the 
71 
court in 1856. In a letter to the Secretary of State, Evans described being "seized by armed 
men and paraded through the street, down in front of the executive [Stevens official 
residence], like trophies of a conquest. That humiliation is excessively hard to bear - its 
moral effect is certainly most hurtful on the public mind."72 Evans was also one of the group 
of lawyers who petitioned President Pierce to censure Stevens after the first time Judge 
Lander was arrested.73 He signed letters and resolutions denouncing Stevens' declaration of 
martial law published in an 1856 pamphlet with Evans' name among those attached. One 
resolution stated that "we can arrive at no other conclusion than that the Governor is a 
usurper, a tyrant and a despot."74 The arrest of the accused was "without process of law, and 
without any complaint or affidavit being lodged against them, charging them with the 
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commission of any offence against the law." There was "a peculiar similarity" between the 
grievances of the people of Washington Territory over martial law and "the grievances 
recited as good cause for redress, when George III imposed them on the Thirteen 
Colonies."76 
In his History of the Pacific Northwest, however, Evans interpreted events very 
differently than had the letters he signed in 1856. Evans had to know that attacking the long-
dead Stevens in 1889 would undermine the campaign for federal payments to veterans. 
Evans frankly stated in the preface to History of the Pacific Northwest, that he wrote the book 
to honor the memory of the settlers of Oregon and support the claims of Indian War 
77 
Veterans. Therefore, it is not surprising that Evans' views published in 1889 were at odds 
with those presented in the letters and resolutions he had signed shortly after martial law was 
enacted. 
In 1889 Evans referred to the declaration of martial law merely as "the extraordinary 
78 
subsequent proceedings of Governor Stevens." His position on the loyalty of the accused 
was that 
[suspicions against those persons were undoubtedly justified, not only on account of 
their marital relations, but also from the fact that they could dwell in perfect safety in 
a section of the country which no American dared to visit. The hostiles were known 
to visit their homes. There were reasons justifying the belief that the Indians could 
and did, by threats or persuasion, obtain supplies; and Indian testimony even charged 
several of them with having furnished ammunition to the hostiles. Public policy, and 
the interest of the territory, seemed to demand the removal of those persons from 
proximity to the hostiles; and no fault can justly be found with the manner in which 
their removal was sought.79 
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The main objection Evans expressed in 1889 to the declaration of martial law was that it was 
unnecessary. Evans argued that 
[t]he hostile Indians were disintegrated, were breaking up into small parties, and were 
disheartened. After the decisive action of Connell's Prairie on the 10th of March, 
1856, there never had been another general fight between the hostiles and the troops 
in either service [regulars or volunteers]. All the reports of the different scouts to 
territorial headquarters indicated that the Indians had separated into small bands, were 
avoiding the troops, were thoroughly demoralized, and that many had escaped across 
the mountains. Assuming that the conduct of those parties had rendered them liable 
to suspicion by the authorities, yet there was no real cause at that time to justify the 
subversion of the civil law to the military, and for the degradation of the judiciary. 
In his assessment of Stevens' popularity Evans supports Stevens' nomination for entry into 
the pantheon of patriotic mythology. Evans wrote that 
[t]he majority of people sustained him. His immediate friends and supporters likened 
the matter to the fining of General Jackson at New Orleans by Judge Hall. There 
were many who gave utterance to the thought, that the mantle of that distinguished 
chieftain had descended to and clothed the hero, who, with a regiment of volunteers at 
his call, had for the time being overawed and overthrown county courts, contemned 
[sic] their authority, and had twice refused to obey a writ of habeas corpus. History 
does not require the further carrying out of the parallel. It may be summed up in the 
respective judgments of Judges Hall and Lander. The former fined General Jackson 
one thousand dollars. Governor Stevens was fined by the latter fifty dollars. 2 
While Stevens was now most valuable as a hero, General Wool had to be demonized 
in order for Evans to reach the goal he expressed in his preface, the attainment of "justice" 
for the volunteer veterans. And Wool was, indeed, vilified. According to Evans, 
General Wool had, in a manner most insulting, humiliating and degrading, ignored 
the authorities of both Oregon and Washington. Through private pique, malignity or 
envy, or all combined, he had refused to furnish an escort or guard to ensure the 
safety of Governor Stevens, an United States commissioner, through the hostile 
Indian country. The time had therefore come, either for the territories to protect 
themselves or abandon the field and trust entirely to General Wool, who, judging 
from the animus so manifestly displayed in his every report made to the War 
Department, was not as much interested in punishing the Indians and securing peace 
Ibid, 581. 
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as he was in seeking to bolster up libelous and slanderous charges he had originated 
against the people of Oregon and Washington territories. 
Victor and Evans corresponded for many years, apparently beginning in 1865 and 
on 
continuing to at least 1886. At the beginning of her historical career in 1865 Victor wrote 
to Evans that "[w]e, in our humble way may be serving posterity by presenting the several 
sides of an argument to dispassionate criticism of another generation." Thus, it would seem 
on the surface that Victor accepted responsibility for presenting dispassionate interpretations 
of history. But if we look at the bits of correspondence between Victor and her lawyer 
friends that have been published, some interesting revelations emerge about attempts at 
shaping the historical memory of the Indian wars. 
In a 1992 MA thesis on the Stevens/Wool Controversy, John Simpson, who made no 
mention of Victor, listed Hubert Bancroft as one of four "historians who wrote strongly in 
support of Governor Stevens' actions."85 Simpson, probably unwittingly, was correct about 
the authorship of the sections of Bancroft's History of Washington, Idaho, and Montana that 
dealt with Stevens. Around 1886 Victor wrote a letter marked confidential to Evans 
complaining that Bancroft had "cut down to nothing, almost, the account of the Stevens and 
Wool war which I had written out fully. He changed my estimate of Stevens, apparently, 
without any good reason - about the only important change of coloring given anywhere." 
About the dispute between Wool and Stevens, Bancroft's final version stated that, 
During this visit, as indeed on some other occasions both before and after, Wool did 
not deport himself as became a man occupying an important position. He censured 
everybody, not omitting [regular army officers] Raines and Haller, but was 
particularly severe upon territorial officers and volunteers. He ordered disbanded the 
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company raised by [acting Washington Territorial Governor] Mason to go to the 
relief of Governor Stevens returning from the Blackfeet country, although Raines put 
forth every argument to induce him to send it forward. This conduct of Wool's was 
bitterly resented by Stevens, who quoted the expressions used by Wool in his report 
to the departments at Washington, and in a letter to the general himself. The effect of 
Wool's course was to raise an impassable barrier between the regular and volunteer 
officers, and to leave the conduct of the war practically in the hands of the latter. 
This single paragraph is apparently all that Bancroft felt the Wool-Stevens 
controversy deserved. The martial law episode, however, received four paragraphs, and 
Bancroft made it quite clear that the Governor faced significant opposition. Bancroft wrote 
that "Stevens, while having with him the ultra anti-Indian element, had become unpopular in 
other quarters. His martial-law measure, among others, was severely criticized."88 Bancroft 
stressed that public opinion was divided over the declaration of martial law and that there 
was open dissent. Bancroft's summary of this episode demonstrates that it did not fade 
away quickly, "for over innumerable technicalities, in which lawyers, judges, citizens, 
officials, and military men had become involved, wrangling continued throughout the 
year."90 
Thus, Bancroft apparently thwarted what seems to have been an attempt by Victor 
and one of her informants to put their own spin on history. Other episodes revealed in bits of 
published correspondence show more attempts to manipulate Bancroft, including one that 
was successful and apparently allowed another of Victor's lawyer friends to put his own 
personal spin on history. 
In another published letter, Victor wrote to Judge Matthew P. Deady in 1883 that 
Bancroft was 
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given to make disparaging remarks not really necessary to the truth of history, of 
some of the most prominent men of early times, such as Pratt and Lane. Wherever he 
alters anything I have written it is usually to put in a paragraph of that kind. He made 
particular war on Pratt, using such words as "infamous" and "disgusting", and where I 
had given Pratt some just praise, cut it out entirely.... What I am getting at is to put 
you on your watch for these passages, and that you may criticize them when the 
proofs go to you. Mr. B will regard your remarks.91 
This was not the only time that Victor complained about Bancroft to Judge Deady. In a 1941 
Oregon Historical Quarterly article on Victor, then editor Alfred Powers presented a very 
similar quotation, but without the plea for assistance, taken from a Victor to Deady letter of 
November 3, 1886. Powers noted that this was just "one of a number of complaining 
references to her Bancroft employment to be found in the Deady correspondence in the 
manuscript collections of the Oregon Historical Society." 
Deady mentioned Victor's "prejudices" in his diary. In his entry for August 10, 1888, 
Deady wrote, "Worked on 2 Oregon and finished it. Have made many corrections of fact and 
might have made many of opinion, but I did not care to. Wrote to Bancroft on the subject 
and cautioned him a little against Victors prejudices and predelictions." Slightly over five 
years transpired between Victor's solicitation of Deady's assistance and Deady's diary entry. 
From the published correspondence, there is no way to tell what may have transpired during 
that time in the way of collaboration between them to manipulate Bancroft. Perhaps Deady 
assisted Victor for a time before tiring of her demands, perhaps not. 
But the collaboration between Victor and another of her lawyer friends paid more 
obvious dividends and strongly suggests that the historical memory was influenced or 
distorted for personal gain. In Volume Two of the Bancroft History of Oregon and again in 
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the book the Oregon legislature paid her to write on the Indian Wars, Victor acknowledged 
her indebtedness to southern Oregon lawyer and newspaper publisher Benjamin Franklin 
Dowell, for allowing her access to his collection of documents. Victor described Dowell's 
collection as 
a valuable compilation of original documents and letters pertaining to the wars of 
1855-6 in southern Oregon, [that] furnishes conclusive proof of the invidious course 
of the Salem clique [of the ruling Democratic Party] toward that portion of the 
territory. Dowell has taken much pains to secure and preserve these fragments of 
history, and in doing so has vindicated his section, from which otherwise the blame of 
certain alleged illegal acts might never have been removed. Then there are his Indian 
Wars; Scrap Book; Letters; Biographies, and various pamphlets which contain almost 
a complete journal of the events to which this chapter is devoted.94 
In other words, these "fragments" that Dowell took "so much pains to secure and 
preserve" had a profound effect upon Victor's history, which helped remove the blame for 
certain illegal acts. One of General Wool's main arguments was that the Indians in Southern 
Oregon were the victims of illegal acts. Wool stated repeatedly that the whites were 
responsible for the conflict there and referred to the killing of groups of unarmed Indians, 
mostly women and children, as "inhuman and atrocious outrages ... several of which were 
spread before the public as great volunteer victories, and which forever will disgrace the 
annals of our country."95 Things did not turn out as Wool predicted. The annals of the 
country were not disgraced by these instances of what now might be termed societal 
genocide, and it would seem that Benjamin Dowell deserves much of the credit for that. 
Dowell may also deserve some of the credit for convincing Victor to toe the party line on 
General Wool, but that cannot be determined from their published correspondence. 
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Dowell's "manuscripts" consist mostly of newspaper clippings, largely from 
Dowell's own paper, The Oregon Sentinel, but with a few items from other papers of the 
area.96 The second most numerous items are letters written by various volunteer officers. 
The striking thing about the letters is that many words, phrases and sometimes entire 
paragraphs are crossed out. They are probably first drafts, with polished versions going to 
the addressee. All of this material is very one-sided and simply serves to reinforce the 
perceptions of those involved in the war. Most are correspondence between the Colonel of 
the Jackson County Volunteers, John Ross, and his Adjutant, Charles S. Drew. In his 
analysis of "The War within a War," historian E.A. Schwartz argued that Dowell, Drew and 
Ross were all partisans of the Know-Nothing-Party who were battling the dominant 
Democratic Party for a chunk of the profits of the Indian War.97 Drew put a significant 
amount of effort into the collection of war related claims, and the main focus of his effort, a 
long submission to Congress in 1860, will be examined in some detail in the final chapter. It 
seems pertinent and appropriate here to draw attention to E.A. Schwartz's assessment of 
Drew: "Any statement by Drew on any subject should be viewed with suspicion." 
Dowell was in a good position to profit during the war. During the early 1850s 
Dowell owned and operated a freighting business active in the mining region of the Siskiyou 
Mountains on the border between Oregon and California. The brief biography of Dowell in 
Bancroft's second volume of Oregon history revealed an ambitious nature. Dowell 
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emigrated from New Franklin, Mo., in 1850, taking the California road, but arriving 
in the Willamette Valley in Nov. He had studied law, but now taught a school in Polk 
county for the summer of 1851, and afterward in the Waldo hills. It was slow work 
for an ambitious man; so borrowing some money and buying a pack train, he began 
trading to the mines of southern Oregon and northern California, following it 
successfully for four years. He purchased flour of J. W. Nesmith at his mills in Polk 
county at ten cents per lb., and sold it in the mines at $1 and $1.25. He bought butter 
at 50 cents per lb., and sold it at $1.50; salt at 15 cents per lb., and sold it at $2 and $3 
per lb., and other articles in proportion.... When war broke out, Do well was 'the first 
in and the last out' of the fight. After that he settled in Jacksonville, and engaged in 
the practice of law and newspaper management. 
Obviously, then, Dowell was in a very good position to profit during the war. More 
uncommonly, however, he was also in a very good position to profit from the war for many 
years after it was over. 
After the war, Dowell's ambitions shifted and when his political aspirations were 
frustrated,100 he "derived some political satisfaction from newspaper writing."101 But his 
primary activity and main source of income from 1868 to 1891 was as a claims attorney 
trying to get money out of Congress. Dividing his time between Oregon and Washington, 
DC, Dowell pursued the collection of claims for volunteers' wages, supplies, and property 
damaged by Indians. In The Early Indian Wars of Oregon, Victor emphasized a theme of 
public service when discussing Dowell's legal practice. "[A]s to the widows and fatherless 
children left by the war," Victor wrote, 
the little indemnity money to be obtained at the end of the congressional deliberation 
and commissioners' awards counted as nothing against their losses. Many of the 
claimants failed to receive this pitiful payment, and, in 1872, the balance of the 
appropriation for this purpose was illegally turned back into the treasury, where it 
remained for ten years longer before, by the labor of several attorneys and an order of 
Secretary Fairchilds, it was placed back to the credit of the claimants. And then the 
commissioner of Indian affairs and the secretary and auditor of the treasury, were 
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unable to find the original report of the commissioners of award, refusing to pass any 
claim without it, or without an act of congress. However, at length, through the 
persistency of B. F. Dowell of Jacksonville, the original report was discovered, and 
the claims all settled thirty years after the war.103 
Histories such as those written by Victor, some sections of which were based largely upon 
material supplied by Dowell, certainly aided Dowell's cause. The nature and subject matter 
of Dowell's fragments suggest that he presented this collection to induce Victor to justify the 
war in southern Oregon in order to support efforts to extract money from the federal 
government, and one is left surmising that may have been the motive for "collecting" these 
fragments in the first place. 
Benjamin Dowell was one of the more prominent individuals to benefit from the 
Indian Wars of Oregon. Through his association with Victor and his ownership of The 
Oregon Sentinel, he was also in an excellent position to influence the historical memory. 
First, those who benefited from the war misrepresented the controversy with Wool and, 
somewhat later, others, such as Victor valorized the settlement enterprise. The original 
misrepresentations are not surprising, but the image of Wool thus constructed showed an 
unexpected resiliency well into the 1980s. 
Victor's take on the Indian Wars of the Pacific Northwest in general and General 
Wool in particular has proved remarkably enduring. And, unfortunately, in contrast to the 
very straightforward passage from Kent Richards praising Victor quoted above, some authors 
are either rather devious about the way they encourage us to take Victor's word for how 
Wool's personality led him to misrepresent things or rather careless in examining the sources 
used for the secondary sources they cite. For example, the editors of the memoirs of a young 
man who made a trip through northern California and southern Oregon in 1855 just as 
Victor, Early Indian Wars of Oregon, 330. 
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hostilities were breaking out in the Rogue River Valley asserted that General Wool was 
uncooperative, antagonistic of civilians, and had his subordinates sufficiently intimidated that 
they colored their reports to escape Wool's criticism.104 These editors cited three sources for 
these assertions. The first source was Volume Two of Hubert Howe Bancroft's history of 
Oregon, which as we have seen was largely written by Victor.105 The third was The Early 
Indian Wars of Oregon.™ The other was a jingoistic tertiary popular history published in 
1953, which has no footnotes, but does have a bibliography that includes The Early Indian 
Wars of Oregon and, except for Jeff C. Riddle's The Indian History of the Modoc War and 
the Causes that Led to It, relied exclusively on settler accounts of the hostilities.107 Thus the 
spin Mrs. Victor put on General Wool's personality continued to shape the historical memory 
of the General for well over a century after Wool's death, and nearly 80 years after Victor's 
death. 
Victor's influence upon the historical memory of Territorial Indian Affairs 
Superintendent Joel Palmer is quite a contrast to Wool's case. In 1855-56 many Oregonians 
severely criticized Palmer for his attitudes, actions, and communications with General Wool. 
The Oregonian of June 28, 1856 contained a report of a citizens' meeting held June 16th at the 
Douglas County courthouse in Roseburg. According to the report, the "very large 
assemblage of the citizens of Douglass county" at the meeting passed a series of resolutions 
that were then distributed to newspaper editors throughout the territory. This meeting was 
obviously focused on smoothing the obstacles to federal payment of the debts incurred while 
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fighting the Indians. The preamble makes a good deal of noise about "nobly fighting to 
avenge the wrongs of our murdered countrymen who fell fighting for the preservation of 
American soil, and for the honor and integrity of the American flag." The first four 
resolutions passed at this meeting placed all responsibility for the hostilities upon the Indians. 
For example, the second resolution states, 
That the war now existing in Oregon was not brought upon us by the maltreatment of 
the Indians by unprincipled white men; but on the contrary, that the whites have 
always observed strictly, the terms of the treaty of 1853, made by Joel Palmer, and 
their only fault has been in treating these ungrateful wretches with too much kindness 
and christian forbearance, thereby familiarizing them with our social condition, our 
exposed situation, and with the use of our weapons of warfare.109 
Palmer is not mentioned again until the fifth resolution, which resolved 
that although the reports and communications of Gen. Wool represent us in a very 
unfair light, we do not impute it to any wrong motives in him, but would rather 
attribute it to the bad hands in which he fell on arriving in Oregon, and from whom he 
received his information, especially the official report of Joel Palmer to Gen. Wool, 
which, coming as it did from an officer of the United States, appointed by the 
President, was well calculated to deceive the old General, and which was false in 
conception, false in fact, and without the shadow of foundation in truth.110 
This was a minority viewpoint and an extremely rare instance of a contemporary source 
absolving General Wool of responsibility for statements he had made. Palmer lost his job as 
Indian Affairs Superintendent shortly after the Roseburg meeting. Stanley Spaid explained 
Palmer's dismissal as "the result of several complicated factors, namely: Palmer's sympathy 
for the friendly Indians, his statements placing the blame for the war upon the whites, 
opposition to [Palmer's] policy of collecting the Indians west of the Cascades on the Coast 
and Grand Ronde Reservations, and political intrigue."111 It should be pointed out that 
"Mass Meeting at Roseburg," The Oregonian (June 28, 1856) in Evans, "Campaign of Maj. Gen. John E. 
Wool." 
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Palmer's plan of collecting the Indians on reservations in western Oregon was founded on his 
belief that the more popularly accepted plan of removing the Indians of western Oregon to 
the desert country east of the Cascades was unworkable, but profit motivations were most 
likely a factor in Palmer's dismissal as well. According to a letter from Governor Curry to 
Delegate Joseph Lane, sagging scrip values immediately jumped 10 percent when news of 
Palmer's dismissal reached Oregon.112 
Palmer's reputation has since been rehabilitated from the negative aspersions once 
cast upon him. The start of this process was evident during Palmer's lifetime. Many of 
Palmer's harshest critics during his tenure as Indian Affairs Superintendent were later 
business or political associates.114 In 1862 Palmer was elected to the lower house of the state 
legislature as a Union Democrat, where he served as speaker, before being elected to the 
upper house in 1864.11 Suggested as a compromise candidate, Palmer declined a seat in the 
US Senate in 1866 because of his perception of a conflict with the oath he had taken upon 
entering the state legislature.116 In 1870 Palmer, by then a Republican, lost the state 
gubernatorial race by a narrow margin of just over 600 votes. There was some criticism of 
Palmer's past during the campaign, but the comments ran along party lines. For example, the 
States Rights Democrat of Albany denounced Palmer's statements during his time as 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs when they declared that "a more cruel, wanton, unnatural, 
and altogether infamous libel upon the innocent and suffering white people of Southern 
Oregon whose happy homes were desolated by the torch and knife of those red devils whom 
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Palmer defended, has never been uttered in the limits of this state before." Slightly over 
11,000 voters apparently disagreed. Palmer's obituary in the Oregonian discussed his term 
as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in two sentences and made no mention of controversy.118 
Historians have been kind to Palmer, so too was Frances Victor. She did not refer to 
Palmer's removal from his position as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in The Early Indian 
Wars of Oregon. About his activities while in office, Victor simply wrote that "Palmer was a 
man who took his own way about things, and as he did his work thoroughly, without pother, 
those from whom he derived his authority seldom meddled with him. If he was arbitrary, he 
was generally in the right, and it saved a deal of trouble to give him the management."11 
Palmer's time as Superintendent and his removal from office were described in Bancroft's 
Oregon history in a similar non-judgmental manner. Once he had 
conceived the idea of removing the Indians from the southern reservations, Palmer 
was not to be deterred either by the protests of the people or the disapprobation of the 
legislative assembly. 
.... Preparations were then made for bringing all the tribes from Coos Bay south to 
the California line upon the coast reservation selected in 1854. The legislature had 
asked for the removal of the superintendent on this ground; though in reality it was a 
political dodge; and his removal was accomplished before he had fairly finished the 
work at hand.120 
None of the earlier criticism of Palmer over his words and actions as Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs came through in Victor's historical narratives. But Victor was certainly not 
gentle with General Wool. And, as we have seen, her influence was sometimes openly 
acknowledged and other times could be clearly seen in regional historical writing in the 
1980s, nearly 100 years after she wrote. We have also seen the influence of Benjamin 
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Franklin Dowell upon Victor. Do well's case shows clearly that the historical memory of the 
war was influenced for profit. This is not particularly surprising; economic motivation will 
always be more than sufficient to convince some people to misrepresent situations. The 
durability of the memory thus constructed is far more surprising. 
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Chapter Three 
"Inhuman and atrocious outrages" 
This final chapter tackles the issue of societal responsibility for the War in southern 
Oregon. This has never really been done before. Settler mythology has long been accepted 
at face value, and the founding myths have never really been subjected to serious critical 
analysis. Nor has any real examination been done of how the racial attitudes of the settlers 
may have influenced interactions with the aboriginal peoples of the Pacific Northwest. Some 
may find my emphasis on racial factors to be simplistic, or intellectually unfashionable, but 
the wars were described in racial terms both at the time and for many years later. 
During the tension immediately before the outbreak of hostilities in the autumn of 
1855, Editor Dryer of the Oregonian described the conflict in racial terms and wrote 
eloquently about his preferred solution to the Indian problem: extermination. Dryer argued 
that it was time 
to admit that we have about as much sympathy for the whole race of Indians on the 
Pacific slope, as we have for a nest of scorpions, or a den of rattlesnakes - and would 
rejoice to see them exterminated in the one case, as we would in the other. Until that 
is done, there will be no peace or safety, notwithstanding the innumerable treaties that 
may be made, and the millions of money expended by the general government, under 
the impression that the race can, and ought to be civilized, or christianized, or that 
justice ought to be meted out to the original occupants of the soil.1 
Oregon Territory's Congressional Delegate, Joseph Lane, also framed the conflict in racial 
terms in a speech to Congress. Lane claimed that 
a general uprising has taken place for the purpose of exterminating the intruders, or 
driving them from the land. Who that acknowledges the right of the white race to 
occupy and improve the lands of the natives, (and I know of no one who will deny it) 
- who that acknowledges such right will deny to them the right of self-defense when 
assailed in their pioneer homes; and who will not go further than this, and say that, 
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where their numbers and their means are inadequate to their defense, it is the duty of 
the Government to afford them protection, and save them.2 
Lane clearly expected that racial solidarity would prevail and play a role in convincing 
Congress to pay the war claims. 
In fact racial explanations for the Indian Wars of the Pacific Northwest were 
dominant before the middle of the twentieth century. For example, the first history text 
written specifically for teaching Oregon history, by three academic historians, including the 
head of the History Department at the University of Oregon, stated that, "after all is said, the 
Indian vanished because he could not learn the ways of the white man. He could not survive 
in competition with the dominant race." 
From its earliest beginnings the developing mythology of the settlement of the Pacific 
Northwest shrouded the conflicts with the region's original inhabitants in a cloak of denial. 
In this chapter key aspects of the formation of the social memory of the Indian wars are 
examined with an emphasis on the denial of responsibility for the Indian wars, which became 
an important aspect of the settler mythology of the Pacific Northwest. The focus is on the 
last stage of the conflict in southern Oregon, more commonly known as the Rogue River 
Indian War, 1855-56. Two starkly contrasting pictures of the war emerge from early 
accounts. The dissenting account was excluded from the developing historical memory of 
the conflict in Southern Oregon. The implications of this exclusion upon the accuracy of the 
social memory become quite obvious upon close comparison of the two accounts. 
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Denial of responsibility for starting the war began in the early days of the conflict. 
One common method of denial was the inversion of who the invaders were. This inversion 
was clearly seen in the editorials of Thomas Dryer. Dryer claimed that the facts were 
[b]riefly this: Our country is invaded by hostile savages - we are suddenly plunged 
into a war. It becomes absolutely necessary for the protection of the lives and 
property of our citizens, that immediate action should be taken to repel these savages. 
An army must be immediately raised, armed, mounted and sent into the field to beat 
back the invaders of our soil. 
Dryer used the concept of the Indians as invaders for a variety of purposes. The above 
quotation was part of one of Dryer's characteristic polemical attacks on the ruling 
Democratic party. The following quotation was part of a diatribe against merchants who 
would not share the risk by raising their prices and taking scrip for supplying volunteer units. 
Dryer wrote that some merchants 
refuse even to furnish, at exorbitant prices, articles which they have on hand for sale 
to the Commissary and Quartermaster's departments, without the cash in hand. In 
other words, they won't trust Uncle Sam when the territory is invaded by a hostile 
foe, and yet claim that Uncle Sam must protect them, and furnish men in their behalf, 
without food, without clothes, arms, ammunition, or anything else necessary to carry 
on the war.5 
Dryer also used the extermination of the Indians as a concept to rally around in order to 
encourage unity among the settlers. He claimed that 
[a] long, bloody and destructive Indian war is on hand, which must be checked. 
Volunteers, arm and out! Let no political party or selfish interest, cause any for a 
moment to hesitate or falter. The time has come when the people must act in concert 
to repel and exterminate these Indian marauders, who are the curse and scourge of the 
country. Let every man who can shoulder a rifle, rush to the contest and never yield 
until these merciless red-skins are driven from our borders.6 
If the Indians were the invaders, then the settlers were fighting a defensive war, which 
was forced upon them. Ideally, the foe should be formidable as well. In early March of 
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1856, as the controversy with Wool was starting, before the Oregonian published Wool's 
letter to Stevens, Dryer argued there was a general conspiracy of Indians in the Northwest 
and greatly inflated the number of Indians involved. As Dryer saw things, 
Our common country is now and has been for several months involved in a general 
war with the combined forces of some twenty different tribes of Indians, numbering 
thousands of warriors, who are well armed, mounted and supplied for a long and 
destructive war against the Americans, who own and occupy this country. This war is 
not of our seeking, but has been forced upon us in self defence. It must go forward 
until the last Indian is exterminated, and a lasting peace is conquered. The 
government of the United States are bound in honor and in duty to stand by, defend, 
protect and sustain us in this war. That they will pay its expenses we have no doubt, 
and do all that they have covenanted to do, Gen. Wool's policy, influence or views to 
the contrary not withstanding. 
Dryer significantly exaggerated the extent of the hostilities when he wrote that 
[t]here is no man of common observation acquainted with the facts but who will 
testify that the present Indian war in Oregon has been forced upon our citizens. 
Notwithstanding what Gen. Wool has said, done or written, or what the Oregon 
Statesman may have published in its columns in relation to the present Indian war, the 
facts stand upon record that this war was the result of a combination of all the Indian 
tribes between California and the British possessions in the north, and between the 
Missouri river and the Pacific ocean on the west, to commence a war with the whites. 
Whatever the justification on the part of the Indians - if any - we shall not stop now 
to inquire. It is enough that the Indian tribes occupying this large extent of country 
have, by concert of action, commenced at the same time, a war of extermination 
against the whites. They have been for a long time laying waste to the country by the 
torch of the incendiary, and by killing every unfortunate unarmed white man who 
might fall in their way. They have always been in the habit of stealing everything 
they could lay their hands on. Now, they have simultaneously commenced murdering 
men, women and children all around us. Treaty stipulations and solemn covenants 
are set at naught. The whole country resounds with the cry of anguish; and the nights 
are made light by the flames of burning dwellings and barns. The property of the 
people is constantly being destroyed, their stock driven into the mountains, and 
thousands of our citizens forced to abandon their homes and find shelter and 
protection among strangers, or perish.8 
It would seem that Dryer was quite aware that more sympathy could be won for the payment 
of the war debts if more were at stake than the welfare of a few settlers in a remote region. 
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Making it seem like American control of a vast region was threatened most likely can be 
interpreted as indicating how important payment of the war debts was to Dryer. 
Dryer provided an outlet for people to have their say by publishing letters from 
people in outlying regions discussing events in their region. In the fall of 1855 a settler in the 
Rogue River Valley wrote to Dryer describing his perception of the situation in the 
lower part of the Rogue river valley[, which] is very thinly settled. The Indians, 
aware of this fact, take advantage of it, and swarm among us worse than the plagues 
of Egypt; Indians from all parts dwell among us at all times and in large numbers.... 
They invade our dwellings at all times, no part of which is sacred from their 
sacrilegious steps, and not only this, but we must tamely endure the presence and 
almost daily visits of the most cold-blooded murderers and midnight assassins that 
our country has ever been cursed with. With the blood of our fellow-citizens, who 
cried vainly for mercy in the Illinois valley, scarcely dry upon their hands - with the 
groans from the Klamath still ringing in our ears - the heartless butchery on the 
Siskiyou, even before our eyes - he that can tamely look upon the fiends, the 
perpetrators of these atrocious deeds, with the threat of a like fate to himself and 
family hanging over him, and be satisfied, must be either more or less than a man.9 
This letter was not published until nearly three weeks later, but it was dated October 8, 1855, 
the day of a controversial attack upon a sleeping group of Indian women, children and a few 
elderly men. The events of October 8 and their aftermath will be examined in some detail 
below. First, however, there were some who saw the situation in the Rogue River Valley 
prior to the final outbreak of hostilities there much differently than did Dryer's 
correspondent. 
Mining and settlement in the Rogue River Valley started slowly in 1851 and 
increased in 1852-53.10 Aboriginal subsistence patterns in the valley were disrupted quite 
quickly. As Indian Affairs Superintendent Palmer reported in June of 1853, "The increasing 
9
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settlements are rapidly diminishing the roots and game on which the Indians of the valley 
mainly subsist, and their increasing difficulties in obtaining subsistence, in the absence of 
moral restraint, impel them to the frequent commission of petty thefts - a source of 
annoyance, loss, and irritation to the settlers."11 These Indians' very survival was threatened 
by an influx of newcomers who saw depriving the Indians of subsistence as perfectly moral, 
and who viewed the Indians' efforts to survive as theft, which was then labeled as immoral. 
During the summer of 1852 prominent settlers were drinking toasts to the extinction of the 
1 7 
Indians of Rogue River Valley. A year later a recent immigrant to the Rogue River Valley 
reported in her journal during early August of 1853, "Strong threats are made of 
exterminating all the Red mans tribe." The situation worsened as settlement increased. In 
his first annual report of July 1854, Indian Agent Samuel Culver echoed the sentiments heard 
from Palmer a year earlier. Culver related that "the Indians complained that the white people 
had come to their country, taken their homes, destroyed their means of subsistence, and shot 
down their people, until, with the uncertainty of food and of life which surrounded them, and 
the agonies of continual mourning, life had become almost a burden."14 Culver also noted 
that the presence of the settlers was an important factor in the Indians' food shortage. Before 
settlement began the Indians of the valley 
subsisted in the main upon roots, of which there was a great variety and quantity; 
each kind had its locality and time of ripening or becoming fit for use. But the whites 
have nearly destroyed this kind of food by plowing the ground and crowding the 
Indians from localities where it could once be procured. They did not find these roots 
upon any one tract of the country, but there would be an abundance in one locality 
11
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one month, and of another variety at another place the ensuing. The settlers have 
interfered, by the cultivation of the soil in the valleys, with the obtaining of this 
species of food to such an extent, that while they can get plenty during certain seasons 
of the year, they will at other times be in a starving condition.15 
Later in 1854 a report by Superintendent Palmer made the situation of the Indians of 
the upper Rogue River sound quite dismal. Palmer reported that he 
found the Indians of the Rogue River Valley excited and unsettled. The hostilities of 
last summer had prevented the storing of the usual quantities of food; the occupation 
of their best root-grounds by the whites greatly abridged that resource: their scanty 
supplies and the unusual severity of the winter had induced disease, and death had 
swept away nearly one fifth of those residing on the [Table Rock] reserve. 
Consternation and dismay prevailed; many had fled, and others were preparing to fly 
to the mountains for security.1 
The settlers' livestock also contributed to the destruction. George Riddle, whose settler 
parents enjoyed good relations with the Cow Creek Band just north of the Rogue River 
Valley, related in a 1920 series of newspaper articles that "[t]he settlers' hogs rooted up the 
Kamas, a bulb upon which the Indians depended largely for food."17 But it seems that most 
settlers were either unaware of the fragility of the Indians' traditional means of subsistence or 
simply did not care. 
Agent Culver's 1854 report revealed his impression of the way in which many Euro-
Americans in the valley saw the plight of the Indians. Culver explained that 
[m]any, and perhaps most persons then in this valley, had been attracted hither in 
advance of the settlement to any considerable extent of the country by the rich gold 
discoveries made in the valley, and were actuated by the same laudable motive of 
gain as miners generally, without the intention of remaining in the country, and alike 
without the wish to sow the seeds for future discord between the natives and our own 
people, to the injury of those of their friends who might wish to reside permanently in 
the valley. Their minds were upon but the one object; they did not care about or think 
of Indians. But, as they say, during the whole period of our sojourn here previous to 
15
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the commencement of the war alluded to, it has been an unending series of disasters 
to us and our associates, caused by Indians. 
However, Culver's replacement, Dr. George Ambrose, clarified in an 1855 report that many 
of the miners' "disasters" were actually incidents of petty theft. As Ambrose described the 
situation, 
In most instances, the houses are of rude logs, and not very securely fastened, which 
offers a temptation to Indians hard for them to resist, especially when we consider 
they have been trained to steal from their infancy. After a repetition of thefts a few 
times, and the individual, after a hard day's work, has had to walk two or three miles 
to get his supper and lay in another small lot of provisions, which in a few days may 
probably go the same way, he gets peevish and angry, and embittered against the 
Indian race, and would about as soon shoot an Indian as eat his supper.1 
From the beginning of settlement, then, the very presence of settlers threatened the Indians of 
the Rogue River Valley with starvation, and many settlers seem to have reacted with either 
apathy or hostility. 
Into this simmering subsistence crisis we can add a disease that devastated the Indians 
of southern Oregon. Riddle estimated that between half and two-thirds of the Indians of the 
southern Umpqua Valley, just north of the Rogue River Valley, died of some kind of fever 
during the winter of 1852-53. This was most likely the same chills, ague and fever 
graphically described by America Rollins Butler during the latter half of 1853.21 However, 
Butler discussed the disease many times in her journal without mentioning fatalities among 
the settlers. This dire situation for the aboriginal people of the valley developed rather 
quickly after the start of settlement in the Rogue River Valley. Riddle described what his 
family saw in 1851 on their 
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journey through the beautiful Rogue river valley. At that time its primitive beauty 
had not been marred by the hand of the white man. Our home seekers must have 
regretted that they could not at that time settle upon the fertile soil of Bear creek 
valley, but we were in the Indian country. 
At the time we passed through the Rogue river valley there were no settlements of 
any kind and we met no prospectors, but later in the fall of 1851 gold was discovered 
at Jacksonville, which caused that country to settle up rapidly in 1852. We met with 
very few Indians in the Rogue River country and those we met were friendly.22 
Neither Riddle nor early historian A.G. Walling explained exactly why this party felt they 
could not settle in the Rogue River Valley in 1851, but the Riddles went north to settle in 
Cow Creek Valley, a tributary of the South Umpqua.23 Riddle related how his family and the 
other settlers in the Cow Creek Valley got along very well with the local Indians from 1851-
94 
55. However, in spite of these good relations, the Cow Creek Indians decided in the 
autumn of 1855 to leave Cow Creek Valley and participate in the hostilities, but took no 
action against their immediate neighbors. Riddle described the dismal situation of 
the Indians of southern Douglas County. In the four years after 1851 their numbers 
had diminished over one half. The sources of their food supply had been greatly 
diminished by the settlers' fields and livestock, especially hogs, that ravaged their 
kammas fields. Many of their race had been ruthlessly killed.... 
These hangings and killing together with the treacherous slaughter of the Grave 
Creek Indians and the murder of "Tip-su" Bill by the Grave Creeks at the instigation 
of the whites, also the murder of the old Indian and squaw near our home, and 
numerous other slaughters of Indians in Josephine county at a time of peace and of 
Indians not involved in the short war of 1853 - all these outrages were known to our 
Indians and made them ripe to enter into the hostilities against the whites when the 
general outbreak of the Rogue Rivers came in 1855.26 
A repeated theme in Riddle's narrative is a tendency to dispute published historical 
accounts of events familiar to him. As he saw it, "The writers of the history of the Indian 
wars of Southern Oregon were too ready to find excuses for the outrages committed upon the 
Riddle, 27. 
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Indians. The writer of Walling's history was disposed to be fair, but was often misled into 
making false statements."27 Riddle then disputed in its entirety Walling's account of the 
murder of two unnamed miners on Cow Creek, near the Riddle farm, during the summer of 
1853, when he was thirteen years old. Riddle was adamant that this incident never occurred, 
because "[s]uch an event would have been indelibly impressed upon my mind." Riddle was 
not so kind to Victor and The Early Indian Wars of Oregon. Before a point by point rebuttal, 
he called Victor's account of the war of 1855-56 in the Umpqua Valley "a sample of what 
will pass down to future generations as history."29 Riddle also noted Victor's tendency "to 
excuse the wrongs perpetrated upon the Indians by the whites." 
Waiting's History of Southern Oregon, on the other hand, stands in contrast to 
Victor's historical writing because it is almost completely lacking in racist or racialist 
rhetoric, and because it stands as one of the first local histories to recognize that some whites 
had treated the Indians inappropriately while others did nothing to stop to these activities. 
Walling believed that, 
Concerning the character of the general white population in 1851-6, nothing need be 
said. Men of all ranks in life and all conceivable characters were there. There is no 
occasion to go into raptures over the generosity, magnanimity and bravery of the 
better sort, nor to enter upon a long description of the vices of the worse. Good men 
were there and bad. The same vicious qualities which characterized the ruffian in 
more settled communities marked his career in this, except that circumstances may 
have given him a better chance here to display himself. "A majority of white persons 
came to the country with kind feelings for the Indians and not wishing to injure them; 
but there also came many having opposite sentiments." This sentence sets forth the 
condition of affairs as forcibly as if it were expanded into a volume. A portion were 
ready to do the Indian harm and circumstances never could have been more favorable 
to their malice.... Because these Indians were poor, because they were ignorant, and 
because they were aliens, society frowned on them, justice ignored them, the United 
States government neglected to protect them and they were left a prey to the worst 
Ibid, 51. 
Ibid, 51. 
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passions of the worst of men. To again quote, "Miscreants, regardless of sex or age, 
slaughter poor, weak, defenceless Indians with impunity. There are no means for 
agents to prevent or punish it. There are many well-disposed persons, but they are 
silent through fear or some other cause," etc. These are the words of Joel Palmer, 
superintendent of Indian affairs for Oregon.31 
Walling's History of Southern Oregon laid the foundations for limiting societal 
responsibility for the Rogue River Wars. However, Walling stopped short of laying all the 
responsibility for the atrocities committed against Indians upon the outcasts of settler society, 
the placer miners. That task was taken on in a 1907 article in the Quarterly of the Oregon 
Historical Society by Frederic G. Young, University of Oregon professor and first editor of 
the Quarterly. Rather than dismissing Wool, as had Victor years before, Young rehabilitated 
General Wool. Gone was the superannuated villain with a grudge against the settlers of the 
Pacific Northwest; Wool was just some one who made an honest mistake. In Young's 
narrative, "General Wool and other army officers had meanwhile used with largest effect 
incidents that had taken place in the contact between disreputable miners and the Indians. It 
was easy to assume that these were representative." Young attributed this idea to one of 
Oregon's most notable pioneers, Jesse Applegate. Young obviously felt the need to explain 
"[h]ow the prejudice, of those who took the other side in this controversy, was created." To 
explain this prejudice, Young used 
the statements of so representative an Oregon pioneer as Jesse Applegate. In his 
"Views of Oregon History" he speaks of the ruthlessness with which the Indians were 
sometimes treated, particularly by bands of miners. He holds that it was regularly 
observed that when water for washing the gold bearing gravel became scarce and 
mining unprofitable, the miners would turn to killing Indians as a more lucrative 
employment. The United States had been liberal with compensation for services and 
supplies contributed during the Cayuse War, so the miners, he suggests, were not 
31
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disinclined to provoke the Indians to another contest in expectation of a like liberal 
reimbursement from the national treasury.3 
In contrast to the greed driven exploits of the miners, Young held up the early settlers 
of the Northwest as a shining example of Manifest Destiny. According to Young the settlers 
moved across the continent at an auspicious time, and so were able to influence, if not 
to shape, the course of great events touching the widening of the American Dominion 
on the Pacific. It was all done so quietly, so efficiently, at so comparatively small 
cost and without any shock of harrowing disaster, that the world has yet to connect 
the momentous results with a cause seemingly so inadequate. 
The Manifest Destiny described in early issues of the Quarterly of the Oregon Historical 
Society was racially idealized. In Young's article on the Oregon Trail he described how 
[t]he Oregon migrations effected at one sweep a two-thousand mile extension of the 
Aryan movement westward in the occupation of the north temperate zone - 'a far-
flung' outpost of occupation and settlement. To appreciate the boldness, intrepidity 
and consummate effectiveness of such pioneering we have but to note that no 
previous extension had encompassed one-fourth this distance. Nor were the 
conditions in this instance easy.35 
Of course, the fulfillment of Aryan destiny aroused jealousy from the supposedly inferior 
races being displaced, but this was not the fault of the settlers because this jealousy was 
"inflamed by the insult and outrage of characters of which no community is entirely rid."36 
Young idealized Oregon pioneers throughout his association with the Quarterly. In 
the final issue before his death in early 1929 he wrote that "[t]hose who struck out for Oregon 
were the valiant, the enterprising and the relatively well-to-do in the communities from 
which they hailed. The ordeal of the Oregon migration meant a process of natural selection 
of the fittest for pioneering."37 There are no shortage of such statements in Young's work. 
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Young also published other writers with similar views. The most notable of these other 
writers was Thomas Condon, a senior colleague of Young's at the University of Oregon, who 
had an article in the first Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society. Condon came to 
Oregon as a missionary in 1853, developed a fascination for fossils, became state geologist in 
1872 and, in 1876, became one of the three founding faculty members at the University of 
Oregon. Condon's article in the Quarterly put a Darwinist spin on the Oregon pioneers. 
Condon theorized "that the difficulties in the way of a migration to Oregon - as these 
difficulties were seen by the people of the frontier states - formed a selecting test of the kind 
of people who alone could go to Oregon across the mountains in those days - a real and 
practical natural selection of a new people for a new community."39 Condon's Darwinist 
views obviously influenced Frederic Young. Twenty-eight years after Condon's article 
Young seems to have borrowed Condon's idea without citing him. 
One wonders, however, how many early settlers saw themselves in the same glowing 
light that did Condon and Young. In a letter dated April 15, 1856 an anonymous settler from 
Oregon responded to letters by General Wool published in California papers before Wool's 
letter to the National Intelligencer. This anonymous writer had the pioneers coming to the 
Northwest for more self serving motives than Condon and Young indicated. In a letter 
signed "One of the People," this correspondent claimed that the 
settlers were induced to emigrate to this country by a National bribe, donating to the 
heads of each family, first, six hundred and forty acres of Indian land; second, three 
hundred and twenty-one acres, or to each adult person one hundred and sixty acres. 
This was considered by Congress a sufficient inducement to lure the honest 
husbandman and mechanic from his quiet home in the older States, hazard his own 
life and the lives of his family in a journey across the Plains, subjecting them to every 
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hardship, suffering and privation humanity can endure, for the purpose of 
permanently settling the country and wresting it from British and Indian rule. 
This National bribe had the desired effect. The honest farmer, mechanic, and 
tradesman abandoned their quiet homes and pursuits in the Western States, and after a 
six months journey of unequaled hardships, suffering, privation, loss of property, and 
in thousands of instances the sacrifice of human life, they reached their destined 
donated homes and settled among Indians, the title to whose lands had not been 
extinguished by purchase or treaty. 
The idea that the pioneers should be compensated for coming west was very durable. Over 
four decades after the above letter to the Oregonian it can be found in a message sent to the 
speaker of the House of Representatives some time before late February 1897 by the Grand 
Commander of the Indian War Veterans, Thomas A. Wood. Wood, a Methodist minister, 
was very explicit when he wrote that "[t]he reminder that Oregon was not a present from the 
United States to its settlers, but a present from the settlers to the Union, is offered as an 
argument in support of the value placed upon services of the pioneers."41 Similar arguments 
appeared intermittently throughout the 1890s. Indeed, Wood and six others took their case to 
the President at the behest of the Oregon legislature. No one who was in the habit of 
reading newspapers thoroughly could have been unaware of such sentiments, but in the 
articles Condon and Young wrote on the pioneers there are no suggestions of motivation for 
anything as crass as monetary gain. 
Turning back to the manuscript attributed to Jesse Applegate, the first part is written 
in third person, not in interview transcript format, and the handwriting in the first part differs 
from the letters that follow. These signed letters were apparently written by Jesse Applegate 
to Hubert Bancroft and/or Frances Victor and offer a critique of Victor's first book length 
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historical work, The River of the West (1870). The first striking thing about the letters is 
Applegate's assertion that Oregon history lacks merit as a field of study. Specifically, "It has 
added no new fact to human knowledge - has produced no high illustration of any fact 
already known, has produced no warrior, or scholar in any branch of human knowledge, in 
fact not a single name that for any merit or acts of its possessor deserves to live in the 
memory of mankind." In analyzing the letter, a later commentator emphasized Applegate's 
implicit eagerness to forget in this statement and then tried "to establish connections between 
personality characteristics and life experiences, and those in turn to attitudes toward the 
past." Applegate's conflicted attitude to history was supposedly a product of the deaths of 
Jesse's eldest son, a nephew, and an old family friend in a boating accident on the Columbia 
River near the Dalles just after the Applegate party completed the overland journey from 
Missouri.45 This rather complicated analysis links Jesse's despair over the death of his eldest 
son to his public disdain for the Oregon Pioneer Association. Applegate attached no lofty 
motives to pioneers, not even himself. As Applegate characterized the motives of the 
settlers, "for myself and those of my class I claim no higher motive for coming here than the 
inherent restlessness of our nature, and if we have done any praiseworthy thing it has only 
been incidental to aims purely selfish, and so far from being proud of the years I have been in 
this country, I am ashamed to confess the insufficient motives upon which I acted."46 
But there is the possibility of a more parsimonious explanation for Applegate's 
disdain of the history of the settlement of Oregon. Perhaps a series of potentially troubling 
incidents known as the Modoc War shaped his view of the past. Applegate may have felt 
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some responsibility for the Modoc War, which caused the deaths of many soldiers and 
settlers. Little has been written on how land speculation in the nineteenth century West 
affected relations with the aboriginal inhabitants. However, an article authored by historian 
Robert Johnston on the Modoc uprising of 1872-73, emphasizes land speculation and the 
activities of Jesse D. Carr, an affluent business associate of Applegate's. Johnston argued 
that "the two Jesses - one an Oregonian, the other a Californian - probably did more than all 
other 'settlers,' civilian governmental officials, or the military, to 'cause' that tragic 
conflict." 7 Despite this, historians of the Modoc uprising have tended to ignore Carr and 
downplay Applegate's role. Specifically, the relevant volumes of Bancroft's histories each 
briefly mention Carr once. The appropriate volume of California history relates that "[i]n the 
early part of the summer of 1871, Jesse Applegate settled at Clear Lake upon a tract of land 
owned by J.D. Carr, and lying partly in Oregon and partly in California, which was selected 
as a rancho from the swamp lands of the states, and of which Applegate was agent."49 
Bancroft's second volume of Oregon history added that "[a]mong the settlers in the country 
desired by [Captain] Jack, [the Modoc sub-chief who led his band off the Klamath 
Reservation,] was Oregon's venerable pioneer, Jesse Applegate, residing as agent upon a 
tract claimed by Jesse D. Carr of California, and lying partly in that state and partly in 
Oregon." These two mentions comprise the entire discussion of Carr in the Bancroft 
volumes. Carr was a prominent and highly controversial politician, whose activities in 
Modoc country were completely ignored by later historians until 1977 when his role in the 
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tension leading up to the Modoc uprising was finally acknowledged. ! Further, Johnston 
argues that Applegate played an important role in convincing the Indian Bureau not to grant 
the Modocs the reservation on Lost River, and also diverted attention from Carr's efforts to 
assemble a massive ranch astride the Oregon - California border.52 Johnston also identified 
Carr as a dishonest politician with connections to other dishonest politicians of the Johnson 
administration.53 
In a parallel to the missing description of Governor Curry's dispatch of volunteers 
into Washington Territory, which was discussed in the second chapter of this study, there are 
vague, tantalizing bits in the Bancroft volumes that suggest more information on the 
activities of Applegate and Carr has been somehow misplaced. In discussing the Peace 
Commission appointed to negotiate with the Modoc band led by Keintpoos, or Captain Jack, 
Volume 35 of The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft: California inter pocula states that "[o]n 
the 22d of February their first report was formulated, in which was recited all the alleged 
wrongs of the Modocs, as already known to the reader of my general history, dissatisfaction 
with the Klamath reservation as a place of residence, owing mainly to the domination of the 
Klamaths and ill treatment by the agents." Later in the same volume there is an even more 
tantalizing bit. During a discussion of the Peace Commission it is mentioned more or less in 
passing "[t]hat Applegate would have resigned [the Peace Commission] had not his relatives 
been impugned by the allegations of Captain Jack, into which inquiry was ordered to be 
made, is rendered probable by his separate report made on the 9th of March."55 Applegate's 
Johnston, 1. 
Ibid, 23-32. 
Ibid, 13-28. 
Hubert Howe Bancroft, California Inter Pocula (San Francisco: The History Company, 1888), 517. 
Ibid, 519. 
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report is quoted extensively, and his disdain for the Peace Commission is apparent 
throughout. Applegate characterized "the commission [as] an expensive blunder."56 
These bits of information built an interest in Jack's allegation against the Applegates. 
However, efforts to find further mention of his allegations in any of Bancroft's histories 
proved fruitless. Another Bancroft volume of California history covers the appropriate 
period, but deals primarily with political history, and was published in 1890, so it seems 
unlikely to have been referred to in a volume from 1888. It was checked anyway and no 
mention found of Captain Jack. Of all Bancroft's volumes, the only other that was 
chronologically and geographically appropriate was the second volume of Oregon History, 
written by Frances Victor. The account of the Modoc crisis was more detailed in this Oregon 
volume, because, although most of the bloodiest events of the crisis occurred in California, 
the Modocs were under the authority of the Oregon Superintendency of Indian Affairs. 
Victor's account of the Modoc affair was contains no reference to accusations made by 
Captain Jack against any one. It is uncertain which relatives were referred to. However, two 
of Jesse's nephews, brothers Ivan and Oliver Cromwell Applegate, both employed by the 
Klamath Agency, were also involved in the standoff in the lava beds. 
Victor was already well acquainted with the Applegates before the Modoc War. Both 
Jesse and his nephew Oliver wrote to Victor in early March of 1873 inviting her to come for 
an extended visit and write the history of the Modoc uprising. This was over a month before 
the Modocs killed General Canby and Dr. Thomas of the Peace Commission. However, 
Victor did not receive the letters until after the Commissioners' deaths, and it took a few 
weeks for her to arrange her affairs before departing. Victor spent most of June, July and 
August in the company of the Applegate family and attended the trial of the Modoc leaders 
56
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before ascending to Crater Lake, which resulted in a rock being named after her. Frances 
developed a particular attachment to Oliver, over twenty years her junior, whom she called 
"Dear Bliwas" and her "'plumed' friend." They corresponded for years afterward. Thus it 
is difficult to see Victor as impartial toward any member of the Applegate family, especially 
her good friends Oliver and Jesse, but it must be stressed that there does not appear to be any 
evidence suggesting Victor's complicity with respect to the missing information. 
Jesse Applegate was one of the more colorful and conflicted characters in Oregon 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. At one point Applegate was involved in a 
bitter legal struggle with Benjamin Franklin Dowell, over a political bond they had jointly 
posted for a politician who ended up absconding with state funds. Dowell was forced to pay 
the entire bond and then sued Jesse Applegate for 50%, claiming that Applegate and 
Applegate's children had conspired to hide assets from the state, thus compelling the state to 
collect the entire bond from Dowell. Robert Johnston speculated that it was probably the 
financial distress caused by this affair that led to Jesse. Applegate becoming associated with 
CO 
Carr in the first place. These uncertainties in Jesse Applegate's background certainly call 
into question his impartiality, objectivity and possibly even his honesty. But Frederic Young 
chose to ignore Applegate's questionable reliability and use his theory about the start of the 
war on the Rogue River in what appears to be an effort to reconcile Wool's commentary on 
the war with Young's own tendency to venerate the pioneers. 
Another striking point about Applegate's letter to Bancroft is that he explicitly 
rejected any notion of his own authority on Oregon history. Applegate was very clear that 
"[f]rom 1849 forward I resided in the Umpqua valley and except for a two weeks 
57
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membership of the Convention to form a Constitution of the state took no part in public 
affairs. I am not therefore in any sense an authority to be used in the history of Oregon 
subsequent to that time."59 Immediately after dismissing himself as an authority, Applegate 
presented his theory about placer miners and Indians. Applegate explained that the 
Indian wars were the main historical incidents of this period. These in their bringing 
on, as well as management attach no credit upon the whites. Since 1849 a new 
element, the gold hunters, was added to the population having few if any of the 
virtues of the early pioneers. The prompt assumption of the Cayuse war debt by the 
Government being a precedent, suggested an easier mode of obtaining gold than 
digging it from the bowells of the earth. If new diggings were sometimes difficult to 
find, a new Indian war was easily provoked which served their purposes equally well. 
When the supply of water began to fail in the summer an Indian war was almost 
sure to be inaugurated in Southern Oregon and Northern California.60 
Admittedly, this theory sounds quite logical, but it turns out that Young distorted 
Applegate's statement where it contradicts something Young wrote a year earlier. Applegate 
described the "prompt assumption of the Cayuse war debt by the Government." However, in 
his discussion of Applegate's theory, Young described the Government as "liberal with 
compensation." Prompt assumption of debt and liberal compensation are not the same thing, 
and an article Young published a year earlier makes it clear why he felt the need to change 
the terms. In Part One of his "Financial History of Oregon," which dealt with the Provisional 
Government and the Cayuse War, Young said the final appropriation by Congress to pay 
Cayuse War debts was not made until July 1854. Young also wrote that in March of 1857, 
the deadline for presenting claims was extended. The reason or duration of the extension was 
not specified. Young wrote that "the people of Oregon were fairly well reimbursed for the 
financial losses sustained in the prosecution of the Cayuse War."61 However, in a note 
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Young cites Early Indian Wars of Oregon (1894), in which Frances Victor wrote that one bill 
was then before Congress about a claim for Cayuse War expenses. There is a problem, then, 
with how Young used Applegate's manuscript. The assumption of the Cayuse War claims by 
the Government was not prompt, and Young's own words of "fairly well reimbursed" do not 
seem quite synonymous with his later "liberal reimbursement." 
In addition to his theory about miners, Applegate left a fairly detailed description of 
the start of hostilities in the last of the Rogue River Indian Wars, a description that Frederic 
Young did not mention in his presentation of Applegate's theory. Applegate noted that 
River of the West page 507 tells how the war north of the Columbia was inaugurated 
but does not tell how the Rogue river war of the same time was provoked. 
So frequent had been war in Rogue river valley that the Government had 
established a military post on Rogue river near Table Rock. It was the later part of 
August + 1st Sept [this alternate date is written above the line] - the Elk hunting 
season, a large band of Indians had gone into the mountains on the hunt of the Elk, 
leaving their old men, women, and children encamped close to Fort Lane, under its 
guns it may be said, to protect them from the miners. 
But some 30 or more, ruffians under the lead of a packer, came out of Jacksonville 
in the evening, sent spies to the Indian camp to ascertain its position and state. There 
were no dangerous Indians in it and at daylight next morning visited upon it 
slaughtering indiscriminately male and female, old age and helpless infancy. 
Certainly it was a great victory for the whites some 30 Indians were killed and only 
one white man hurt. But this happened to be the brave commander of the white army 
- a very old Indian who had already been shot used his last simmering strength to 
shoot an arrow, which struck the white leader in a vital place and ended his life, while 
his [four illegible words] upon him. A small boy who escaped from the massacre 
found his way to the hunters in the mountains and told them the whites had killed all 
that were dear to them. 
These infuriated Indians did what of course it was expected of them to do, rushed 
upon the defenceless settlements and committed a long list of savage atrocities. None 
of them exceeding in cold blooded fiendishness the provocation.62 
Applegate's narrative of the commencement of the final conflict in the Rogue River 
Valley raises far more questions that it answers. The first thing that one familiar with this 
incident notices is that Applegate has the date wrong. The attack on the Indian camp 
Applegate, "Views on Oregon History," 51-52. 
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occurred on the early morning of October 8, 1855. Because of the description of the death of 
the leader of the attackers there is no possibility that Applegate is describing another incident. 
It appears that Applegate is playing a shell game here, and leaving out this part of 
Applegate's account suggests that Young knew which shell the pea was under. The man 
killed, with an arrow through his chest, was James A. Lupton. Lupton came to Oregon with 
the US Army as a packer in 1849.63 Outside of that, little reference seems to have been made 
to Lupton before 1855, other than America Butler noting that she fed him supper in 1853.64 
It is unclear what Lupton was doing in the interval between 1849 and 1855. He may have 
been in the packing business, which could be lucrative on the edge of an active mining area, 
such as the Siskiyou mountains to the south of the Rogue River. However, in 1855 Lupton 
was not a ruffian without community connections; he was a member of the Oregon 
Territorial Legislature, representing Jackson County. 
Jesse Applegate said only one white man was hurt, but Victor noted eleven were 
injured, and named six of them. She cited two manuscripts in the Bancroft collection, 
including one of Dowell's, and the October 27 edition of The Oregon Statesman.65 Stephen 
Beckham also cited Dowell and did not name any of the wounded, but stated that "Several 
other volunteers were wounded - many of them by their comrades."66 In The Early Indian 
Wars of Oregon, however, the wounded were Victor's "proof that the Indians were not all 
unarmed."67 
Once again, Applegate's lack of accuracy seems striking, but Young ignored all that 
and constructed a shaky edifice on a shaky foundation. It also looks as though whoever was 
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responsible for organizing the layout of Bancroft's second volume of Oregon history may 
have been playing a little shell game of their own with respect to Representative Lupton. In 
the discussion of the attack on the Indian camp, his death is mentioned briefly, but his 
membership in the Territorial Legislature is not. However, in the subsequent section of the 
same volume that discusses the Legislature of 1855-56, the fact that Lupton's death caused a 
vacancy that needed to be filled is mentioned, but the circumstances of his death are not 
mentioned there.69 As a further complication, albeit perhaps an inadvertent one, he is 
70 
referred to in the text as J.A. Lupton but listed as LA. in the index. But, Lupton's 
membership in the legislature is not the only inconvenience encountered by those who deny 
the community connections of participants in the massacre he led. 
A good place to start an examination of community involvement in the Lupton 
massacre is with George Riddle, a teenager at the time. The Riddles lived close enough to 
the Rogue River to know what was going on but far enough away to avoid direct 
involvement. Riddle's comments on the Lupton massacre are as interesting for what he did 
not say as they are for what he did say. Riddle made no mention of miners and left the strong 
implication of community involvement when he wrote that it 
will seem strange to my readers that forty white men could be so lost to all sense of 
justice and humanity as to engage in a slaughter of helpless old men, squaws and 
children. 
It is not my purpose to analyze public sentiment at the time of which I write. 
There was a feeling of insecurity among the white people of the Rogue river valley 
and a desire that the Indians might be removed and a fear that the Indians might be 
aroused to avenge their own wrongs. There was some outspoken sentiment against 
the outrages committed against the Indians, but when the Indians retaliated within two 
days by a general slaughter of whites, the Indian sympathizers were very unpopular. 
One man was compelled to leave his home. 
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However, Riddle and most other commentators downplay, unintentionally or otherwise, the 
number of attackers. A newspaper account from Yreka, California, not far across the state 
line, reported that there were seven parties of 115 men in total and that Lupton led the largest 
group composed of thirty-six men. Obviously this changes the picture substantially from 
Jesse Applegate's thirty "ruffians," or even George Riddle's forty white men who had "lost 
all sense of justice and humanity." The man whom Riddle referred to above as compelled to 
leave his home was John Beeson of Jacksonville. The picture changes even more when we 
consider Beeson's information. 
John Beeson was born in England in 1803, apprenticed to a confectioner at age ten, 
joined the Methodist Society at age 14, and emigrated to the US with his wife in 1830. After 
a few years in the candy business in New York, the Beeson's moved to Illinois in 1834 to 
farm. An active Methodist all his life, in Illinois Beeson took up the temperance cause, and 
worked with a network smuggling runaway slaves to Canada. In 1853, when John was fifty, 
the urge to move struck again and the Beesons moved to the Rogue River Valley with their 
teenaged son. The Beesons arrived just as the brief conflict of 1853 was ending and paid 
$1500 for a claim of 320 acres near Jacksonville with a little house and three cultivated 
acres. Beeson's description of the scene in the Rogue River Valley when they arrived, 
albeit written seven years later in 1860, is quite interesting. Beeson reported that he 
felt keenly the wrong which was done to the Indians, for gold mines were just 
discovered in various parts of the Valley, and a host of settlers and miners crowded 
in, and every fertile spot was soon occupied, and in the second year dams were 
thrown across the streams and mills erected. The consequence was that the two 
thousand Indians, consisting of several bands who had heretofore occupied the Valley 
which furnished them abundance of spontaneous substance, were now suddenly 
deprived of their homes and means of life. We had gone there by invitation from a 
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Government proclamation which offered free land to settlers; we supposed that 
treaties had been made and the Indians provided for, but to our surprise and horror, 
we found that no regard whatever was had to the Indian's rights, and the assumption 
seemed general that the Indians should be treated as aliens or enemies, and that the 
soil was indisputably ours for possessions. My judgment and conscience protested 
against the assumption as being grossly unjust and wicked; many of my neighbors in 
private conversation avowed the same opinion, but the love of gain and the 
prevalence of low sordid influence prevented their open expression.74 
Beeson made it clear that it was not only the miners who profited by the war, and that support 
for the war came from the upper echelons of settler society. Beeson noted that it was "well 
known that the prospect of great gain had attracted the people to those parts; and as Indian 
wars promised a ready way to obtain it, we may easily see how, in this case, the love of 
money became the root of all evil, and how little effort there would be to avoid that which 
those in high position seemed to sanction."75 Unfortunately Beeson does not clarify which 
persons in high positions he is referring to. 
Of course, Beeson did not spare the miners and made it quite clear that he felt their 
"baser passions" contributed significantly to the tension in the valley. Beeson believed that 
[t]he peculiar nature of the climate, and the employment of the mining companies, 
had also considerable influence in bringing about hostilities. Owing to a scarcity of 
water during several months of the year, the Miners have no work. Their food, 
meanwhile, consists principally of fine bread and beef; and they generally use an 
abundance of tobacco and whisky. Thus the quality of the food, and the poisons, in 
connection with a stimulating atmosphere, excite their baser passions; and, in the 
absence of moral restraint and civil law, they seek indulgence by outrages on the 
persons of defenseless Indians. I forbear the recital of horrors.... It is no palliation to 
say that the females are willing victims; for it is notorious that their fathers and 
brothers are often shot in order to gain forcible possession. We should realize the 
magnitude of this wrong, if we consider what excoration and punishment we inflict 
upon another race for such violations of our own.... 
The consequence of this amalgamation of drunkenness, filth, and vice, became 
manifest in disease, disgust, and mutual hate.76 
Ibid, 7, emphasis in original. 
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From the above it is evident that Beeson's commitment to the Temperance cause made him 
something at odds with his neighbors, and his attitude toward slavery increased the distance. 
As Beeson described the situation, 
There were scores of men, assuming the prerogatives of sovereigns, who could not 
read, and yet made and executed laws, and whose only idea of the Constitution of the 
country is, that it was made to keep down the "Niggers." Of course they understood 
it to have the same bearing upon Indians, and all others except "white male American 
citizens." 
This cruel and fatal error was strengthened, rather than corrected, by the aspirants 
for office; and especially was this the case with the candidates for Representative at 
Washington. Indians were mentioned frequently in their speeches, but always in such 
a manner as to convey the impression that it was meritorious to destroy them; and one 
of the candidates based his claims to the public suffrage on his superior tact or facility 
for securing the public funds as indemnity for Indian wars. 
Beeson's perception of the racist, pro-slavery attitudes of many of his neighbors in the upper 
Rogue River Valley found support from the work of a later historian who followed the 
character of Jackson County society through the Civil War well into the twentieth century 
and convincingly argued that Jackson County was a little pocket of southern sympathy and 
character throughout that time.78 
By the fall of 1855 it appears that John Beeson was probably the only settler in the 
area of Jacksonville who was prepared to speak publicly in support of the fair and just 
Ibid, 23. The election that Beeson referred to here was held in June 1855, before the outbreak of 
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treatment of the aboriginal peoples of the Rogue River Valley. The situation came to a head 
in early October when 
Major L. came into town and addressed the citizens, informing them that it was 
determined to organize several companies and attack the Indians at different points, 
so that none should escape. He also said that the Indians were in great commotion at 
seeing the Settlers driving their cattle and moving their families away from their [the 
Indians'] encampments. "I have been among them," added the Major, "and pacified 
them with the assurance that we were not going to war with them;" and he then coolly 
proposed to massacre them while off their guard.79 
Later the same day Beeson talked to a farmer acquaintance who said he was going to shoot 
Indians. Beeson 
felt impelled to remonstrate against such injustice, and pointed out the probability of 
himself and some of his neighbors falling in such an encounter. I reminded him that 
the Indians were not only more numerous than ourselves, but that they occupied 
vantage ground; that when attacked above, they would naturally run down the Valley 
and kill all before them. I begged him to remember that it is not Indian nature, but 
Human nature, to make a desperate struggle, rather than give up life and home. But 
Mr. Jones mounted his horse and rode away, apparently fixed in his determination for 
slaughter. 
Having no further business in town I returned, twelve miles up the Valley, to my 
home, full of sad reflections. 
Beeson was out of touch with the developing plans for a few days, but Beeson's 
description of events at the Methodist church the following Sunday merits an extensive 
quotation. Beeson reported that he 
did not know what further measures had been taken until Sunday morning, when I 
was informed that a meeting of citizens had been held, that two Methodist Preachers, 
and other leading men, had made speeches, and that the unanimous feeling was in 
favor of the measures which have already been set forth. Monday morning, October 
8th, 1855, was the time agreed on to commence the work. 
As there was a Methodist Quarterly Meeting to assemble that day, within two 
hours' ride of the intended massacre, I hoped there would be heard in that religious 
assembly some expression of brotherly kindness, and charity for the poor doomed 
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outcasts in their immediate vicinity. Full of this hope I attended the meeting; but the 
services progressed with the rehearsal of "Experiences" common on such occasions, 
until speakers became scarce, and the Presiding Elder exhorted all who had anything 
to say for the Lord, to improve the time. 
I arose, and spoke with all the feeling, and all the power I had, in the behalf of the 
poor Indians. I entreated that Assembly, who had gathered themselves together in the 
name of Christ - whose whole life and ministry was a living Gospel of Love - to put 
on the spirit and power of Christ. I begged them, by every principle of humanity and 
justice, to inflict no wrong upon the helpless. I drew in strong colors the scenes that 
would inevitably follow such an attack as was meditated. I thought if there was a 
soul, or a heart in them, I would find it even if it could be reached through nothing but 
their own selfishness. I pictured our burning houses, our murdered wives and 
children, our silent and desolated homes, and all the wrongs that would inevitably 
flow into that crimson torrent they were about to open. In conclusion, I strongly 
urged them, as citizens and Christians, to raise a voice of remonstrance, or to call on 
the Authorities for the administration of justice, and thus avert the impending 
calamity. 
No voice responded to the appeal, and the meeting closed; for no one had 
independence enough to speak his thoughts. But I afterward learned that there were 
members of that assembly who silently acknowledged its force; but the pressure of 
public opinion prevented open expression. I can not resist the conviction that if the 
Presiding Elder, with his brethren of the Ministry, and leading members of the 
Church, had taken a firm, manly, and Christian position, as advocates of the Gospel 
of Peace, the horrors of that week, and of the subsequent war, might have been 
prevented. I am confirmed in this opinion by one who became penitent for the part he 
had taken in those atrocities. He solemnly declared that he was led into it by the 
Preachers. 
It may be that on questions of mere speculation, or of Politics, that Ministers and 
leading religious men may justifiably keep silent; but for such to remain passive in 
the presence of murderous outrage upon dependent helplessness, is a virtual approval, 
which common humanity and common sense must denounce as a monstrous 
inconsistency. The wrong and crime sanctioned and propagated by the silence and 
81 
inaction of that Assembly can never be erased. 
Beeson's account seems quite clear. There were two different meetings at which the plan to 
attack the Indians was discussed. Beeson only attended one of them. He wrote that the 
meeting he attended was a Methodist Quarterly Meeting, and as a life long Methodist he 
would be unlikely to get confused about that. Historians, even recent ones trying to get to 
what happened, seem to have trouble accepting that aspect of Beeson's account. Stephen 
Beckham, who made no mention of Lupton's membership in the Legislature, described how 
Ibid, 47-49. 
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[s]elf-proclaimed "Major" James Lupton, a packer who had come to Oregon with the 
[US Army] Mounted Rifle Regiment in 1849, marched into Jacksonville with the 
Yreka volunteers. These men, still smarting from the rebuffs given them by the 
[Indian] agent and military officers in August, called a public meeting to sound out 
the Oregonians on exterminating the Indians. All looked bright for Lupton's deadly 
plan, and he consequently called a second get-together on October 7 to plan in greater 
detail the strategy for the massacre. 
Ostensibly the meeting was a quarterly church session, and two "elders" presided. 
In actuality, the assembly listened to a lengthy recitation of grievances against the 
Rogues. When the charges were almost exhausted, the chairman called for someone 
to speak on a religious subject. One brave man, firm in his convictions and calm in 
his demeanor, rose to address the audience. John Beeson, an immigrant from Illinois 
who had settled in the valley in 1853, urged all present, as Christians, to desist from 
the course so clearly laid out by the "exterminators." No one seconded Beeson's 
plea. His remarks were greeted with silence and, by some, with contempt.82 
Over two decades after Beckham, E.A. Schwartz wrote that, "The second meeting was held 
on Sunday, October 7, 1855, Beeson said, and was represented as a church meeting." 
However, both Beckham and Schwartz missed Beeson's point. If we look at what a 
historian of Christianity writing after Beckham but before Schwartz had to say about 
Beeson's description of this meeting, Applegate's theory of the responsibility for the war 
takes another serious hit. In his comparison of Beeson's published writings with letters 
written contemporaneously by a Methodist Missionary couple in Seattle, Frederick Norwood 
cited Beeson's description of this meeting in its entirety, as above. In a footnote, Norwood 
directed the reader to "Compare Beckham, Requiem for a People, p. 152. Beckham 
unintentionally garbles this episode through ignorance of Methodist polity and practice." 
So, the meeting described by Beeson as a Methodist Quarterly Meeting was exactly that, and 
it seems unlikely that there were many miners in attendance. 
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Beeson's description of this meeting shows that however much some might like to 
shift the blame to drunken miners, support of exterminationist attacks, whether that support 
was active or tacit, had a much broader base of support than just miners. Further evidence 
for this broadness of support is that when Beeson attempted to publish his letters in two 
religious newspapers, both located outside the Rogue River Valley, the Pacific Christian 
Advocate and the California Christian Advocate, he was turned down because it was feared 
that violence would be directed against the newspapers.85 This strongly suggests that a few 
churchgoers in Jacksonville were not the only settlers in favor of extermination. 
The letters that Frederick Norwood used in his study to compare to Beeson's A Plea 
for the Indians were written by a Methodist missionary couple working in Seattle during the 
Indian wars. These letters support the idea that it was not a big stretch for religious settlers to 
accept the extermination of the Indians as necessary or inevitable. David E. and Kate Blaine 
arrived in Seattle in late 1853 ostensibly to minister to the Indians. Within months the 
Blaines were writing intolerant letters expressing a sense of utter futility in reaching through 
the Indians lack of intellect and hopefully anticipating the Indians' removal from the area.86 
An example of a Methodist minister who advocated extermination is John M. Chivington, the 
leader of the 1864 volunteer attack in Colorado better known as the Sand Creek Massacre.87 
Lest it appear that Methodists are being singled out here, an analysis of letters written from 
the Pacific Northwest during the Indian Wars by missionaries with the American Home 
Missionary Society shows that although these missionaries did not lead or participate in 
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attacks, they were quite willing to stand back and watch the Indians go extinct.88 Thus we 
can see that in the Pacific Northwest during the 1850s being a Christian did not necessarily 
mean tolerance of Indians. A possible explanation can be found in the work of the late 
UCLA Professor Emeritus of Sociology Leo Kuper. In his analysis of how texts sacred to 
Judaism, Islam and Christianity can serve as "warrants" for genocide, Kuper noted that 
"while an ancient sacred text might provide a continuous warrant for the annihilation of 
vilified or demonized groups, the mass killings carried out under its authority are 
intermittent. Only under a particular combination of social forces is the sacred legitimation 
activated." Perhaps this "sacred legitimation" explains some of the silence at the meeting 
described by John Beeson. 
John Beeson's continued relations with the people of Jackson County are enlightening 
because they show that many of those who talked to Beeson about the war made a conscious 
choice to support the war. Beeson reported that 
[d]uring one period of the winter's campaign, the Volunteers were more dreaded by 
the Settlers than the Indians. Property was wantonly destroyed, cattle killed, and 
Jacksonville fired; and while the stores were burning the merchants were robbed. Yet 
those merchants dared not openly complain, partly through fear of private revenge, 
and partly, lest any public exposition relative to the management of the war, might 
jeopardize the profitable contracts in which they were all more or less concerned.90 
After this episode, a group of citizens passed a resolution calling for a public meeting to be 
held in Jacksonville on January 22, 1856 to consider the possibility of ending the war by 
treaty. Because the sole newspaper in Jacksonville supported the war from the beginning, 
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Beeson felt the meeting was not given fair reporting there and began moving around the area 
discussing the war with people, listening to their concerns. Beeson described how he 
visited and conversed with a number of different persons in various parts of the 
Valley, all of whom agreed with me, that the war, so far as the volunteers were 
concerned, was a mere farce, a boys' play, that ought to be stopped; but there were 
two circumstances that made it a difficult thing to bring about. The first of these was 
the pecuniary interests involved. There had not been for a long time any profitable 
objects of industry. Nearly all the labor, and produce, and capital of the country had 
been employed in the prosecution of the war; and to secure indemnity from the public 
treasure, it was necessary to be pretty unanimous in regard to the justness of their 
claims, which would rest directly on the righteousness of the war. Hence, to dispute 
these points at home, would be to jeopardize their interests at Washington; and the 
disputant was sure of the ill-will of those around him, and might reasonably calculate 
on something worse. 
In the next place, a sense of shame and mortified pride, in those who had been so 
long active participants in the campaign, made them wish to retrieve their honor by 
some more successful experiments of bravery and generalship than they had yet 
exhibited. They felt how unfavorably they would appear before the country - after 
spending and losing so much, to be overcome by a few starving savages, whom they 
despised as being less than human.91 
Beeson also made a conscious choice, which was to carry on his own, solitary, brand 
of anti-war activism. Beeson lamented that "although in the succeeding pages of this 
Narrative the first person singular appears in frequent prominence, it is a subject of regret 
rather than egotism."92 Beeson wrote letters to newspapers in New York and San Francisco, 
and unsuccessfully pressured the publisher of the Sentinel, the Jacksonville paper eventually 
bought by B.F. Dowell, to publish his anti-war letters. Some of Beeson's friends began 
avoiding him, and other people often glared at him with hostile looks. Beeson became very 
conscious of his own mortality. Beeson related that he 
knew that law had lost its supremacy, and human life its sacredness; and for weeks I 
never stepped from my door but I realized the probability of being saluted by the 
rifle's crack, and the bullets whiz, from the thick brush that fringed the creek, within a 
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few rods of my house. Indians would have had the credit, or the blame; and my 
name, with my life, would have sunk in oblivion as a stone sinks in the mighty deep.94 
In late May of 1856 Beeson was invited to a public meeting. The men who invited 
him claimed not to know the purpose of the meeting. Beeson readily accompanied them 
anyway. Upon their arrival the chairman of the meeting was reading from a New York 
newspaper an excerpt of a letter that Beeson had written some weeks previously. The 
publisher of the Jacksonville Sentinel was at the meeting with another letter Beeson had 
attempted to mail to a San Francisco paper. Beeson left the meeting after being refused an 
opportunity to speak. He later heard about a resolution declaring that his writings were 
"products of a low depraved intellect, and that it was the duty of every good citizen to stop 
their circulation."95 The next evening a friend sent word that sentiments against him were 
running high in town. Several companies of volunteers had just been discharged, men who 
considered Beeson as a potential obstacle to collecting their wages. Beeson wrote out his 
will, and left his home and his wife behind as he and his twenty-year-old son rode all night to 
get to Fort Lane. At Fort Lane, a Captain Underhill arranged an escort of Dragoons north to 
the Willamette Valley.96 Beeson then said good bye to his son and left his home for what 
turned out to be nearly a decade. 
Like General Wool and Superintendent Palmer, Beeson was also wrong about how 
the war in southern Oregon would be remembered. Beeson wrote that he "need not, and 
therefore shall not; attempt to offer a defense of General Wool. The pure nobleness of his 
character will do much to redeem from utter disgrace that page of our history which is foul 
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with the shame of his traducers." After he self-published A Plea for the Indians, John 
Beeson went on to spend nearly decade in the East actively working to better the situation of 
the North American Indians, during which time he had a number of meetings with President 
Lincoln, before he returned to Oregon in 1865 to spend his remaining years writing letters 
making suggestions for the betterment of Indians. With Beeson effectively expelled from 
Oregon and other sources of dissent quieted due to financial pressure and fear, the desired 
unanimity of opinion within Oregon was apparently achieved, and there were no serious 
impediments to the construction and maintenance of a memory conducive to the collection of 
federal funds for the expenses occurred during the "boys' play" of 1855-56. 
However, there were sometimes serious contradictions apparent in the positions of 
supporters of the war. If we look at what two of the more important supplicants to Congress 
said during the first years of the agitation for payment of the war expenses, we can see they 
were highly contradictory, thus raising further questions of reliability. The first of these 
important supplicants was Joseph Lane, former Territorial Governor of Oregon, and 
eventually 1860 Vice-Presidential candidate for the pro-slavery Democrats. As discussed in 
Chapter One, Lane served under General Wool in Mexico as a Brigadier General of 
Volunteers, but in 1856 Lane was Oregon Territory's Congressional Delegate. Territorial 
Delegates had the right to be heard, but not to vote, and Lane made several speeches on the 
Oregon War Claims. On May 7, 1856 Lane was in particularly eloquent form when he 
responded to General Wool's first letter to the National Intelligencer, which had been read 
into the Congressional record. Lane claimed that he would be "humiliated" if he 
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could believe one word of that letter, or if I believed this house could credit charges 
there made by that gallant old man against the people of Oregon Territory as having 
made war upon the Indians for the sake of plunder! .... Sir, the people of Oregon are 
an honest, industrious people; and to charge that they could be capable of making a 
war against the Indians for the sake of plunder is a slander upon chivalrous, high-
spirited and gallant men who have periled their lives and bared their bosoms to the 
weapons of a skulking and treacherous foe in protecting the defenseless women and 
children who have been forced to fly from their beautiful dwellings, which have, in 
many instances, been fired by the torch of the savage before they were out of the sight 
of their once peaceful homes." 
On May 31,1856 Lane continued in the same vein with another Congressional speech that 
took up slightly more than the entire front page of the Olympia Pioneer and Democrat when 
it was published in that paper. Lane's argument that the people of Oregon were innocent of 
any responsibility for starting the conflict rested on two main points. The first was the 
exemplary character of the citizens of Oregon, whom Lane described as "a peaceable, law-
abiding, orderly people; and they are also a gallant people. They have taken pains ever since 
I became acquainted with the country, to cultivate the most friendly feeling with the Indians. 
They lived in the same valleys and districts of the country with the Indians, and they were 
anxious to do all they could to maintain friendly relations with them."100 We have seen how 
John Beeson and others have described the way that some settlers interacted with the Indians, 
so we know that Lane's description of relations between settlers and Indians was not always 
accurate. It also should be noted that Joseph Lane's personal concept of the fair treatment of 
Indians involved negotiations conducted at gunpoint.1 l 
The main part of Lane's argument to Congress that the accusations against the settlers 
could not possibly be true was that hostilities started nearly simultaneously in southern 
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Oregon and northern Washington. Lane stated that "the Indians commenced the slaughter of 
the white people, from the southern portion of Oregon to the northern extreme of 
Washington, at the very same time, the same week of the same month, the 8th, 9th, and 10th 
days of October."102 This statement by Lane reflects the common belief among the settlers of 
the Pacific Northwest that a vast conspiracy of Indians was working to exterminate the 
settlers. Thomas Dryer and other editorialists wrote of contemporary perceptions of the 
threat. Many people in the region apparently believed in such a conspiracy. Not everyone 
bought into this fear, however. Joel Palmer was a non-believer, as he made perfectly clear in 
a letter to General Wool when he stated that "[t]he reported combination of all these tribes 
with intent to wage a war of extermination against the whites, is, I apprehend, but a phantom 
. . . . . 1 Q ' X 
conjured up in the brains of alarmists, unsupported by one substantial reason." In 
Washington Territory, there was a kinship connection between the Nisqually of Puget Sound 
and the Yakama east of the Cascades.104 Some used this relationship as support for 
arguments of conspiracy, however, no real evidence of any conspiracy has ever come to light. 
Another supplicant to Congress who eloquently argued for the payment of the Pacific 
Northwest war debts was Charles S. Drew. Drew was adjutant of the Jackson County 
Volunteers during the Rogue River War and later became involved in the effort to collect 
money from Congress. Drew's presentation to Congress in 1860 got right to the point at the 
beginning. Drew opened by arguing 
that the rights and interests of the people of Oregon, as connected with the allowance 
of their war debt, now pending before Congress, are seriously endangered because of 
the evil reports that have been placed upon record respecting it, and the origin of the 
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war on account of which it was created, I have thought it proper to present to you at 
this time a circumstantial account of the origin and early prosecution of the war in 
question, for which pay is now claimed and is justly due. °5 
In an attempt to justify the hostilities, and especially their financial result, Drew provided 
Congress with a list of 259 persons, largely Euro-American but with a few Mexican and 
French, killed by Indians from late 1847 to early 1857. Most of these fatalities occurred in 
southern Oregon, but some were in northern California or northern Oregon. In most of these 
cases Drew emphatically denied any provocation, but in a few cases he did admit there had 
been provocation.106 
The main point of Drew's argument was that the settlers of the Rogue River Valley 
had no responsibility whatsoever for the war. According to Drew, from "the close of war 
with those Indians in 1853, to the open declaration of war by the same Indians in October, 
1855, the people of the Rogue River valley did not molest or interfere with them in any 
manner whatever, but left their management and all dealings with them wholly and 
exclusively to the military and the Indian department."107 In Drew's scenario, the regular 
army troops were so incompetent that they needed to be protected by the volunteers. As he 
described it, the federal "troops and the Indian agent had lost all control, little as they ever 
had, over the Indians, and the service of the volunteers was absolutely necessary, not only to 
save the settlements of the Upper Rogue River valley from certain destruction, but also for 
the safety of the regular troops themselves." Drew claimed that the idea that the Indian 
attack upon settlers on October 9 had been triggered by Lupton's October 8 attack upon the 
Indians was nothing more than politically motivated maliciousness. As Drew described it, 
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the report, however, that this massacre [on October 9 of settlers at Evans Ferry on the 
Illinois River] was a "retaliatory act" - the result of the affair with the Butte Creek 
Indians on the 8th - 1 have to say, that in truth it has no foundation whatever; that it 
originated with a clique of politicians, who had for their object the injury of a few 
men whom they could not control in political matters, and for this reason sought to 
render them odious to the community in which they lived, by charging them with 
being the instigators of the various murders which the Indians had from time to time 
committed.109 
Drew seems here to have been playing a shell game of his own. Without any explanation he 
inverted the order in his narrative of the Lupton massacre and its most immediate result, the 
deaths of about 15 settlers, including the Jones family, in the Evans Ferry area on October 
9.110 Drew devoted 5 pages to the events of October 9, before using slightly over one page to 
describe Lupton's attack of October 8. Most of Drew's description of the Lupton attack is of 
highly questionable accuracy. For example, Drew's explanation for the non-combatant 
casualties seems contrived. As Drew described it the 
attack was commenced while it was yet too dark to distinguish one Indian from 
another, and by this reason it so happened that several squaws and children were 
killed. None were killed after it became light enough to distinguish the sexes. I 
mention this fact because the action of the volunteers on this occasion has been 
grossly misrepresented. They are accused of having attacked a "few squaws and 
decrepit old men," and murdered them with more than savage cruelty. Such, 
however, is not the fact. If no other testimony could be obtained to refute the 
accusation, the loss on the part of the volunteers would be good evidence that there 
were other than cripples, squaws and children in the fight on the other side. Two of 
the whites, Lupton and Shepard, were wounded, mortally, and some seven others 
more or less severely. It is true, as has been said, that the bodies of but few warriors 
were found on the ground after the action was over. But this was owing to the fact 
that the Indians observed their usual custom in such cases and carried off their 
warriors as fast as they became disabled or killed.111 
What Drew did not offer an explanation for was how the Indians could see well enough to 
leave the dead or dying women and children behind if the volunteers could not see well 
enough to determine that their victims were women and children. 
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This is perhaps a suitable point to repeat the statement by E.A. Schwartz that "[a]ny 
statement by Drew on any subject should be viewed with suspicion."112 With regard to 
Drew's account of the origin of the war, this is something of an understatement. If we 
compare Drew's description of incidents just before the Lupton attack with that of Agent 
Ambrose we can see that some one is lying. According to Drew the Indians in question 
refused to return to the reserve when requested to do so by Ambrose. Drew reported that 
Agent Ambrose, taking with him Mr. Lupton, who was well and favorably known to 
these Indians, made his last effort to induce them to return to the reserve on Sunday, 
October 7th. Their reply to him was that they would not return; that they had decided 
on war, and were now prepared for it; that they could easily kill all the "Boston men," 
(meaning citizens,) because they were all cowards and would not fight.11 
However, in his report of the attack on the Indian camp to Superintendent Palmer, Ambrose 
did not mention any visit to the Indian camp on October 7. Instead Ambrose said that, 
I had apprehended danger [to the Indians from settlers], and had so informed the 
Indians several days previous, and Captain Smith [Commanding, Fort Lane] had 
notified the Indians that if they wanted protection they had to come on to the reserves 
or to Fort Lane. It seems, from their statements, that they had concluded to go on the 
reserve, and had accordingly started on Sunday evening [October 7], leaving the old 
men and women to follow on Monday. In the meantime this attack was made, quite 
early in the morning, which resulted as above stated [in twenty-three dead bodies]. 
There were found killed [by Ambrose and Captain Smith] eight men, four of whom 
were very aged, and fifteen women and children, all belonging to Jake's band. The 
attack was so early in the morning, it is more than probable that the women were 
indistinguishable from the men.114 
In contrast to Ambrose's statement that most of the warriors in the group left camp 
before the attack and Drew's assertion that the Indians in question refused a request to return 
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to the reserve, Lane had the slaughtered Indians seeking refuge on the reserve. According to 
Lane, 
It was only when all the outrages enumerated were committed that Major Lupton 
raised his company. He tracked the Indians, and found in their possession property 
taken from those whose bodies had been found mutilated on the mountains; it was 
proof positive that they were the murderers. They had tried to get to the reserve, but 
did not succeed before the Major overtook and attacked them. He himself was killed, 
and also some fifteen or twenty of the Indians, among them some squaws. 
General Wool has charged that this battle was the origin and cause of all the 
subsequent hostilities. The squaws that Major Lupton killed were escorted by the 
warriors who killed the men and boy upon the mountains from which place he tracked 
them to Bute Creek, where he attacked them.115 
In this, his first Congressional speech after General Wool's letter to the National 
Intelligencer was read into the record, Joseph Lane described Lupton as raising his own 
company after outrages were committed by Indians, but in his narrative Drew asserted that, 
This is the affair in which Lupton has been represented as the leader. But it is due to 
truth, as well as to the volunteers who served on that occasion, to say that he had no 
lot or part in it except in the way that I have indicated. He was not even a private of 
the volunteer corps, had nothing whatever to do with its organization, nor had he the 
control of a single individual belonging to it.116 
With such questionable evidence these early proponents of the settler-friendly 
memory apparently preferred to avoid a direct encounter with General Wool's account if 
possible. Using tactics quite similar to Frances Victor's historical disempowerment of 
General Wool, Lane did his best to have Wool's input rejected by Congress. After reciting 
graphic descriptions of dead settler women and children, and then noting that Wool had 
refused volunteer requests for arms and ammunition, Lane asked, "Now, sir, shall this man 
be quoted here against the people of Oregon Territory? Shall his evidence be used in 
condemnation of the people of that Territory, who volunteered to save the women and 
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children of the settlements from massacre? Shall such an argument be produced here against 
the appropriation now asked for? I hope not."117 
One of the analytical problems that come to mind when examining the accounts of the 
conflict in southern Oregon is the distance between Beeson's account and those of supporters 
of the war such as Lane and Drew. Agent Ambrose's month-end report to Superintendent 
Palmer for September 1855 goes a significant distance toward explaining how such a wide 
gap could develop between the perceptions of supporters and opponents of the war. Ambrose 
wrote that 
[t]he month has been passed in one continued series of aggressions; although, taken 
singly, each item in itself appears small, but in the aggregate the sum total presents a 
formidable appearance. It would seem as though they had studied how far they can 
go with impunity, and seemingly have endeavored to go no farther. I think nearly or 
quite all of the mischief that has been done was perpetrated by a few Shastas and 
Scotans. The settlers' patience has become exhausted; they are quite irritable and will 
not bear the least offence from an Indian any longer; petitions are handed me weekly, 
and in some instances, I may say, almost daily. One day a theft has been committed 
in one portion of the valley, in a few days another and different part of the valley. 
The thefts are quite small as a general thing, not amounting to more than four or five 
dollars; in some instances, a gun; another, some powder or lead, or both; again, a 
miner's cabin will be broken open, and his little stock of provisions taken.... After a 
repetition of the thefts a few times, and the individual, after a hard day's work, has 
had to walk two or three miles to get his supper and lay in another small lot of 
provisions, which in a few days may probably go in the same way, he gets peevish 
and angry and embittered against the Indian race, and would about as soon shoot an 
118 
Indian as eat his supper. 
If we accept Ambrose's description of circumstances in the Rogue River Valley during the 
few weeks before the final outbreak of hostilities there, and it must be noted here that there is 
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evidence suggesting that perhaps Ambrose harbored exterminationist sympathies himself,119 
then we cannot help but conclude that a significant number of citizens were simply irate over 
being inconvenienced by starving Indians. Indians were prohibited by Territorial legislation 
from purchasing ammunition, so they had difficulty hunting unless they acquired ammunition 
by other means.120 It appears that the inconvenience created by starving Indians might have 
been enough to trigger Kuper's "sacred legitimation" of genocide And it certainly appears 
that the number of settlers with such sentiments was significant enough that those not sharing 
those views tended to keep their mouths shut in order to avoid joining John Beeson on the 
road out of town. 
However, the idea that the Rogue River Indian War was started by undesirables who 
had little if any connection to the settler community in Jackson County is still with us. It can 
come up explicitly, as in Steven Novak's socio-economic analysis, in which he attempted to 
determine how many names from the list of volunteers supplied by Frances Victor in The 
Early Indian Wars of Oregon could be found, still in Oregon, on the 1860 census.121 In spite 
of the fact that Novak noted that "it is hazardous to interpret negative data,"122 he went on to 
do exactly that because, in spite of significant flexibility about the spelling of names, he was 
unable to locate over 57% of the names supplied by Victor in the 1860 census records.123 
Novak also distorted John Beeson's account of public opinion when he argued that "John 
Beeson himself distinguished between unemployed miners who provoked the war and others 
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who responded out of patriotic motives."1 As we have seen above, Beeson attributed profit 
motives to many of his neighbors.12 Novak cited another passage from Beeson about 
unemployed miners being joined by settler men who were afraid of being considered 
unpatriotic, but he did not mention Beeson's next sentence about the settlers bringing mules 
and ponies normally valued at $30 or $40 to be sold for $100 to $350.126 Novak provided 
convincing evidence that Euro-American society in Jackson County during the 1850s was 
divided into two segments, one more transient that the other, but he did not address the 
profiteering by the less transient, settler population and ignored Beeson's testimony on this 
issue. One useful thing Novak accomplished, however, is to show that Applegate's miner 
hypothesis may not have been original, at least it appeared in written form a number of times 
1 97 
before Applegate's letter to Bancroft. 
More often, however, the miner hypothesis is implicit in historical writing, seemingly 
lurking just out of sight in hidden assumptions. Beckham, Schwartz and Douthit have all 
19R 
inaccurately summarized Beeson's account of the Methodist Quarterly Meeting. Douthit 
represented the account of the Quarterly Meeting the most accurately, and simply got the date 
wrong by one day, placing it on Monday, October 8.129 Beeson's full account of his 
experiences on Sunday October 7 makes it plain that Beeson did not go to the planning 
session, and that the meeting he attended on October 7 was a legitimate Methodist Quarterly 
Meeting where he took the opportunity to preach to those in the Congregation who did attend 
Lupton's organizational meeting. Beeson does not specify when the organizational meeting 
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was held, but simply leaves the impression that it was before Sunday. These inaccurate 
representations by later historians are most likely the result of that vagueness and of 
difficulty believing that such things could occur at a legitimate Methodist Quarterly Meeting. 
But if one reads Beeson's testimony carefully, without such preconceptions, that testimony 
shows very clearly that such a thing could and did happen. Upright, churchgoing citizens 
participated in the Lupton Massacre, and no amount of wishful thinking on the part of Jesse 
Applegate, Frederic Young, Steven Novak or anybody else is going to change that. 
There was strong and clear support within influential elements of settler society for a 
war of extermination against the Indians of southern Oregon. Such support is clearly 
demonstrated in the incitement of Thomas Dryer and others. The settlers' reaction to the 
behavior of Indians starving as a result of the subsistence crisis induced by the incursion of 
miners and settlers was clearly described by various employees of the Indian Bureau. Also, 
from John Beeson, George Riddle, Mrs. Butler and others, there are descriptions of 
exterminationist rhetoric that show such talk was not spread only by newspaper editors. 
Although Beeson's evidence of the widespread nature of profit-seeking during the war is 
unique, it is compelling, and the long-term nature of efforts to extract money from Congress 
support the accuracy of accusations of profiteering by Beeson, Wool and Palmer. Further, 
there was a time when the idea of Oregon having had its own war of extermination was 
accepted by at least some of the elites of Oregon. The authors of the first textbook written 
specifically to teach Oregon history, including the Head of the Department of History at the 
University of Oregon, had no trouble characterizing the events of 1855-56 as a war of 
extermination. This state education department approved text used a bolded heading to 
describe the operation that Lupton led as a massacre before describing the ensuing war as a 
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war of extermination. For quite some years after its publication the children of the Pacific 
Northwest learned about, 
The massacre at Butte Creek. Early on the morning of October 8, 1855, a company 
of volunteers, without military orders, went to the Indian village on Butte Creek and 
began firing into the cabins. They killed twenty-three and wounded many others. 
When the [regular army] troops [from Fort Lane] went to investigate, they found that 
the settlers had killed many Indian women, children, and old men. Next day the war 
began in earnest. The Indians appeared everywhere, they killed settlers and drove off 
or slaughtered the white men's cattle. 
The settlers and soldiers took up the trail, and the conflict became a war of 
extermination.131 
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Conclusion 
The foregoing examination of the historical memory of the Indian wars of the Pacific 
Northwest, as constructed over the succeeding decades, suggests that this memory was 
fundamentally flawed and basically dishonest. The few audible voices of dissent at the time 
were marginalized and excluded from the developing historical memory by character 
defamation, slander and exile. This historical memory was then further padded by distorted 
and one-sided evidence from participants. The prime motivation for this distortion of the 
historical memory was evidently financial, just as the dissenters claimed in the first place. As 
a result the historical writing on the conflict produced in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries seems to be so flawed as to be completely unreliable. Some writers had 
agendas of their own, others appear to have been assisting associates, and some tried to be 
accurate but were misled. All in all, the voices of denial completely drowned out the voices 
of the few brave enough to speak out. 
Later writers, most often intent upon valorizing pioneers, have uncritically tended to 
be rather easily taken in and very accepting of the memory constructed in the quest for 
federal funds. More recently, a few academic historians have accurately characterized the 
Indian wars as built on a foundation of greed, and kept in the shadow by a curtain of 
deception, but have stopped short for one reason or another of dealing head on with the level 
of popular support for exterminating the Indians of the Pacific Northwest. Only recently has 
it been admitted that it was more than just miners who were seeking to profit by killing 
Indians. The long term denial about the economic motivation behind the wars that has 
reigned supreme for so long needs still more exposure before it can be finally put to rest. 
The fact that, even at the time of the Rogue River war, both supporters and opponents 
of the war against the Indians explicitly described the war as a war of extermination supports 
a conclusion that what happened in southern Oregon can and should be described as racially 
motivated, small-scale societal genocide. From the evidence it also appears that support for, 
and acquiescence in the genocidal acts, though certainly not universal, was significant 
enough that only one resident of Jackson County had the courage to speak out publicly 
against what he saw happening around him. 
The sources used in this study cannot allow us to gauge public opinion very 
accurately. However, the sources clearly show that public support for the extermination of 
the Indians in the Rogue River Valley was far more significant than the literature on the 
history of Oregon suggests. At the most general level, this study has demonstrated that the 
entire history of the Indian wars of the Pacific Northwest needs to be re-examined. More 
specifically, it would be valuable to re-examine the significant number of relevant 
unpublished primary sources from the period with a view to determining the extent of public 
support for exterminating the Indians of the Pacific Northwest and also to determining the 
foundation of that support, whether it be fear, racial animosity, greed or a combination of 
motives. Many settlers' journals and letters have been preserved and might be potentially 
useful sources for determining not only the level of support for the extermination of the 
Indians of the Pacific Northwest, but also quite possibly might give some indication of the 
extent that profit motivation played in the wars. The substantial number of pioneers' journals 
and letters preserved in the Pacific Northwest could very well serve to make the region 
important for studying the genocidal tendencies of settler colonialism, which is some fresh 
ground that scholars of genocide have just recently started to examine. 
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